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Author SHA1 Message Date
Ashwin BhatandGitHub 6e2bd52842 fix: pin bun runtime config and improve log hygiene (#1174)
* fix: pin bun runtime config and improve log hygiene

* snapshot all SENSITIVE_PATHS to .claude-pr/, not just .claude/
2026-04-05 07:42:02 -07:00
Ashwin BhatandGitHub 3534c326a5 chore: fix prettier formatting in parse-sdk-options.test.ts (#1176) 2026-04-04 23:10:12 -07:00
Ashwin BhatandGitHub 6685b26dfb chore: fix prettier formatting (#1171) 2026-04-04 20:56:18 -07:00
5150ea9643 fix: snapshot PR's .claude/ to .claude-pr/ before security restore (#1172)
When a PR modifies files under .claude/, the security restore in
restoreConfigFromBase() overwrites them with the base branch version —
correct for execution safety, but it means review agents never see what
the PR actually changes.

Before deleting the PR-controlled .claude/ tree, copy it to .claude-pr/.
Review agents can read .claude-pr/ to inspect the PR's hooks, MCP
configs, settings, and CLAUDE.md without those files ever being executed.
The snapshot is taken before the security delete so it captures the full
PR-authored version.

Fixes #1134.

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]>
2026-04-04 20:47:27 -07:00
eb8baa46af fix: strip shell comment lines before parsing claude_args (#1055)
shell-quote treats # as a shell comment character, swallowing all
subsequent content including flags on new lines. Strip comment lines
(lines starting with #) before passing input to shell-quote.

Fixes #802

Co-authored-by: VoidChecksum <Admin@CyberNord>
2026-04-04 20:26:13 -07:00
f328a5c889 fix: prevent hang in restoreConfigFromBase on repos with .gitmodules (#1166)
When a PR head contains `.gitmodules`, git's default
`fetch.recurseSubmodules=on-demand` config causes `git fetch` to attempt
submodule object fetches. In CI (no credentials), this blocks indefinitely
waiting for auth — producing ~4-hour hangs reported in #1088.

Two changes, both defence-in-depth:

1. Delete SENSITIVE_PATHS *before* fetching. The attacker-controlled
   `.gitmodules` is absent during the network operation, so git never
   sees a submodule config to follow regardless of git settings.

2. Pass `--no-recurse-submodules` to the fetch. Suppresses submodule
   fetching explicitly, independent of any git config on the runner.

The original order (fetch-then-delete) was a brief window where
`.gitmodules` from the PR head could influence the fetch. Reordering
also tightens the security property: if `git checkout` below fails, the
attacker-controlled file is already gone rather than present during fetch.

Fixes #1088.

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]>
2026-04-04 20:21:28 -07:00
b15d4751a6 fix: allow # in branch names for PR checkout and base restore (#1167)
`validateBranchName` used a strict whitelist that excluded `#`,
causing the action to fail on PRs from branches like `put-back-arm64-#2`
with "Invalid branch name" — even though the branch already exists in
git and `#` is permitted by git-check-ref-format.

The validation was designed to prevent command injection. However, every
git call in the action uses `execFileSync`, which bypasses the shell
entirely and passes arguments directly to the kernel's execve. There is
no shell to interpret `#` as a metacharacter, so the strict whitelist was
over-blocking valid names with no security benefit.

Add `#` to the whitelist pattern, and update the JSDoc and error message
to reflect the allowed character set.

Fixes #1137.

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]>
2026-04-04 20:17:46 -07:00
d5db8208f9 fix: restore ripgrep execute bits after bun install --production (#1163)
bun install --production strips execute bits from vendored binaries
(bun bug). The Claude Agent SDK ships rg binaries in:

  node_modules/@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk/vendor/ripgrep/
    {x64,arm64}-{linux,darwin}/rg
    {x64,arm64}-win32/rg.exe

After bun --production, all of these lose +x, causing EACCES when the
SDK tries to spawn ripgrep. The fix is a targeted find(1) that restores
+x on the rg binaries immediately after bun install.

Design notes:
- -type f excludes symlinks (symlink attack safety, no || true needed)
- -name "rg" naturally excludes rg.exe on Windows (find returns nothing,
  chmod never called — safe and correct on all platforms)
- .node audio-capture files use dlopen, not exec — no +x needed there
- Fails loudly if the binary path is missing (no || true) so a SDK
  packaging change is immediately visible rather than silently broken

Fixes #1140

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <[email protected]>
2026-04-04 20:15:31 -07:00
d8af4e9f01 fix: skip retries for non-retryable errors in retryWithBackoff (#1082)
Add shouldRetry predicate to RetryOptions so callers can abort retries
for errors that will never succeed (e.g. 401 WorkflowValidationSkipError).

Previously, retryWithBackoff retried all errors blindly, wasting ~35s on
deterministic failures like workflow validation 401s.

Fixes #1081

Co-authored-by: Claude <[email protected]>
2026-04-04 20:14:47 -07:00
chyipinandGitHub f37c786ad3 Strip OIDC token request env vars from Claude session (#1011)
When id-token: write permission is enabled, ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL
and ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN are passed to the Claude session via
the process.env spread in parseSdkOptions(). This allows Claude to mint
new OIDC tokens, which is an unintended capability.

This commit deletes these two variables from the env object before passing
it to the Claude SDK. The OIDC flow in token.ts reads directly from
process.env and runs before parseSdkOptions(), so it is unaffected.

Fixes #1010
2026-04-04 20:13:05 -07:00
21b0f0f9aa fix: use correct fallback type for reviewData in fetcher (#1034)
The reviewData variable is typed as `{ nodes: GitHubReview[] } | null`,
but the fallback value was `[]` (a plain array). When
`pullRequest.reviews` is null/undefined, `reviewData` becomes `[]`,
causing `reviewData.nodes` to return `undefined` instead of `[]`.

This leads to silent failures in downstream code that iterates over
`reviewData.nodes`, such as `filterReviewsToTriggerTime` and
`filterCommentsByActor`.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
2026-04-04 20:12:05 -07:00
Mario Yuri Mota LaraandGitHub 27f549ae64 docs: document include/exclude_comments_by_actor inputs (#1130)
* docs: document include_comments_by_actor and exclude_comments_by_actor inputs

These inputs were added in #812 but never documented in usage.md or
security.md. This adds them to the inputs table in usage.md and
references comment filtering as a prompt injection mitigation in
security.md.

Fixes #972

* docs: clarify wildcard support is limited to *[bot] pattern

Address review feedback: "Supports wildcards" was misleading since
only the *[bot] pattern is supported, not general glob matching.
2026-04-04 20:10:29 -07:00
David DworkenandGitHub 263993d836 Use env vars for workflow_run context values in example workflows (#1125)
* Use env vars for workflow_run context values in example workflows

* Add security note to ci-failure-auto-fix example about trust requirements
2026-04-04 20:10:11 -07:00
85133eeab2 fix: skip token revocation when no token was acquired (#918)
Add a check for non-empty github_token output before attempting to
revoke the app token in the cleanup step. When the prepare phase fails
(e.g., unsupported event type with track_progress), no token is
acquired, causing the cleanup curl to send an empty Bearer token
and produce a confusing "Bad credentials" 401 error.

Fixes #858

Co-authored-by: Dave-London <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
2026-04-04 20:09:21 -07:00
GitHub Actions 1eddb334cf chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.92 and Agent SDK to 0.2.92 2026-04-04 00:45:34 +00:00
GitHub Actions 0432df8bfe chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.91 and Agent SDK to 0.2.91 2026-04-03 00:19:01 +00:00
Octavian GuzuandGitHub ba026a3e56 Pass env to execFileSync git calls (#1151)
Bun's execFileSync without an explicit env option spawns with the process
startup environment, dropping runtime process.env mutations. The credential
helper reads GH_TOKEN which is set at runtime, so git fetch in the
restore-config path failed with empty password.

Fixes #1139

🏠 Remote-Dev: homespace
2026-04-02 21:52:02 +01:00
Octavian GuzuandGitHub c95e735eb1 Fix subprocess isolation install step never running (#1148)
env context isn't available in composite-action if: conditions.
Move opt-out check into run: body.

🏠 Remote-Dev: homespace
2026-04-02 14:05:08 +01:00
GitHub Actions 58dbe8ed68 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.90 and Agent SDK to 0.2.90 2026-04-01 23:57:02 +00:00
Ashwin BhatandGitHub c281e17d7f fix: fall back to repo default_branch instead of hardcoded "main" (#1143)
* fix: fall back to repo default_branch instead of hardcoded "main"

When no explicit base_branch input is provided, the action previously
fell back to a hardcoded "main", which fails on repositories whose
default branch is named differently (e.g. "master", "develop").

This reads repository.default_branch from the GitHub event payload
(populated once in parseGitHubContext) and uses it as the fallback in
all three callsites: agent/index.ts, run.ts, and update-comment-link.ts.
Explicit env/input precedence is preserved; "main" remains only as a
last-resort defensive fallback if the payload somehow lacks the field.

* test: drop unused BASE_BRANCH env handling from default_branch test

agent/index.ts no longer reads process.env.BASE_BRANCH directly (it now
goes through context.inputs.baseBranch which is set on the mock context),
so saving/clearing/restoring that env var in the regression test is dead
code.
2026-04-01 14:48:46 -07:00
Ashwin BhatandGitHub 408a40e7c2 Pin Claude Code to 2.1.87 (#1142)
* Revert "chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.89 and Agent SDK to 0.2.89"

This reverts commit bee87b3258.

* Revert "chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.88 and Agent SDK to 0.2.88"

This reverts commit 7225f045c6.
2026-04-01 11:29:30 -07:00
GitHub Actions bee87b3258 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.89 and Agent SDK to 0.2.89 2026-04-01 01:13:44 +00:00
Octavian GuzuandGitHub 32156b120b Add subprocess isolation setup and git credential helper (#1132)
- Add optional bubblewrap setup step for Linux subprocess isolation
  when allowed_non_write_users is configured
- Use git credential helper instead of embedding token in remote URL
- edit-issue-labels.sh: read issue number from workflow event payload
  instead of CLI arg
- Add CLAUDE_CODE_SCRIPT_CAPS env for per-script call limit config
- docs/security.md: note recommended github_token configuration

🏠 Remote-Dev: homespace
2026-03-31 12:36:51 +01:00
GitHub Actions 7225f045c6 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.88 and Agent SDK to 0.2.88 2026-03-31 00:35:26 +00:00
GitHub Actions 88c168b39e chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.87 and Agent SDK to 0.2.87 2026-03-29 02:29:10 +00:00
GitHub Actions e7b588b6ea chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.86 and Agent SDK to 0.2.86 2026-03-27 21:50:59 +00:00
GitHub Actions 094bd24d57 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.85 and Agent SDK to 0.2.85 2026-03-26 22:51:40 +00:00
GitHub Actions 3ac52d0da9 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.84 and Agent SDK to 0.2.84 2026-03-26 00:37:42 +00:00
GitHub Actions 0ee1beea58 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.83 and Agent SDK to 0.2.83 2026-03-25 06:35:03 +00:00
Octavian GuzuandGitHub ff9acae588 Auto-set subprocess env scrub when allowed_non_write_users is configured (#1093)
* Auto-set CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB when allowed_non_write_users is configured

Sets the env var automatically whenever allowed_non_write_users is
non-empty, so downstream workflows don't need to add it manually.
Updates the input description and docs/security.md to note the behavior.

🏠 Remote-Dev: homespace

* Fall back to inherited env when allowed_non_write_users is unset

🏠 Remote-Dev: homespace

* Let workflow/job env override the auto-set scrub flag

Env var takes priority so users can opt in/out via CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB
at job or workflow level independently of allowed_non_write_users.

🏠 Remote-Dev: homespace
2026-03-23 12:10:02 +00:00
GitHub Actions 6062f37096 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.81 and Agent SDK to 0.2.81 2026-03-20 22:30:13 +00:00
GitHub Actions df37d2f076 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.79 and Agent SDK to 0.2.79 2026-03-18 22:39:18 +00:00
David DworkenandGitHub 1ba15be4f0 Remove redundant git status/diff/log from tag mode allowlist (#1075) 2026-03-18 09:06:33 -07:00
kashyap muraliandGitHub 9ddce40de8 Restore .claude/ and .mcp.json from PR base branch before CLI runs (#1066)
* Restore .claude/ and .mcp.json from PR base branch before CLI runs

The CLI's non-interactive mode trusts cwd: it reads .mcp.json and
.claude/settings{,.local}.json from the working directory and acts on
them before any tool-permission gating — executing hooks, setting env
vars (NODE_OPTIONS, LD_PRELOAD), running apiKeyHelper shell commands,
and auto-approving MCP servers. When this action checks out a PR head,
these files are attacker-controlled.

Rather than enumerate dangerous keys, replace the entire .claude/ tree
and .mcp.json with the versions from the PR base branch (which a
maintainer has reviewed). Paths absent on base are deleted. Uses local
git state, so no TOCTOU against the GitHub API.

* Read PR base ref from payload for config restore in agent mode

Agent mode's branchInfo.baseBranch defaults to "main" (or env/input
override) instead of the PR's actual target branch — it doesn't query
prData.baseRefName like tag mode does. This meant a PR targeting
develop would get .claude/ restored from main.

Fix by reading pull_request.base.ref directly from the webhook payload
for pull_request, pull_request_review, and pull_request_review_comment
events. For issue_comment on a PR (no base.ref in payload), fall back
to the mode-provided value — tag mode's value is correct (from GraphQL);
agent mode on issue_comment is an edge case that at worst restores from
the wrong trusted branch, which is still secure.

The payload value passes through validateBranchName for defense-in-depth
(GitHub enforces valid branch names server-side, but we validate anyway).

* Extend restored paths to .gitmodules, .ripgreprc, .claude.json

.gitmodules defines submodule URLs and paths; path-confusion attacks
against git submodule operations can write into .git/hooks. .ripgreprc
can set --pre (arbitrary command on each file) if RIPGREP_CONFIG_PATH
points at it. .claude.json is cheap defense-in-depth.

Documented why .git/ is excluded (not trackable in commits, and
restoring it would undo the PR checkout), along with .gitconfig
(git never reads it from cwd) and shell rc files (sourced from $HOME,
not cwd — checkout cannot reach $HOME).
2026-03-18 12:00:18 -04:00
GitHub Actions 1b422b3517 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.78 and Agent SDK to 0.2.77 2026-03-17 23:47:59 +00:00
GitHub Actions 4c044bb2f5 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.77 and Agent SDK to 0.2.77 2026-03-17 00:33:47 +00:00
GitHub Actions cd77b50d2b chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.76 and Agent SDK to 0.2.76 2026-03-14 01:29:31 +00:00
GitHub Actions 0e80d3c5b8 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.75 and Agent SDK to 0.2.75 2026-03-13 17:07:33 +00:00
kashyap muraliandGitHub f956510b1a Harden tag mode tool permissions against prompt injection (#1002)
Two defenses for tag mode where an attacker with repo write access could
craft a prompt injection payload in an issue/PR to gain RCE on the
Actions runner:

1. git-push wrapper (H1 #3556799)
   The Bash(git\ push:*) rule permitted arbitrary flags and remotes,
   including combinations that execute shell commands locally. Replaced
   with scripts/git-push.sh which allowlists exactly 'origin <ref>' with
   no flags, validates the ref via check-ref-format. Same pattern as
   scripts/gh.sh.

2. acceptEdits instead of blanket Write/Edit (Asana 1213310082312048)
   Edit/MultiEdit/Write in allowedTools granted write access to the
   whole runner filesystem (~/.bashrc etc). Removed from allowedTools
   and set --permission-mode acceptEdits, which auto-accepts edits
   inside cwd ($GITHUB_WORKSPACE) and denies outside. Headless SDK has
   no prompt handler so 'ask' becomes deny.

Also:
- Noted that create-prompt/index.ts exports ALLOWED_TOOLS env var that
  nothing reads. The live path is modes/tag/index.ts. Mirrored the fix
  in both so the file the H1 report likely points to stays in sync.
- Updated prompt text (3 callsites) to reference the wrapper.
- Updated tests (4 prompt-content asserts, 7 tool-list asserts).
2026-03-12 13:35:17 -07:00
kashyap muraliandGitHub 5d0cc745cd feat(inline-comment): add confirmed param + probe-pattern safety net (#1048)
* feat(inline-comment): add confirmed param + probe-pattern safety net

Subagents that inherit this tool sometimes probe it with test comments
('Test comment to see if I can create inline comments') after hitting
unrelated errors elsewhere. Recurring issue across customer PRs.

Adds two defenses:
1. confirmed param: set true to post (final review comments should pass
   this). When false, buffers to a JSONL file instead of posting.
2. Probe-pattern safety net: when confirmed is omitted (backward compat
   for existing prompts), the body is checked against obvious probe
   patterns ('test comment', 'can i', 'does this work', etc.). Matching
   calls are buffered instead of posted.

A post-run step in action.yml reports the buffered call count and bodies
as a workflow warning for diagnostics.

Backward compatibility:
- Existing single-agent prompts (no confirmed param) post normally unless
  the body happens to start with a probe phrase (unlikely for real
  review comments)
- The code-review skill is being updated to pass confirmed: true in its
  final posting step
- Subagent probes that would previously post now harmlessly buffer

* refactor: replace probe-regex with Haiku classification in post-step

The regex approach was narrow and could miss creative probe phrasings.
Replaced with a batch Haiku classification that runs after the session
completes.

Flow:
- MCP server: confirmed !== true -> buffer to JSONL (no classification
  in-band, no latency in the tool path)
- Post-step (src/entrypoints/post-buffered-inline-comments.ts): reads
  buffer, sends all bodies to a single Haiku call, posts only those
  classified as real review comments
- confirmed=false entries are never posted regardless of classification

Fail-open: if ANTHROPIC_API_KEY is unavailable (Bedrock/Vertex users)
or the classification call fails, posts all unconfirmed comments. This
matches pre-PR behavior where all calls posted immediately.

The post-step emits ::warning:: for each filtered comment so users can
see what was dropped and why.

* feat: add classify_inline_comments opt-out input

New action input classify_inline_comments (default 'true'). Setting to
'false' restores pre-buffering behavior: all inline comment calls post
immediately regardless of the confirmed param.

Threads through: action input -> CLASSIFY_INLINE_COMMENTS env ->
context.inputs.classifyInlineComments -> MCP server env ->
CLASSIFY_ENABLED module const.

Post-step is also gated on the input so it skips entirely when
classification is disabled.

* docs: document classify_inline_comments input and confirmed param

- usage.md: add classify_inline_comments to inputs table
- solutions.md: mention confirmed=true in the prompt example and explain
  buffering/classification in the tool permissions section
2026-03-12 00:12:55 -07:00
GitHub Actions 567be3da98 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.73 and Agent SDK to 0.2.73 2026-03-11 18:33:26 +00:00
GitHub Actions eb99fb38f0 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.72 and Agent SDK to 0.2.72 2026-03-10 00:49:35 +00:00
dustinandGitHub 33fbb80626 docs: warn that allowed_bots can expose the action to external triggers (#1039)
allowed_bots does not verify that a matching bot is installed on the
repository or has write access. On a public repo, external GitHub Apps
may be able to trigger workflow events (issues, comments, PR reviews).
If the workflow listens on those events and allowed_bots is '*', an
external App can invoke this action with a prompt it controls.

Default config (allowed_bots: "") is unaffected.

- docs/security.md: add warning and mitigation guidance
- docs/usage.md: add inline warning to the allowed_bots input row
- action.yml: add warning to the allowed_bots input description

🏠 Remote-Dev: homespace
2026-03-09 13:04:11 -07:00
GitHub Actions 3428ca8991 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.71 and Agent SDK to 0.2.71 2026-03-07 00:11:30 +00:00
GitHub Actions 26ec041249 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.70 and Agent SDK to 0.2.70 2026-03-06 01:18:43 +00:00
GitHub Actions 1fc90f3ed9 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.69 and Agent SDK to 0.2.69 2026-03-05 00:24:53 +00:00
GitHub Actions e763fe78de chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.68 and Agent SDK to 0.2.68 2026-03-04 10:09:58 +00:00
45 changed files with 1262 additions and 142 deletions
+1 -1
View File
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ TASK OVERVIEW:
- If you find similar issues using ./scripts/gh.sh search, consider using a "duplicate" label if appropriate. Only do so if the issue is a duplicate of another OPEN issue.
5. Apply the selected labels:
- Use `./scripts/edit-issue-labels.sh --issue NUMBER --add-label LABEL1 --add-label LABEL2` to apply your selected labels
- Use `./scripts/edit-issue-labels.sh --add-label LABEL1 --add-label LABEL2` to apply your selected labels (issue number is read from the workflow event)
- DO NOT post any comments explaining your decision
- DO NOT communicate directly with users
- If no labels are clearly applicable, do not apply any labels
+2
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ jobs:
- name: Run Claude Code for Issue Triage
uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@main
env:
CLAUDE_CODE_SCRIPT_CAPS: '{"edit-issue-labels.sh":2}'
with:
prompt: "/label-issue REPO: ${{ github.repository }} ISSUE_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.issue.number }}"
anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
+70 -5
View File
@@ -28,11 +28,20 @@ inputs:
required: false
default: ""
allowed_bots:
description: "Comma-separated list of allowed bot usernames, or '*' to allow all bots. Empty string (default) allows no bots."
description: "Comma-separated list of allowed bot usernames, or '*' to allow all bots. Empty string (default) allows no bots. WARNING: On public repos with '*', external Apps may be able to invoke this action with prompts they control. See docs/security.md."
required: false
default: ""
allowed_non_write_users:
description: "Comma-separated list of usernames to allow without write permissions, or '*' to allow all users. Only works when github_token input is provided. WARNING: Use with extreme caution - this bypasses security checks and should only be used for workflows with very limited permissions (e.g., issue labeling)."
description: |
Comma-separated list of usernames to allow without write permissions, or '*' to allow all users.
Only works when github_token input is provided. WARNING: Use with extreme caution - this
bypasses security checks and should only be used for workflows with very limited permissions
(e.g., issue labeling).
SECURITY: Processing untrusted content exposes the workflow to prompt injection. When this
input is set, Claude does a best-effort scrub of Anthropic, cloud, and GitHub Actions secrets
from subprocess environments. This reduces but does not eliminate prompt injection risk -
only use for workflows with very limited permissions and validate all outputs.
required: false
default: ""
include_comments_by_actor:
@@ -89,6 +98,10 @@ inputs:
description: "Use just one comment to deliver issue/PR comments"
required: false
default: "false"
classify_inline_comments:
description: "Buffer inline comments without confirmed=true and classify them (real review vs test/probe) before posting after the session ends. Set to 'false' to post all inline comments immediately (pre-buffering behavior)."
required: false
default: "true"
use_commit_signing:
description: "Enable commit signing using GitHub's commit signature verification. When false, Claude uses standard git commands"
required: false
@@ -181,12 +194,43 @@ runs:
run: |
cd ${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}
bun install --production
# bun install --production strips execute bits from vendored binaries (bun issue #1140).
# Restore +x on the ripgrep binaries so the Claude Agent SDK can exec them.
find "${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/node_modules/@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk/vendor/ripgrep" \
-name "rg" -type f -exec chmod +x {} \;
- name: Install subprocess isolation dependencies
# Install subprocess isolation dependencies when processing content from non-write users.
# Best-effort: skips on non-Linux or when sudo/apt unavailable (self-hosted runners).
if: ${{ inputs.allowed_non_write_users != '' && runner.os == 'Linux' }}
continue-on-error: true
shell: bash
run: |
if [ "${CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB:-}" = "0" ]; then
echo "Subprocess isolation opted out via CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB=0"
exit 0
fi
if command -v apt-get >/dev/null && command -v sudo >/dev/null; then
for i in 1 2 3; do
sudo apt-get update -qq && sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends bubblewrap socat && break
echo "apt-get attempt $i failed, retrying..."
sleep 5
done
fi
# Ubuntu 24.04+ restricts unprivileged user namespaces via AppArmor.
# The sysctl doesn't exist on older kernels — that's fine.
if [ -f /proc/sys/kernel/apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns ] && command -v sudo >/dev/null; then
sudo sysctl -w kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=0
fi
- name: Run Claude Code Action
id: run
shell: bash
run: |
bun run ${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/src/entrypoints/run.ts
bun --no-env-file \
--config="${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/bunfig.toml" \
--tsconfig-override="${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/tsconfig.json" \
run ${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/src/entrypoints/run.ts
env:
# Prepare inputs
MODE: ${{ inputs.mode }}
@@ -200,10 +244,13 @@ runs:
OVERRIDE_GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ inputs.github_token }}
ALLOWED_BOTS: ${{ inputs.allowed_bots }}
ALLOWED_NON_WRITE_USERS: ${{ inputs.allowed_non_write_users }}
CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB: ${{ env.CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB || (inputs.allowed_non_write_users != '' && '1') || '' }}
CLAUDE_CODE_SCRIPT_CAPS: ${{ env.CLAUDE_CODE_SCRIPT_CAPS || '' }}
INCLUDE_COMMENTS_BY_ACTOR: ${{ inputs.include_comments_by_actor }}
EXCLUDE_COMMENTS_BY_ACTOR: ${{ inputs.exclude_comments_by_actor }}
GITHUB_RUN_ID: ${{ github.run_id }}
USE_STICKY_COMMENT: ${{ inputs.use_sticky_comment }}
CLASSIFY_INLINE_COMMENTS: ${{ inputs.classify_inline_comments }}
DEFAULT_WORKFLOW_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
USE_COMMIT_SIGNING: ${{ inputs.use_commit_signing }}
SSH_SIGNING_KEY: ${{ inputs.ssh_signing_key }}
@@ -280,10 +327,28 @@ runs:
if: always() && inputs.ssh_signing_key != ''
shell: bash
run: |
bun run ${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/src/entrypoints/cleanup-ssh-signing.ts
bun --no-env-file \
--config="${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/bunfig.toml" \
--tsconfig-override="${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/tsconfig.json" \
run ${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/src/entrypoints/cleanup-ssh-signing.ts
- name: Post buffered inline comments
if: always() && inputs.classify_inline_comments != 'false'
shell: bash
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ steps.run.outputs.github_token || inputs.github_token || github.token }}
REPO_OWNER: ${{ github.event.repository.owner.login }}
REPO_NAME: ${{ github.event.repository.name }}
PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.event.issue.number }}
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: ${{ inputs.anthropic_api_key }}
run: |
bun --no-env-file \
--config="${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/bunfig.toml" \
--tsconfig-override="${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/tsconfig.json" \
run ${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/src/entrypoints/post-buffered-inline-comments.ts
- name: Revoke app token
if: always() && inputs.github_token == '' && steps.run.outputs.skipped_due_to_workflow_validation_mismatch != 'true'
if: always() && inputs.github_token == '' && steps.run.outputs.github_token != '' && steps.run.outputs.skipped_due_to_workflow_validation_mismatch != 'true'
shell: bash
run: |
curl -L \
+1 -1
View File
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ runs:
PATH_TO_CLAUDE_CODE_EXECUTABLE: ${{ inputs.path_to_claude_code_executable }}
run: |
if [ -z "$PATH_TO_CLAUDE_CODE_EXECUTABLE" ]; then
CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION="2.1.66"
CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION="2.1.92"
echo "Installing Claude Code v${CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION}..."
for attempt in 1 2 3; do
echo "Installation attempt $attempt..."
+190 -2
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
"name": "@anthropic-ai/claude-code-base-action",
"dependencies": {
"@actions/core": "^1.10.1",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.2.66",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.2.92",
"shell-quote": "^1.8.3",
},
"devDependencies": {
@@ -27,10 +27,16 @@
"@actions/io": ["@actions/[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-wi9JjgKLYS7U/z8PPbco+PvTb/nRWjeoFlJ1Qer83k/3C5PHQi28hiVdeE2kHXmIL99mQFawx8qt/JPjZilJ8Q=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].66", "", { "optionalDependencies": { "@img/sharp-darwin-arm64": "^0.34.2", "@img/sharp-darwin-x64": "^0.34.2", "@img/sharp-linux-arm": "^0.34.2", "@img/sharp-linux-arm64": "^0.34.2", "@img/sharp-linux-x64": "^0.34.2", "@img/sharp-linuxmusl-arm64": "^0.34.2", "@img/sharp-linuxmusl-x64": "^0.34.2", "@img/sharp-win32-arm64": "^0.34.2", "@img/sharp-win32-x64": "^0.34.2" }, "peerDependencies": { "zod": "^4.0.0" } }, "sha512-hJL+j35yIkhcryR0kkszLz00lsEWBMu3qx8hazIHh55QV2nnZ6cn3p6oi04/VT84J9YU90jfmDffTQ66RD7YZg=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].92", "", { "dependencies": { "@anthropic-ai/sdk": "^0.80.0", "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.27.1" }, "optionalDependencies": { "@img/sharp-darwin-arm64": "^0.34.2", "@img/sharp-darwin-x64": "^0.34.2", "@img/sharp-linux-arm": "^0.34.2", "@img/sharp-linux-arm64": "^0.34.2", "@img/sharp-linux-x64": "^0.34.2", "@img/sharp-linuxmusl-arm64": "^0.34.2", "@img/sharp-linuxmusl-x64": "^0.34.2", "@img/sharp-win32-arm64": "^0.34.2", "@img/sharp-win32-x64": "^0.34.2" }, "peerDependencies": { "zod": "^4.0.0" } }, "sha512-loYyxVUC5gBwHjGi9Fv0b84mduJTp9Z3Pum+y/7IVQDb4NynKfVQl6l4VeDKZaW+1QTQtd25tY4hwUznD7Krqw=="],
"@anthropic-ai/sdk": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "json-schema-to-ts": "^3.1.1" }, "peerDependencies": { "zod": "^3.25.0 || ^4.0.0" }, "optionalPeers": ["zod"], "bin": { "anthropic-ai-sdk": "bin/cli" } }, "sha512-WeXLn7zNVk3yjeshn+xZHvld6AoFUOR3Sep6pSoHho5YbSi6HwcirqgPA5ccFuW8QTVJAAU7N8uQQC6Wa9TG+g=="],
"@babel/runtime": ["@babel/[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-JiDShH45zKHWyGe4ZNVRrCjBz8Nh9TMmZG1kh4QTK8hCBTWBi8Da+i7s1fJw7/lYpM4ccepSNfqzZ/QvABBi5g=="],
"@fastify/busboy": ["@fastify/[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-vBZP4NlzfOlerQTnba4aqZoMhE/a9HY7HRqoOPaETQcSQuWEIyZMHGfVu6w9wGtGK5fED5qRs2DteVCjOH60sA=="],
"@hono/node-server": ["@hono/[email protected]", "", { "peerDependencies": { "hono": "^4" } }, "sha512-dr8/3zEaB+p0D2n/IUrlPF1HZm586qgJNXK1a9fhg/PzdtkK7Ksd5l312tJX2yBuALqDYBlG20QEbayqPyxn+g=="],
"@img/sharp-darwin-arm64": ["@img/[email protected]", "", { "optionalDependencies": { "@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-arm64": "1.2.4" }, "os": "darwin", "cpu": "arm64" }, "sha512-imtQ3WMJXbMY4fxb/Ndp6HBTNVtWCUI0WdobyheGf5+ad6xX8VIDO8u2xE4qc/fr08CKG/7dDseFtn6M6g/r3w=="],
"@img/sharp-darwin-x64": ["@img/[email protected]", "", { "optionalDependencies": { "@img/sharp-libvips-darwin-x64": "1.2.4" }, "os": "darwin", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-YNEFAF/4KQ/PeW0N+r+aVVsoIY0/qxxikF2SWdp+NRkmMB7y9LBZAVqQ4yhGCm/H3H270OSykqmQMKLBhBJDEw=="],
@@ -63,6 +69,8 @@
"@img/sharp-win32-x64": ["@img/[email protected]", "", { "os": "win32", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-+29YMsqY2/9eFEiW93eqWnuLcWcufowXewwSNIT6UwZdUUCrM3oFjMWH/Z6/TMmb4hlFenmfAVbpWeup2jryCw=="],
"@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": ["@modelcontextprotocol/[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "@hono/node-server": "^1.19.9", "ajv": "^8.17.1", "ajv-formats": "^3.0.1", "content-type": "^1.0.5", "cors": "^2.8.5", "cross-spawn": "^7.0.5", "eventsource": "^3.0.2", "eventsource-parser": "^3.0.0", "express": "^5.2.1", "express-rate-limit": "^8.2.1", "hono": "^4.11.4", "jose": "^6.1.3", "json-schema-typed": "^8.0.2", "pkce-challenge": "^5.0.0", "raw-body": "^3.0.0", "zod": "^3.25 || ^4.0", "zod-to-json-schema": "^3.25.1" }, "peerDependencies": { "@cfworker/json-schema": "^4.1.1" }, "optionalPeers": ["@cfworker/json-schema"] }, "sha512-gmloF+i+flI8ouQK7MWW4mOwuMh4RePBuPFAEPC6+pdqyWOUMDOixb6qZ69owLJpz6XmyllCouc4t8YWO+E2Nw=="],
"@types/bun": ["@types/[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "bun-types": "1.2.19" } }, "sha512-d9ZCmrH3CJ2uYKXQIUuZ/pUnTqIvLDS0SK7pFmbx8ma+ziH/FRMoAq5bYpRG7y+w1gl+HgyNZbtqgMq4W4e2Lg=="],
"@types/node": ["@types/[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "undici-types": "~6.21.0" } }, "sha512-cuVNgarYWZqxRJDQHEB58GEONhOK79QVR/qYx4S7kcUObQvUwvFnYxJuuHUKm2aieN9X3yZB4LZsuYNU1Qphsw=="],
@@ -71,22 +79,202 @@
"@types/shell-quote": ["@types/[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-+UE8GAGRPbJVQDdxi16dgadcBfQ+KG2vgZhV1+3A1XmHbmwcdwhCUwIdy+d3pAGrbvgRoVSjeI9vOWyq376Yzw=="],
"accepts": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "mime-types": "^3.0.0", "negotiator": "^1.0.0" } }, "sha512-5cvg6CtKwfgdmVqY1WIiXKc3Q1bkRqGLi+2W/6ao+6Y7gu/RCwRuAhGEzh5B4KlszSuTLgZYuqFqo5bImjNKng=="],
"ajv": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "fast-deep-equal": "^3.1.3", "fast-uri": "^3.0.1", "json-schema-traverse": "^1.0.0", "require-from-string": "^2.0.2" } }, "sha512-PlXPeEWMXMZ7sPYOHqmDyCJzcfNrUr3fGNKtezX14ykXOEIvyK81d+qydx89KY5O71FKMPaQ2vBfBFI5NHR63A=="],
"ajv-formats": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "ajv": "^8.0.0" } }, "sha512-8iUql50EUR+uUcdRQ3HDqa6EVyo3docL8g5WJ3FNcWmu62IbkGUue/pEyLBW8VGKKucTPgqeks4fIU1DA4yowQ=="],
"body-parser": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "bytes": "^3.1.2", "content-type": "^1.0.5", "debug": "^4.4.3", "http-errors": "^2.0.0", "iconv-lite": "^0.7.0", "on-finished": "^2.4.1", "qs": "^6.14.1", "raw-body": "^3.0.1", "type-is": "^2.0.1" } }, "sha512-oP5VkATKlNwcgvxi0vM0p/D3n2C3EReYVX+DNYs5TjZFn/oQt2j+4sVJtSMr18pdRr8wjTcBl6LoV+FUwzPmNA=="],
"bun-types": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "@types/node": "*" }, "peerDependencies": { "@types/react": "^19" } }, "sha512-uAOTaZSPuYsWIXRpj7o56Let0g/wjihKCkeRqUBhlLVM/Bt+Fj9xTo+LhC1OV1XDaGkz4hNC80et5xgy+9KTHQ=="],
"bytes": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-/Nf7TyzTx6S3yRJObOAV7956r8cr2+Oj8AC5dt8wSP3BQAoeX58NoHyCU8P8zGkNXStjTSi6fzO6F0pBdcYbEg=="],
"call-bind-apply-helpers": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "es-errors": "^1.3.0", "function-bind": "^1.1.2" } }, "sha512-Sp1ablJ0ivDkSzjcaJdxEunN5/XvksFJ2sMBFfq6x0ryhQV/2b/KwFe21cMpmHtPOSij8K99/wSfoEuTObmuMQ=="],
"call-bound": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "call-bind-apply-helpers": "^1.0.2", "get-intrinsic": "^1.3.0" } }, "sha512-+ys997U96po4Kx/ABpBCqhA9EuxJaQWDQg7295H4hBphv3IZg0boBKuwYpt4YXp6MZ5AmZQnU/tyMTlRpaSejg=="],
"content-disposition": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-oIXISMynqSqm241k6kcQ5UwttDILMK4BiurCfGEREw6+X9jkkpEe5T9FZaApyLGGOnFuyMWZpdolTXMtvEJ08Q=="],
"content-type": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-nTjqfcBFEipKdXCv4YDQWCfmcLZKm81ldF0pAopTvyrFGVbcR6P/VAAd5G7N+0tTr8QqiU0tFadD6FK4NtJwOA=="],
"cookie": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-yki5XnKuf750l50uGTllt6kKILY4nQ1eNIQatoXEByZ5dWgnKqbnqmTrBE5B4N7lrMJKQ2ytWMiTO2o0v6Ew/w=="],
"cookie-signature": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-D76uU73ulSXrD1UXF4KE2TMxVVwhsnCgfAyTg9k8P6KGZjlXKrOLe4dJQKI3Bxi5wjesZoFXJWElNWBjPZMbhg=="],
"cors": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "object-assign": "^4", "vary": "^1" } }, "sha512-tJtZBBHA6vjIAaF6EnIaq6laBBP9aq/Y3ouVJjEfoHbRBcHBAHYcMh/w8LDrk2PvIMMq8gmopa5D4V8RmbrxGw=="],
"cross-spawn": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "path-key": "^3.1.0", "shebang-command": "^2.0.0", "which": "^2.0.1" } }, "sha512-uV2QOWP2nWzsy2aMp8aRibhi9dlzF5Hgh5SHaB9OiTGEyDTiJJyx0uy51QXdyWbtAHNua4XJzUKca3OzKUd3vA=="],
"csstype": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-M1uQkMl8rQK/szD0LNhtqxIPLpimGm8sOBwU7lLnCpSbTyY3yeU1Vc7l4KT5zT4s/yOxHH5O7tIuuLOCnLADRw=="],
"debug": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "ms": "^2.1.3" } }, "sha512-RGwwWnwQvkVfavKVt22FGLw+xYSdzARwm0ru6DhTVA3umU5hZc28V3kO4stgYryrTlLpuvgI9GiijltAjNbcqA=="],
"depd": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-g7nH6P6dyDioJogAAGprGpCtVImJhpPk/roCzdb3fIh61/s/nPsfR6onyMwkCAR/OlC3yBC0lESvUoQEAssIrw=="],
"dunder-proto": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "call-bind-apply-helpers": "^1.0.1", "es-errors": "^1.3.0", "gopd": "^1.2.0" } }, "sha512-KIN/nDJBQRcXw0MLVhZE9iQHmG68qAVIBg9CqmUYjmQIhgij9U5MFvrqkUL5FbtyyzZuOeOt0zdeRe4UY7ct+A=="],
"ee-first": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-WMwm9LhRUo+WUaRN+vRuETqG89IgZphVSNkdFgeb6sS/E4OrDIN7t48CAewSHXc6C8lefD8KKfr5vY61brQlow=="],
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"es-define-property": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-e3nRfgfUZ4rNGL232gUgX06QNyyez04KdjFrF+LTRoOXmrOgFKDg4BCdsjW8EnT69eqdYGmRpJwiPVYNrCaW3g=="],
"es-errors": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-Zf5H2Kxt2xjTvbJvP2ZWLEICxA6j+hAmMzIlypy4xcBg1vKVnx89Wy0GbS+kf5cwCVFFzdCFh2XSCFNULS6csw=="],
"es-object-atoms": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "es-errors": "^1.3.0" } }, "sha512-FGgH2h8zKNim9ljj7dankFPcICIK9Cp5bm+c2gQSYePhpaG5+esrLODihIorn+Pe6FGJzWhXQotPv73jTaldXA=="],
"escape-html": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-NiSupZ4OeuGwr68lGIeym/ksIZMJodUGOSCZ/FSnTxcrekbvqrgdUxlJOMpijaKZVjAJrWrGs/6Jy8OMuyj9ow=="],
"etag": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-aIL5Fx7mawVa300al2BnEE4iNvo1qETxLrPI/o05L7z6go7fCw1J6EQmbK4FmJ2AS7kgVF/KEZWufBfdClMcPg=="],
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"eventsource-parser": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-Vo1ab+QXPzZ4tCa8SwIHJFaSzy4R6SHf7BY79rFBDf0idraZWAkYrDjDj8uWaSm3S2TK+hJ7/t1CEmZ7jXw+pg=="],
"express": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "accepts": "^2.0.0", "body-parser": "^2.2.1", "content-disposition": "^1.0.0", "content-type": "^1.0.5", "cookie": "^0.7.1", "cookie-signature": "^1.2.1", "debug": "^4.4.0", "depd": "^2.0.0", "encodeurl": "^2.0.0", "escape-html": "^1.0.3", "etag": "^1.8.1", "finalhandler": "^2.1.0", "fresh": "^2.0.0", "http-errors": "^2.0.0", "merge-descriptors": "^2.0.0", "mime-types": "^3.0.0", "on-finished": "^2.4.1", "once": "^1.4.0", "parseurl": "^1.3.3", "proxy-addr": "^2.0.7", "qs": "^6.14.0", "range-parser": "^1.2.1", "router": "^2.2.0", "send": "^1.1.0", "serve-static": "^2.2.0", "statuses": "^2.0.1", "type-is": "^2.0.1", "vary": "^1.1.2" } }, "sha512-hIS4idWWai69NezIdRt2xFVofaF4j+6INOpJlVOLDO8zXGpUVEVzIYk12UUi2JzjEzWL3IOAxcTubgz9Po0yXw=="],
"express-rate-limit": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "ip-address": "10.1.0" }, "peerDependencies": { "express": ">= 4.11" } }, "sha512-D1dKN+cmyPWuvB+G2SREQDzPY1agpBIcTa9sJxOPMCNeH3gwzhqJRDWCXW3gg0y//+LQ/8j52JbMROWyrKdMdw=="],
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"finalhandler": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "debug": "^4.4.0", "encodeurl": "^2.0.0", "escape-html": "^1.0.3", "on-finished": "^2.4.1", "parseurl": "^1.3.3", "statuses": "^2.0.1" } }, "sha512-S8KoZgRZN+a5rNwqTxlZZePjT/4cnm0ROV70LedRHZ0p8u9fRID0hJUZQpkKLzro8LfmC8sx23bY6tVNxv8pQA=="],
"forwarded": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-buRG0fpBtRHSTCOASe6hD258tEubFoRLb4ZNA6NxMVHNw2gOcwHo9wyablzMzOA5z9xA9L1KNjk/Nt6MT9aYow=="],
"fresh": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-Rx/WycZ60HOaqLKAi6cHRKKI7zxWbJ31MhntmtwMoaTeF7XFH9hhBp8vITaMidfljRQ6eYWCKkaTK+ykVJHP2A=="],
"function-bind": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-7XHNxH7qX9xG5mIwxkhumTox/MIRNcOgDrxWsMt2pAr23WHp6MrRlN7FBSFpCpr+oVO0F744iUgR82nJMfG2SA=="],
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"gopd": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-ZUKRh6/kUFoAiTAtTYPZJ3hw9wNxx+BIBOijnlG9PnrJsCcSjs1wyyD6vJpaYtgnzDrKYRSqf3OO6Rfa93xsRg=="],
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"hono": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-wy3T8Zm2bsEvxKZM5w21VdHDDcwVS1yUFFY6i8UobSsKfFceT7TOwhbhfKsDyx7tYQlmRM5FLpIuYvNFyjctiA=="],
"http-errors": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "depd": "~2.0.0", "inherits": "~2.0.4", "setprototypeof": "~1.2.0", "statuses": "~2.0.2", "toidentifier": "~1.0.1" } }, "sha512-4FbRdAX+bSdmo4AUFuS0WNiPz8NgFt+r8ThgNWmlrjQjt1Q7ZR9+zTlce2859x4KSXrwIsaeTqDoKQmtP8pLmQ=="],
"iconv-lite": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "safer-buffer": ">= 2.1.2 < 3.0.0" } }, "sha512-im9DjEDQ55s9fL4EYzOAv0yMqmMBSZp6G0VvFyTMPKWxiSBHUj9NW/qqLmXUwXrrM7AvqSlTCfvqRb0cM8yYqw=="],
"inherits": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-k/vGaX4/Yla3WzyMCvTQOXYeIHvqOKtnqBduzTHpzpQZzAskKMhZ2K+EnBiSM9zGSoIFeMpXKxa4dYeZIQqewQ=="],
"ip-address": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-XXADHxXmvT9+CRxhXg56LJovE+bmWnEWB78LB83VZTprKTmaC5QfruXocxzTZ2Kl0DNwKuBdlIhjL8LeY8Sf8Q=="],
"ipaddr.js": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-0KI/607xoxSToH7GjN1FfSbLoU0+btTicjsQSWQlh/hZykN8KpmMf7uYwPW3R+akZ6R/w18ZlXSHBYXiYUPO3g=="],
"is-promise": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-hvpoI6korhJMnej285dSg6nu1+e6uxs7zG3BYAm5byqDsgJNWwxzM6z6iZiAgQR4TJ30JmBTOwqZUw3WlyH3AQ=="],
"isexe": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-RHxMLp9lnKHGHRng9QFhRCMbYAcVpn69smSGcq3f36xjgVVWThj4qqLbTLlq7Ssj8B+fIQ1EuCEGI2lKsyQeIw=="],
"jose": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-d7kPDd34KO/YnzaDOlikGpOurfF0ByC2sEV4cANCtdqLlTfBlw2p14O/5d/zv40gJPbIQxfES3nSx1/oYNyuZQ=="],
"json-schema-to-ts": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "@babel/runtime": "^7.18.3", "ts-algebra": "^2.0.0" } }, "sha512-+DWg8jCJG2TEnpy7kOm/7/AxaYoaRbjVB4LFZLySZlWn8exGs3A4OLJR966cVvU26N7X9TWxl+Jsw7dzAqKT6g=="],
"json-schema-traverse": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-NM8/P9n3XjXhIZn1lLhkFaACTOURQXjWhV4BA/RnOv8xvgqtqpAX9IO4mRQxSx1Rlo4tqzeqb0sOlruaOy3dug=="],
"json-schema-typed": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-fQhoXdcvc3V28x7C7BMs4P5+kNlgUURe2jmUT1T//oBRMDrqy1QPelJimwZGo7Hg9VPV3EQV5Bnq4hbFy2vetA=="],
"math-intrinsics": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-/IXtbwEk5HTPyEwyKX6hGkYXxM9nbj64B+ilVJnC/R6B0pH5G4V3b0pVbL7DBj4tkhBAppbQUlf6F6Xl9LHu1g=="],
"media-typer": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-aisnrDP4GNe06UcKFnV5bfMNPBUw4jsLGaWwWfnH3v02GnBuXX2MCVn5RbrWo0j3pczUilYblq7fQ7Nw2t5XKw=="],
"merge-descriptors": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-Snk314V5ayFLhp3fkUREub6WtjBfPdCPY1Ln8/8munuLuiYhsABgBVWsozAG+MWMbVEvcdcpbi9R7ww22l9Q3g=="],
"mime-db": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-aU5EJuIN2WDemCcAp2vFBfp/m4EAhWJnUNSSw0ixs7/kXbd6Pg64EmwJkNdFhB8aWt1sH2CTXrLxo/iAGV3oPQ=="],
"mime-types": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "mime-db": "^1.54.0" } }, "sha512-Lbgzdk0h4juoQ9fCKXW4by0UJqj+nOOrI9MJ1sSj4nI8aI2eo1qmvQEie4VD1glsS250n15LsWsYtCugiStS5A=="],
"ms": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-6FlzubTLZG3J2a/NVCAleEhjzq5oxgHyaCU9yYXvcLsvoVaHJq/s5xXI6/XXP6tz7R9xAOtHnSO/tXtF3WRTlA=="],
"negotiator": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-8Ofs/AUQh8MaEcrlq5xOX0CQ9ypTF5dl78mjlMNfOK08fzpgTHQRQPBxcPlEtIw0yRpws+Zo/3r+5WRby7u3Gg=="],
"object-assign": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-rJgTQnkUnH1sFw8yT6VSU3zD3sWmu6sZhIseY8VX+GRu3P6F7Fu+JNDoXfklElbLJSnc3FUQHVe4cU5hj+BcUg=="],
"object-inspect": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-W67iLl4J2EXEGTbfeHCffrjDfitvLANg0UlX3wFUUSTx92KXRFegMHUVgSqE+wvhAbi4WqjGg9czysTV2Epbew=="],
"on-finished": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "ee-first": "1.1.1" } }, "sha512-oVlzkg3ENAhCk2zdv7IJwd/QUD4z2RxRwpkcGY8psCVcCYZNq4wYnVWALHM+brtuJjePWiYF/ClmuDr8Ch5+kg=="],
"once": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "wrappy": "1" } }, "sha512-lNaJgI+2Q5URQBkccEKHTQOPaXdUxnZZElQTZY0MFUAuaEqe1E+Nyvgdz/aIyNi6Z9MzO5dv1H8n58/GELp3+w=="],
"parseurl": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-CiyeOxFT/JZyN5m0z9PfXw4SCBJ6Sygz1Dpl0wqjlhDEGGBP1GnsUVEL0p63hoG1fcj3fHynXi9NYO4nWOL+qQ=="],
"path-key": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-ojmeN0qd+y0jszEtoY48r0Peq5dwMEkIlCOu6Q5f41lfkswXuKtYrhgoTpLnyIcHm24Uhqx+5Tqm2InSwLhE6Q=="],
"path-to-regexp": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-PuseHIvAnz3bjrM2rGJtSgo1zjgxapTLZ7x2pjhzWwlp4SJQgK3f3iZIQwkpEnBaKz6seKBADpM4B4ySkuYypg=="],
"pkce-challenge": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-wQ0b/W4Fr01qtpHlqSqspcj3EhBvimsdh0KlHhH8HRZnMsEa0ea2fTULOXOS9ccQr3om+GcGRk4e+isrZWV8qQ=="],
"prettier": ["[email protected]", "", { "bin": { "prettier": "bin/prettier.cjs" } }, "sha512-QQtaxnoDJeAkDvDKWCLiwIXkTgRhwYDEQCghU9Z6q03iyek/rxRh/2lC3HB7P8sWT2xC/y5JDctPLBIGzHKbhw=="],
"proxy-addr": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "forwarded": "0.2.0", "ipaddr.js": "1.9.1" } }, "sha512-llQsMLSUDUPT44jdrU/O37qlnifitDP+ZwrmmZcoSKyLKvtZxpyV0n2/bD/N4tBAAZ/gJEdZU7KMraoK1+XYAg=="],
"qs": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "side-channel": "^1.1.0" } }, "sha512-mAZTtNCeetKMH+pSjrb76NAM8V9a05I9aBZOHztWy/UqcJdQYNsf59vrRKWnojAT9Y+GbIvoTBC++CPHqpDBhQ=="],
"range-parser": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-Hrgsx+orqoygnmhFbKaHE6c296J+HTAQXoxEF6gNupROmmGJRoyzfG3ccAveqCBrwr/2yxQ5BVd/GTl5agOwSg=="],
"raw-body": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "bytes": "~3.1.2", "http-errors": "~2.0.1", "iconv-lite": "~0.7.0", "unpipe": "~1.0.0" } }, "sha512-K5zQjDllxWkf7Z5xJdV0/B0WTNqx6vxG70zJE4N0kBs4LovmEYWJzQGxC9bS9RAKu3bgM40lrd5zoLJ12MQ5BA=="],
"require-from-string": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-Xf0nWe6RseziFMu+Ap9biiUbmplq6S9/p+7w7YXP/JBHhrUDDUhwa+vANyubuqfZWTveU//DYVGsDG7RKL/vEw=="],
"router": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "debug": "^4.4.0", "depd": "^2.0.0", "is-promise": "^4.0.0", "parseurl": "^1.3.3", "path-to-regexp": "^8.0.0" } }, "sha512-nLTrUKm2UyiL7rlhapu/Zl45FwNgkZGaCpZbIHajDYgwlJCOzLSk+cIPAnsEqV955GjILJnKbdQC1nVPz+gAYQ=="],
"safer-buffer": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-YZo3K82SD7Riyi0E1EQPojLz7kpepnSQI9IyPbHHg1XXXevb5dJI7tpyN2ADxGcQbHG7vcyRHk0cbwqcQriUtg=="],
"send": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "debug": "^4.4.3", "encodeurl": "^2.0.0", "escape-html": "^1.0.3", "etag": "^1.8.1", "fresh": "^2.0.0", "http-errors": "^2.0.1", "mime-types": "^3.0.2", "ms": "^2.1.3", "on-finished": "^2.4.1", "range-parser": "^1.2.1", "statuses": "^2.0.2" } }, "sha512-1gnZf7DFcoIcajTjTwjwuDjzuz4PPcY2StKPlsGAQ1+YH20IRVrBaXSWmdjowTJ6u8Rc01PoYOGHXfP1mYcZNQ=="],
"serve-static": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "encodeurl": "^2.0.0", "escape-html": "^1.0.3", "parseurl": "^1.3.3", "send": "^1.2.0" } }, "sha512-xRXBn0pPqQTVQiC8wyQrKs2MOlX24zQ0POGaj0kultvoOCstBQM5yvOhAVSUwOMjQtTvsPWoNCHfPGwaaQJhTw=="],
"setprototypeof": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-E5LDX7Wrp85Kil5bhZv46j8jOeboKq5JMmYM3gVGdGH8xFpPWXUMsNrlODCrkoxMEeNi/XZIwuRvY4XNwYMJpw=="],
"shebang-command": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "shebang-regex": "^3.0.0" } }, "sha512-kHxr2zZpYtdmrN1qDjrrX/Z1rR1kG8Dx+gkpK1G4eXmvXswmcE1hTWBWYUzlraYw1/yZp6YuDY77YtvbN0dmDA=="],
"shebang-regex": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-7++dFhtcx3353uBaq8DDR4NuxBetBzC7ZQOhmTQInHEd6bSrXdiEyzCvG07Z44UYdLShWUyXt5M/yhz8ekcb1A=="],
"shell-quote": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-ObmnIF4hXNg1BqhnHmgbDETF8dLPCggZWBjkQfhZpbszZnYur5DUljTcCHii5LC3J5E0yeO/1LIMyH+UvHQgyw=="],
"side-channel": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "es-errors": "^1.3.0", "object-inspect": "^1.13.3", "side-channel-list": "^1.0.0", "side-channel-map": "^1.0.1", "side-channel-weakmap": "^1.0.2" } }, "sha512-ZX99e6tRweoUXqR+VBrslhda51Nh5MTQwou5tnUDgbtyM0dBgmhEDtWGP/xbKn6hqfPRHujUNwz5fy/wbbhnpw=="],
"side-channel-list": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "es-errors": "^1.3.0", "object-inspect": "^1.13.3" } }, "sha512-FCLHtRD/gnpCiCHEiJLOwdmFP+wzCmDEkc9y7NsYxeF4u7Btsn1ZuwgwJGxImImHicJArLP4R0yX4c2KCrMrTA=="],
"side-channel-map": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "call-bound": "^1.0.2", "es-errors": "^1.3.0", "get-intrinsic": "^1.2.5", "object-inspect": "^1.13.3" } }, "sha512-VCjCNfgMsby3tTdo02nbjtM/ewra6jPHmpThenkTYh8pG9ucZ/1P8So4u4FGBek/BjpOVsDCMoLA/iuBKIFXRA=="],
"side-channel-weakmap": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "call-bound": "^1.0.2", "es-errors": "^1.3.0", "get-intrinsic": "^1.2.5", "object-inspect": "^1.13.3", "side-channel-map": "^1.0.1" } }, "sha512-WPS/HvHQTYnHisLo9McqBHOJk2FkHO/tlpvldyrnem4aeQp4hai3gythswg6p01oSoTl58rcpiFAjF2br2Ak2A=="],
"statuses": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-DvEy55V3DB7uknRo+4iOGT5fP1slR8wQohVdknigZPMpMstaKJQWhwiYBACJE3Ul2pTnATihhBYnRhZQHGBiRw=="],
"toidentifier": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-o5sSPKEkg/DIQNmH43V0/uerLrpzVedkUh8tGNvaeXpfpuwjKenlSox/2O/BTlZUtEe+JG7s5YhEz608PlAHRA=="],
"ts-algebra": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-FPAhNPFMrkwz76P7cdjdmiShwMynZYN6SgOujD1urY4oNm80Ou9oMdmbR45LotcKOXoy7wSmHkRFE6Mxbrhefw=="],
"tunnel": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-1h/Lnq9yajKY2PEbBadPXj3VxsDDu844OnaAo52UVmIzIvwwtBPIuNvkjuzBlTWpfJyUbG3ez0KSBibQkj4ojg=="],
"type-is": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "content-type": "^1.0.5", "media-typer": "^1.1.0", "mime-types": "^3.0.0" } }, "sha512-OZs6gsjF4vMp32qrCbiVSkrFmXtG/AZhY3t0iAMrMBiAZyV9oALtXO8hsrHbMXF9x6L3grlFuwW2oAz7cav+Gw=="],
"typescript": ["[email protected]", "", { "bin": { "tsc": "bin/tsc", "tsserver": "bin/tsserver" } }, "sha512-p1diW6TqL9L07nNxvRMM7hMMw4c5XOo/1ibL4aAIGmSAt9slTE1Xgw5KWuof2uTOvCg9BY7ZRi+GaF+7sfgPeQ=="],
"undici": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "@fastify/busboy": "^2.0.0" } }, "sha512-raqeBD6NQK4SkWhQzeYKd1KmIG6dllBOTt55Rmkt4HtI9mwdWtJljnrXjAFUBLTSN67HWrOIZ3EPF4kjUw80Bg=="],
"undici-types": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-iwDZqg0QAGrg9Rav5H4n0M64c3mkR59cJ6wQp+7C4nI0gsmExaedaYLNO44eT4AtBBwjbTiGPMlt2Md0T9H9JQ=="],
"unpipe": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-pjy2bYhSsufwWlKwPc+l3cN7+wuJlK6uz0YdJEOlQDbl6jo/YlPi4mb8agUkVC8BF7V8NuzeyPNqRksA3hztKQ=="],
"vary": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-BNGbWLfd0eUPabhkXUVm0j8uuvREyTh5ovRa/dyow/BqAbZJyC+5fU+IzQOzmAKzYqYRAISoRhdQr3eIZ/PXqg=="],
"which": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "isexe": "^2.0.0" }, "bin": { "node-which": "./bin/node-which" } }, "sha512-BLI3Tl1TW3Pvl70l3yq3Y64i+awpwXqsGBYWkkqMtnbXgrMD+yj7rhW0kuEDxzJaYXGjEW5ogapKNMEKNMjibA=="],
"wrappy": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-l4Sp/DRseor9wL6EvV2+TuQn63dMkPjZ/sp9XkghTEbV9KlPS1xUsZ3u7/IQO4wxtcFB4bgpQPRcR3QCvezPcQ=="],
"zod": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-gzUt/qt81nXsFGKIFcC3YnfEAx5NkunCfnDlvuBSSFS02bcXu4Lmea0AFIUwbLWxWPx3d9p8S5QoaujKcNQxcQ=="],
"zod-to-json-schema": ["[email protected]", "", { "peerDependencies": { "zod": "^3.25.28 || ^4" } }, "sha512-O/PgfnpT1xKSDeQYSCfRI5Gy3hPf91mKVDuYLUHZJMiDFptvP41MSnWofm8dnCm0256ZNfZIM7DSzuSMAFnjHA=="],
}
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
},
"dependencies": {
"@actions/core": "^1.10.1",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.2.66",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.2.92",
"shell-quote": "^1.8.3"
},
"devDependencies": {
+21 -1
View File
@@ -79,6 +79,20 @@ function mergeMcpConfigs(configValues: string[]): string {
return JSON.stringify(merged);
}
/**
* Strip comment lines from a shell argument string.
* Lines whose first non-whitespace character is `#` are removed entirely.
* Inline `#` within a line (e.g. inside a quoted value) is left untouched
* because shell-quote handles quoting — we only need to remove full comment lines
* before shell-quote sees them.
*/
function stripShellComments(input: string): string {
return input
.split("\n")
.filter((line) => !line.trim().startsWith("#"))
.join("\n");
}
/**
* Parse claudeArgs string into extraArgs record for SDK pass-through
* The SDK/CLI will handle --mcp-config, --json-schema, etc.
@@ -92,7 +106,7 @@ function parseClaudeArgsToExtraArgs(
if (!claudeArgs?.trim()) return {};
const result: Record<string, string | null> = {};
const args = parseShellArgs(claudeArgs).filter(
const args = parseShellArgs(stripShellComments(claudeArgs)).filter(
(arg): arg is string => typeof arg === "string",
);
@@ -215,6 +229,12 @@ export function parseSdkOptions(options: ClaudeOptions): ParsedSdkOptions {
// Set the entrypoint for Claude Code to identify this as the GitHub Action
env.CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT = "claude-code-github-action";
// Remove OIDC token request variables so Claude cannot mint new tokens.
// These are only needed by the action itself (via @actions/core.getIDToken()),
// not by the Claude session.
delete env.ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL;
delete env.ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN;
// Build system prompt option - default to claude_code preset
let systemPrompt: SdkOptions["systemPrompt"];
if (options.systemPrompt) {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ export async function runClaudeWithSdk(
console.log(`Running Claude with prompt from file: ${promptPath}`);
// Log SDK options without env (which could contain sensitive data)
const { env, ...optionsToLog } = sdkOptions;
const { env, extraArgs, ...optionsToLog } = sdkOptions;
console.log("SDK options:", JSON.stringify(optionsToLog, null, 2));
const messages: SDKMessage[] = [];
@@ -313,6 +313,40 @@ describe("parseSdkOptions", () => {
});
});
describe("shell comment stripping", () => {
test("should parse flags before and after a comment line", () => {
const options: ClaudeOptions = {
claudeArgs: "--model 'claude-haiku'\n# comment\n--allowed-tools 'Edit'",
};
const result = parseSdkOptions(options);
expect(result.sdkOptions.extraArgs?.["model"]).toBe("claude-haiku");
expect(result.sdkOptions.allowedTools).toEqual(["Edit"]);
});
test("should parse flags correctly when no comments are present", () => {
const options: ClaudeOptions = {
claudeArgs: "--model 'claude-haiku'",
};
const result = parseSdkOptions(options);
expect(result.sdkOptions.extraArgs?.["model"]).toBe("claude-haiku");
});
test("should not strip inline # that appears inside a quoted value", () => {
const options: ClaudeOptions = {
claudeArgs: "--model 'claude-haiku' --prompt 'use color #ff0000'",
};
const result = parseSdkOptions(options);
expect(result.sdkOptions.extraArgs?.["model"]).toBe("claude-haiku");
expect(result.sdkOptions.extraArgs?.["prompt"]).toBe("use color #ff0000");
});
});
describe("environment variables passthrough", () => {
test("should include OTEL environment variables in sdkOptions.env", () => {
// Set up test environment variables
@@ -366,5 +400,26 @@ describe("parseSdkOptions", () => {
"claude-code-github-action",
);
});
test("should strip ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL and ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN from env", () => {
const originalEnv = { ...process.env };
process.env.ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL =
"https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com";
process.env.ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN = "secret-token-value";
try {
const options: ClaudeOptions = {};
const result = parseSdkOptions(options);
expect(
result.sdkOptions.env?.ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL,
).toBeUndefined();
expect(
result.sdkOptions.env?.ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN,
).toBeUndefined();
} finally {
process.env = originalEnv;
}
});
});
});
+60 -2
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
"dependencies": {
"@actions/core": "^1.10.1",
"@actions/github": "^6.0.1",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.2.66",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.2.92",
"@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.11.0",
"@octokit/graphql": "^8.2.2",
"@octokit/rest": "^21.1.1",
@@ -37,10 +37,16 @@
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"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].66", "", { "optionalDependencies": { "@img/sharp-darwin-arm64": "^0.34.2", "@img/sharp-darwin-x64": "^0.34.2", "@img/sharp-linux-arm": "^0.34.2", "@img/sharp-linux-arm64": "^0.34.2", "@img/sharp-linux-x64": "^0.34.2", "@img/sharp-linuxmusl-arm64": "^0.34.2", "@img/sharp-linuxmusl-x64": "^0.34.2", "@img/sharp-win32-arm64": "^0.34.2", "@img/sharp-win32-x64": "^0.34.2" }, "peerDependencies": { "zod": "^4.0.0" } }, "sha512-hJL+j35yIkhcryR0kkszLz00lsEWBMu3qx8hazIHh55QV2nnZ6cn3p6oi04/VT84J9YU90jfmDffTQ66RD7YZg=="],
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"@octokit/plugin-request-log/@octokit/core/@octokit/request/@octokit/endpoint": ["@octokit/[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "@octokit/types": "^14.0.0", "universal-user-agent": "^7.0.2" } }, "sha512-OlYOlZIsfEVZm5HCSR8aSg02T2lbUWOsCQoPKfTXJwDzcHQBrVBGdGXb89dv2Kw2ToZaRtudp8O3ZIYoaOjKlA=="],
"@octokit/rest/@octokit/core/@octokit/request/@octokit/endpoint": ["@octokit/[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "@octokit/types": "^14.0.0", "universal-user-agent": "^7.0.2" } }, "sha512-OlYOlZIsfEVZm5HCSR8aSg02T2lbUWOsCQoPKfTXJwDzcHQBrVBGdGXb89dv2Kw2ToZaRtudp8O3ZIYoaOjKlA=="],
@@ -416,5 +460,19 @@
"@octokit/rest/@octokit/plugin-paginate-rest/@octokit/types/@octokit/openapi-types": ["@octokit/[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-9sIH3nSUttelJSXUrmGzl7QUBFul0/mB8HRYl3fOlgHbIWG+WnYDXU3v/2zMtAvuzZ/ed00Ei6on975FhBfzrg=="],
"@octokit/rest/@octokit/plugin-rest-endpoint-methods/@octokit/types/@octokit/openapi-types": ["@octokit/[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-9sIH3nSUttelJSXUrmGzl7QUBFul0/mB8HRYl3fOlgHbIWG+WnYDXU3v/2zMtAvuzZ/ed00Ei6on975FhBfzrg=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk/@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/express/body-parser/debug": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "ms": "^2.1.3" } }, "sha512-RGwwWnwQvkVfavKVt22FGLw+xYSdzARwm0ru6DhTVA3umU5hZc28V3kO4stgYryrTlLpuvgI9GiijltAjNbcqA=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk/@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/express/body-parser/iconv-lite": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "safer-buffer": ">= 2.1.2 < 3.0.0" } }, "sha512-im9DjEDQ55s9fL4EYzOAv0yMqmMBSZp6G0VvFyTMPKWxiSBHUj9NW/qqLmXUwXrrM7AvqSlTCfvqRb0cM8yYqw=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk/@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/express/body-parser/qs": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "side-channel": "^1.1.0" } }, "sha512-mAZTtNCeetKMH+pSjrb76NAM8V9a05I9aBZOHztWy/UqcJdQYNsf59vrRKWnojAT9Y+GbIvoTBC++CPHqpDBhQ=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk/@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/express/body-parser/raw-body": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "bytes": "~3.1.2", "http-errors": "~2.0.1", "iconv-lite": "~0.7.0", "unpipe": "~1.0.0" } }, "sha512-K5zQjDllxWkf7Z5xJdV0/B0WTNqx6vxG70zJE4N0kBs4LovmEYWJzQGxC9bS9RAKu3bgM40lrd5zoLJ12MQ5BA=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk/@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/express/mime-types/mime-db": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-aU5EJuIN2WDemCcAp2vFBfp/m4EAhWJnUNSSw0ixs7/kXbd6Pg64EmwJkNdFhB8aWt1sH2CTXrLxo/iAGV3oPQ=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk/@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/express/body-parser/raw-body/http-errors": ["[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "depd": "~2.0.0", "inherits": "~2.0.4", "setprototypeof": "~1.2.0", "statuses": "~2.0.2", "toidentifier": "~1.0.1" } }, "sha512-4FbRdAX+bSdmo4AUFuS0WNiPz8NgFt+r8ThgNWmlrjQjt1Q7ZR9+zTlce2859x4KSXrwIsaeTqDoKQmtP8pLmQ=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk/@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/express/body-parser/raw-body/http-errors/statuses": ["[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-DvEy55V3DB7uknRo+4iOGT5fP1slR8wQohVdknigZPMpMstaKJQWhwiYBACJE3Ul2pTnATihhBYnRhZQHGBiRw=="],
}
}
+2
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
# Intentionally minimal. action.yml pins --config to this file so bun resolves
# its runtime config from the action directory rather than the workspace.
+9
View File
@@ -4,11 +4,18 @@
- **Repository Access**: The action can only be triggered by users with write access to the repository
- **Bot User Control**: By default, GitHub Apps and bots cannot trigger this action for security reasons. Use the `allowed_bots` parameter to enable specific bots or all bots
- **⚠️ Allowed bots are not checked for repository permissions.** A bot that matches an entry does **not** need to be installed on your repository or have write access. On a **public repository**, external parties — including GitHub Apps created by anyone — may be able to trigger workflow events such as opening issues, commenting, or reviewing pull requests. If your workflow listens on those events and `allowed_bots` is set to `'*'`, any such App can invoke this action with a prompt it controls.
- Prefer an explicit list over `'*'`
- Only list App names you trust
- If you need `'*'`, scope workflow `permissions:` to the minimum required
- **⚠️ Non-Write User Access (RISKY)**: The `allowed_non_write_users` parameter allows bypassing the write permission requirement. **This is a significant security risk and should only be used for workflows with extremely limited permissions** (e.g., issue labeling workflows that only have `issues: write` permission). This feature:
- Only works when `github_token` is provided as input (not with GitHub App authentication)
- Accepts either a comma-separated list of specific usernames or `*` to allow all users
- **Should be used with extreme caution** as it bypasses the primary security mechanism of this action
- Is designed for automation workflows where user permissions are already restricted by the workflow's permission scope
- When set, Claude does a best-effort scrub of Anthropic, cloud, and GitHub Actions secrets from subprocess environments. On Linux runners with bubblewrap available, subprocesses additionally run with PID-namespace isolation. This reduces but does not eliminate prompt injection risk — keep workflow permissions minimal and validate all outputs. Set `CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB: 0` in your workflow or job `env:` block to opt out.
- Optionally set `CLAUDE_CODE_SCRIPT_CAPS` in your workflow `env:` block to limit how many times Claude can call specific scripts per run. Value is JSON: `{"script-name.sh": maxCalls}`. Example: `CLAUDE_CODE_SCRIPT_CAPS: '{"edit-issue-labels.sh":2}'` allows at most 2 calls to `edit-issue-labels.sh`. Useful for write-capable helper scripts.
- When using `allowed_non_write_users`, always pass `github_token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}`. The auto-generated workflow token is scoped to the job's declared permissions and expires automatically, which limits blast radius. Personal access tokens are not recommended for untrusted-input workflows.
- **Token Permissions**: The GitHub app receives only a short-lived token scoped specifically to the repository it's operating in
- **No Cross-Repository Access**: Each action invocation is limited to the repository where it was triggered
- **Limited Scope**: The token cannot access other repositories or perform actions beyond the configured permissions
@@ -27,6 +34,8 @@ This design ensures that users retain full control over what pull requests are c
**Beware of potential hidden markdown when tagging Claude on untrusted content.** External contributors may include hidden instructions through HTML comments, invisible characters, hidden attributes, or other techniques. The action sanitizes content by stripping HTML comments, invisible characters, markdown image alt text, hidden HTML attributes, and HTML entities, but new bypass techniques may emerge. We recommend reviewing the raw content of all input coming from external contributors before allowing Claude to process it.
On public repos, you can also use `include_comments_by_actor` to allowlist which users' comments are passed to Claude, reducing exposure to untrusted input. Use `exclude_comments_by_actor` to filter out noisy bot comments (e.g., `dependabot[bot]`, `renovate[bot]`). If an actor matches both lists, exclusion takes priority. See [Usage](./usage.md) for details.
## GitHub App Permissions
The [Claude Code GitHub app](https://github.com/apps/claude) requests the following permissions:
+4 -3
View File
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ jobs:
Note: The PR branch is already checked out in the current working directory.
Use `gh pr comment` for top-level feedback.
Use `mcp__github_inline_comment__create_inline_comment` to highlight specific code issues.
Use `mcp__github_inline_comment__create_inline_comment` (with `confirmed: true`) to highlight specific code issues.
Only post GitHub comments - don't submit review text as messages.
claude_args: |
@@ -421,7 +421,8 @@ jobs:
- `./scripts/gh.sh label list` to see available labels
Based on your analysis, add the appropriate labels using:
`./scripts/edit-issue-labels.sh --issue [number] --add-label "label1" --add-label "label2"`
`./scripts/edit-issue-labels.sh --add-label "label1" --add-label "label2"`
(the issue number is read automatically from the workflow event)
If it appears to be a duplicate, post a comment mentioning the original issue.
@@ -585,7 +586,7 @@ prompt: |
### Common Tool Permissions
- **PR Comments**: `Bash(gh pr comment:*)`
- **Inline Comments**: `mcp__github_inline_comment__create_inline_comment`
- **Inline Comments**: `mcp__github_inline_comment__create_inline_comment` — pass `confirmed: true` to post immediately. When omitted, the comment is buffered and classified after the session ends (real review comments post, test/probe comments are filtered). This prevents subagent test comments from reaching PRs. To disable classification entirely, set `classify_inline_comments: 'false'` on the action.
- **File Operations**: `Read,Write,Edit`
- **Git Operations**: `Bash(git:*)`
+32 -29
View File
@@ -52,35 +52,38 @@ jobs:
## Inputs
| Input | Description | Required | Default |
| -------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ------------- |
| `anthropic_api_key` | Anthropic API key (required for direct API, not needed for Bedrock/Vertex) | No\* | - |
| `claude_code_oauth_token` | Claude Code OAuth token (alternative to anthropic_api_key) | No\* | - |
| `prompt` | Instructions for Claude. Can be a direct prompt or custom template for automation workflows | No | - |
| `track_progress` | Force tag mode with tracking comments. Only works with specific PR/issue events. Preserves GitHub context | No | `false` |
| `include_fix_links` | Include 'Fix this' links in PR code review feedback that open Claude Code with context to fix the identified issue | No | `true` |
| `claude_args` | Additional [arguments to pass directly to Claude CLI](https://docs.claude.com/en/docs/claude-code/cli-reference#cli-flags) (e.g., `--max-turns 10 --model claude-4-0-sonnet-20250805`) | No | "" |
| `base_branch` | The base branch to use for creating new branches (e.g., 'main', 'develop') | No | - |
| `use_sticky_comment` | Use just one comment to deliver PR comments (only applies for pull_request event workflows) | No | `false` |
| `github_token` | GitHub token for Claude to operate with. **Only include this if you're connecting a custom GitHub app of your own!** | No | - |
| `use_bedrock` | Use Amazon Bedrock with OIDC authentication instead of direct Anthropic API | No | `false` |
| `use_vertex` | Use Google Vertex AI with OIDC authentication instead of direct Anthropic API | No | `false` |
| `assignee_trigger` | The assignee username that triggers the action (e.g. @claude). Only used for issue assignment | No | - |
| `label_trigger` | The label name that triggers the action when applied to an issue (e.g. "claude") | No | - |
| `trigger_phrase` | The trigger phrase to look for in comments, issue/PR bodies, and issue titles | No | `@claude` |
| `branch_prefix` | The prefix to use for Claude branches (defaults to 'claude/', use 'claude-' for dash format) | No | `claude/` |
| `settings` | Claude Code settings as JSON string or path to settings JSON file | No | "" |
| `additional_permissions` | Additional permissions to enable. Currently supports 'actions: read' for viewing workflow results | No | "" |
| `use_commit_signing` | Enable commit signing using GitHub's API. Simple but cannot perform complex git operations like rebasing. See [Security](./security.md#commit-signing) | No | `false` |
| `ssh_signing_key` | SSH private key for signing commits. Enables signed commits with full git CLI support (rebasing, etc.). See [Security](./security.md#commit-signing) | No | "" |
| `bot_id` | GitHub user ID to use for git operations (defaults to Claude's bot ID). Required with `ssh_signing_key` for verified commits | No | `41898282` |
| `bot_name` | GitHub username to use for git operations (defaults to Claude's bot name). Required with `ssh_signing_key` for verified commits | No | `claude[bot]` |
| `allowed_bots` | Comma-separated list of allowed bot usernames, or '\*' to allow all bots. Empty string (default) allows no bots | No | "" |
| `allowed_non_write_users` | **⚠️ RISKY**: Comma-separated list of usernames to allow without write permissions, or '\*' for all users. Only works with `github_token` input. See [Security](./security.md) | No | "" |
| `path_to_claude_code_executable` | Optional path to a custom Claude Code executable. Skips automatic installation. Useful for Nix, custom containers, or specialized environments | No | "" |
| `path_to_bun_executable` | Optional path to a custom Bun executable. Skips automatic Bun installation. Useful for Nix, custom containers, or specialized environments | No | "" |
| `plugin_marketplaces` | Newline-separated list of Claude Code plugin marketplace Git URLs to install from (e.g., see example in workflow above). Marketplaces are added before plugin installation | No | "" |
| `plugins` | Newline-separated list of Claude Code plugin names to install (e.g., see example in workflow above). Plugins are installed before Claude Code execution | No | "" |
| Input | Description | Required | Default |
| -------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ------------- |
| `anthropic_api_key` | Anthropic API key (required for direct API, not needed for Bedrock/Vertex) | No\* | - |
| `claude_code_oauth_token` | Claude Code OAuth token (alternative to anthropic_api_key) | No\* | - |
| `prompt` | Instructions for Claude. Can be a direct prompt or custom template for automation workflows | No | - |
| `track_progress` | Force tag mode with tracking comments. Only works with specific PR/issue events. Preserves GitHub context | No | `false` |
| `include_fix_links` | Include 'Fix this' links in PR code review feedback that open Claude Code with context to fix the identified issue | No | `true` |
| `claude_args` | Additional [arguments to pass directly to Claude CLI](https://docs.claude.com/en/docs/claude-code/cli-reference#cli-flags) (e.g., `--max-turns 10 --model claude-4-0-sonnet-20250805`) | No | "" |
| `base_branch` | The base branch to use for creating new branches (e.g., 'main', 'develop') | No | - |
| `use_sticky_comment` | Use just one comment to deliver PR comments (only applies for pull_request event workflows) | No | `false` |
| `classify_inline_comments` | Buffer inline comments without `confirmed: true` and classify them (real review vs test/probe) via Haiku before posting after the session ends. Prevents subagent test comments. Set `'false'` to post all inline comments immediately | No | `true` |
| `github_token` | GitHub token for Claude to operate with. **Only include this if you're connecting a custom GitHub app of your own!** | No | - |
| `use_bedrock` | Use Amazon Bedrock with OIDC authentication instead of direct Anthropic API | No | `false` |
| `use_vertex` | Use Google Vertex AI with OIDC authentication instead of direct Anthropic API | No | `false` |
| `assignee_trigger` | The assignee username that triggers the action (e.g. @claude). Only used for issue assignment | No | - |
| `label_trigger` | The label name that triggers the action when applied to an issue (e.g. "claude") | No | - |
| `trigger_phrase` | The trigger phrase to look for in comments, issue/PR bodies, and issue titles | No | `@claude` |
| `branch_prefix` | The prefix to use for Claude branches (defaults to 'claude/', use 'claude-' for dash format) | No | `claude/` |
| `settings` | Claude Code settings as JSON string or path to settings JSON file | No | "" |
| `additional_permissions` | Additional permissions to enable. Currently supports 'actions: read' for viewing workflow results | No | "" |
| `use_commit_signing` | Enable commit signing using GitHub's API. Simple but cannot perform complex git operations like rebasing. See [Security](./security.md#commit-signing) | No | `false` |
| `ssh_signing_key` | SSH private key for signing commits. Enables signed commits with full git CLI support (rebasing, etc.). See [Security](./security.md#commit-signing) | No | "" |
| `bot_id` | GitHub user ID to use for git operations (defaults to Claude's bot ID). Required with `ssh_signing_key` for verified commits | No | `41898282` |
| `bot_name` | GitHub username to use for git operations (defaults to Claude's bot name). Required with `ssh_signing_key` for verified commits | No | `claude[bot]` |
| `include_comments_by_actor` | Comma-separated list of actor usernames to INCLUDE in comments. Supports the `*[bot]` wildcard to match all bot accounts. Empty (default) includes all actors | No | "" |
| `exclude_comments_by_actor` | Comma-separated list of actor usernames to EXCLUDE from comments. Supports the `*[bot]` wildcard to match all bot accounts. If an actor matches both lists, exclusion takes priority | No | "" |
| `allowed_bots` | Comma-separated list of allowed bot usernames, or '\*' to allow all bots. Empty string (default) allows no bots. **⚠️ On public repos with `'*'`, external Apps may be able to invoke this action.** See [Security](./security.md) | No | "" |
| `allowed_non_write_users` | **⚠️ RISKY**: Comma-separated list of usernames to allow without write permissions, or '\*' for all users. Only works with `github_token` input. See [Security](./security.md) | No | "" |
| `path_to_claude_code_executable` | Optional path to a custom Claude Code executable. Skips automatic installation. Useful for Nix, custom containers, or specialized environments | No | "" |
| `path_to_bun_executable` | Optional path to a custom Bun executable. Skips automatic Bun installation. Useful for Nix, custom containers, or specialized environments | No | "" |
| `plugin_marketplaces` | Newline-separated list of Claude Code plugin marketplace Git URLs to install from (e.g., see example in workflow above). Marketplaces are added before plugin installation | No | "" |
| `plugins` | Newline-separated list of Claude Code plugin names to install (e.g., see example in workflow above). Plugins are installed before Claude Code execution | No | "" |
### Deprecated Inputs
+22 -2
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,21 @@
name: Auto Fix CI Failures
# ⚠️ SECURITY NOTE
#
# This workflow checks out the PR branch and runs build/test commands
# (npm, bun, etc.) against it with elevated permissions (contents:write,
# id-token:write). This means code from the PR branch executes in a
# trusted context with access to secrets and the ability to push to the
# repository.
#
# Only use this workflow in repositories where everyone with write access
# is fully trusted with these permissions. Do not use this in repositories
# that accept contributions from untrusted or semi-trusted collaborators.
#
# The pull_requests[0] check below limits this to same-repo PRs (fork PRs
# are excluded), but anyone who can push a branch to this repository can
# control what code runs here.
on:
workflow_run:
workflows: ["CI"]
@@ -35,10 +51,14 @@ jobs:
- name: Create fix branch
id: branch
env:
HEAD_BRANCH: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}
RUN_ID: ${{ github.run_id }}
run: |
BRANCH_NAME="claude-auto-fix-ci-${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}-${{ github.run_id }}"
SAFE_BRANCH=$(printf '%s' "$HEAD_BRANCH" | tr -cd 'a-zA-Z0-9/_.-')
BRANCH_NAME="claude-auto-fix-ci-${SAFE_BRANCH}-${RUN_ID}"
git checkout -b "$BRANCH_NAME"
echo "branch_name=$BRANCH_NAME" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo "branch_name=$BRANCH_NAME" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
- name: Get CI failure details
id: failure_details
+5 -3
View File
@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ jobs:
fromJSON(steps.detect.outputs.structured_output).confidence >= 0.7
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
WORKFLOW_NAME: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.name }}
HEAD_BRANCH: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}
run: |
OUTPUT='${{ steps.detect.outputs.structured_output }}'
CONFIDENCE=$(echo "$OUTPUT" | jq -r '.confidence')
@@ -63,8 +65,7 @@ jobs:
echo ""
echo "Triggering automatic retry..."
gh workflow run "${{ github.event.workflow_run.name }}" \
--ref "${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}"
gh workflow run "$WORKFLOW_NAME" --ref "$HEAD_BRANCH"
# Low confidence flaky detection - skip retry
- name: Low confidence detection
@@ -83,13 +84,14 @@ jobs:
if: github.event.workflow_run.event == 'pull_request'
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
HEAD_BRANCH: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}
run: |
OUTPUT='${{ steps.detect.outputs.structured_output }}'
IS_FLAKY=$(echo "$OUTPUT" | jq -r '.is_flaky')
CONFIDENCE=$(echo "$OUTPUT" | jq -r '.confidence')
SUMMARY=$(echo "$OUTPUT" | jq -r '.summary')
pr_number=$(gh pr list --head "${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}" --json number --jq '.[0].number')
pr_number=$(gh pr list --head "$HEAD_BRANCH" --json number --jq '.[0].number')
if [ -n "$pr_number" ]; then
if [ "$IS_FLAKY" = "true" ]; then
+1 -1
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
"dependencies": {
"@actions/core": "^1.10.1",
"@actions/github": "^6.0.1",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.2.66",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.2.92",
"@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.11.0",
"@octokit/graphql": "^8.2.2",
"@octokit/rest": "^21.1.1",
+11 -15
View File
@@ -1,22 +1,26 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
#
# Edits labels on a GitHub issue.
# Usage: ./scripts/edit-issue-labels.sh --issue 123 --add-label bug --add-label needs-triage --remove-label untriaged
# Usage: ./scripts/edit-issue-labels.sh --add-label bug --add-label needs-triage --remove-label untriaged
#
# The issue number is read from the workflow event payload.
#
set -euo pipefail
ISSUE=""
# Read from event payload so the issue number is bound to the triggering event
ISSUE=$(jq -r '.issue.number // empty' "${GITHUB_EVENT_PATH:?GITHUB_EVENT_PATH not set}")
if ! [[ "$ISSUE" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then
echo "Error: no issue number in event payload" >&2
exit 1
fi
ADD_LABELS=()
REMOVE_LABELS=()
# Parse arguments
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case $1 in
--issue)
ISSUE="$2"
shift 2
;;
--add-label)
ADD_LABELS+=("$2")
shift 2
@@ -26,20 +30,12 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
shift 2
;;
*)
echo "Error: unknown argument (only --add-label and --remove-label are accepted)" >&2
exit 1
;;
esac
done
# Validate issue number
if [[ -z "$ISSUE" ]]; then
exit 1
fi
if ! [[ "$ISSUE" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then
exit 1
fi
if [[ ${#ADD_LABELS[@]} -eq 0 && ${#REMOVE_LABELS[@]} -eq 0 ]]; then
exit 1
fi
+36
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
# Wrapper around `git push` that only allows `origin <ref>` with no flags.
# Defends against --receive-pack / --exec RCE and arbitrary-remote exfiltration
# (H1 #3556799). `git push:*` in allowedTools permits `git push --receive-pack='sh -c ...' ext::sh`
# which runs arbitrary shell on the Actions runner. This wrapper closes that.
#
# Usage:
# git-push.sh origin HEAD
# git-push.sh origin claude/issue-123-20260304
if [[ $# -ne 2 ]]; then
echo "Error: exactly two arguments required: origin <ref>" >&2
exit 1
fi
for arg in "$@"; do
if [[ "$arg" == -* ]]; then
echo "Error: flags are not allowed (got: $arg)" >&2
exit 1
fi
done
if [[ "$1" != "origin" ]]; then
echo "Error: remote must be 'origin' (got: $1)" >&2
exit 1
fi
REF="$2"
if [[ "$REF" != "HEAD" ]] && ! git check-ref-format --branch "$REF" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "Error: invalid ref: $REF" >&2
exit 1
fi
exec git push origin "$REF"
+13 -18
View File
@@ -23,19 +23,15 @@ import { GITHUB_SERVER_URL } from "../github/api/config";
import { extractUserRequest } from "../utils/extract-user-request";
export type { CommonFields, PreparedContext } from "./types";
const GIT_PUSH_WRAPPER = `${process.env.GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/scripts/git-push.sh`;
/** Filename for the user request file, read by the SDK runner */
const USER_REQUEST_FILENAME = "claude-user-request.txt";
// Tag mode defaults - these tools are needed for tag mode to function
const BASE_ALLOWED_TOOLS = [
"Edit",
"MultiEdit",
"Glob",
"Grep",
"LS",
"Read",
"Write",
];
// Tag mode defaults - these tools are needed for tag mode to function.
// Edit/MultiEdit/Write are intentionally omitted: acceptEdits permission mode
// auto-allows file edits inside $GITHUB_WORKSPACE and denies writes outside it.
const BASE_ALLOWED_TOOLS = ["Glob", "Grep", "LS", "Read"];
export function buildAllowedToolsString(
customAllowedTools?: string[],
@@ -59,10 +55,7 @@ export function buildAllowedToolsString(
baseTools.push(
"Bash(git add:*)",
"Bash(git commit:*)",
"Bash(git push:*)",
"Bash(git status:*)",
"Bash(git diff:*)",
"Bash(git log:*)",
`Bash(${GIT_PUSH_WRAPPER}:*)`,
"Bash(git rm:*)",
);
}
@@ -434,7 +427,7 @@ function getCommitInstructions(
Bash(git commit -m "<message>\\n\\n${coAuthorLine}")`
: ""
}
- Push to the remote: Bash(git push origin HEAD)`;
- Push to the remote: Bash(${GIT_PUSH_WRAPPER} origin HEAD)`;
} else {
const branchName = eventData.claudeBranch || eventData.baseBranch;
return `
@@ -448,7 +441,7 @@ function getCommitInstructions(
Bash(git commit -m "<message>\\n\\n${coAuthorLine}")`
: ""
}
- Push to the remote: Bash(git push origin ${branchName})`;
- Push to the remote: Bash(${GIT_PUSH_WRAPPER} origin ${branchName})`;
}
}
}
@@ -823,7 +816,7 @@ ${
: `- Use git commands via the Bash tool for version control (remember that you have access to these git commands):
- Stage files: Bash(git add <files>)
- Commit changes: Bash(git commit -m "<message>")
- Push to remote: Bash(git push origin <branch>) (NEVER force push)
- Push to remote: Bash(${GIT_PUSH_WRAPPER} origin <branch>)
- Delete files: Bash(git rm <files>) followed by commit and push
- Check status: Bash(git status)
- View diff: Bash(git diff)${eventData.isPR && eventData.baseBranch ? `\n - IMPORTANT: For PR diffs, use: Bash(git diff origin/${eventData.baseBranch}...HEAD)` : ""}`
@@ -977,7 +970,9 @@ export async function createPrompt(
console.log("========================");
}
// Set allowed tools
// NOTE: these env var exports are dead — nothing reads ALLOWED_TOOLS / DISALLOWED_TOOLS.
// The live path is modes/tag/index.ts which builds --allowedTools into claudeArgs directly.
// Kept only so the H1 report's pointed-to file stays in sync with the live fix.
const hasActionsReadPermission = false;
const allAllowedTools = buildAllowedToolsString(
+1
View File
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ export function collectActionInputsPresence(): string {
github_token: "",
max_turns: "",
use_sticky_comment: "false",
classify_inline_comments: "true",
use_commit_signing: "false",
ssh_signing_key: "",
};
@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bun
/**
* Reads buffered inline-comment calls from /tmp/inline-comments-buffer.jsonl,
* classifies each as "real review" vs "test/probe" using Haiku, and posts
* only the real ones. Calls with confirmed=false are never posted.
*
* If the Anthropic API is unavailable (Bedrock/Vertex users without a direct
* key), falls back to posting everything with confirmed !== false. This
* preserves backward compatibility — before this change, all unconfirmed
* calls posted immediately.
*/
import { readFileSync } from "fs";
import { createOctokit } from "../github/api/client";
const BUFFER_PATH = "/tmp/inline-comments-buffer.jsonl";
type BufferedComment = {
ts: string;
path: string;
line?: number;
startLine?: number;
side?: "LEFT" | "RIGHT";
commit_id?: string;
body: string;
confirmed?: boolean;
};
const CLASSIFICATION_PROMPT = `You are classifying PR inline comments as either REAL code review feedback or TEST/PROBE calls.
A TEST/PROBE call is when an automated agent is checking whether a commenting tool works. These typically:
- Start with phrases like "Test comment", "Testing if", "Can I", "Does this work", "Checking if"
- Have generic/placeholder content not specific to any code
- Exist to verify tool functionality, not to provide review feedback
A REAL review comment:
- Discusses specific code, logic, bugs, or style
- Provides actionable feedback for the PR author
- References concrete aspects of the change
For each numbered comment body below, respond with ONLY a JSON array of booleans where true = REAL review comment, false = test/probe. No other text.
Comments:
`;
async function classifyComments(bodies: string[]): Promise<boolean[] | null> {
const apiKey = process.env.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY;
if (!apiKey) {
console.log(
"ANTHROPIC_API_KEY not set — skipping classification, posting all unconfirmed comments",
);
return null;
}
const prompt =
CLASSIFICATION_PROMPT +
bodies.map((b, i) => `${i + 1}. ${JSON.stringify(b)}`).join("\n");
try {
const res = await fetch("https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages", {
method: "POST",
headers: {
"content-type": "application/json",
"x-api-key": apiKey,
"anthropic-version": "2023-06-01",
},
body: JSON.stringify({
model: "claude-haiku-4-5",
max_tokens: 1024,
messages: [{ role: "user", content: prompt }],
}),
});
if (!res.ok) {
console.log(
`Classification API returned ${res.status} — posting all unconfirmed comments`,
);
return null;
}
const data = (await res.json()) as {
content: { type: string; text: string }[];
};
const text = data.content.find((c) => c.type === "text")?.text ?? "";
const match = text.match(/\[[\s\S]*\]/);
if (!match) {
console.log(
"Could not parse classification response — posting all unconfirmed comments",
);
return null;
}
const parsed = JSON.parse(match[0]);
if (
!Array.isArray(parsed) ||
parsed.length !== bodies.length ||
!parsed.every((v) => typeof v === "boolean")
) {
console.log(
"Classification response shape mismatch — posting all unconfirmed comments",
);
return null;
}
return parsed;
} catch (e) {
console.log(
`Classification failed (${e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)}) — posting all unconfirmed comments`,
);
return null;
}
}
async function postComment(
octokit: ReturnType<typeof createOctokit>["rest"],
owner: string,
repo: string,
pull_number: number,
headSha: string,
c: BufferedComment,
): Promise<boolean> {
const params: Parameters<typeof octokit.rest.pulls.createReviewComment>[0] = {
owner,
repo,
pull_number,
body: c.body,
path: c.path,
side: c.side || "RIGHT",
commit_id: c.commit_id || headSha,
};
if (c.startLine) {
params.start_line = c.startLine;
params.start_side = c.side || "RIGHT";
params.line = c.line;
} else {
params.line = c.line;
}
try {
await octokit.rest.pulls.createReviewComment(params);
return true;
} catch (e) {
console.log(
` failed ${c.path}:${c.line}: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)}`,
);
return false;
}
}
async function main() {
let raw: string;
try {
raw = readFileSync(BUFFER_PATH, "utf8");
} catch {
console.log("No buffered inline comments");
return;
}
const comments: BufferedComment[] = raw
.split("\n")
.filter(Boolean)
.map((line) => JSON.parse(line));
if (comments.length === 0) {
console.log("No buffered inline comments");
return;
}
console.log(`Found ${comments.length} buffered inline comment(s)`);
const githubToken = process.env.GITHUB_TOKEN;
const owner = process.env.REPO_OWNER;
const repo = process.env.REPO_NAME;
const prNumber = process.env.PR_NUMBER;
if (!githubToken || !owner || !repo || !prNumber) {
console.log(
"::warning::Missing GITHUB_TOKEN/REPO_OWNER/REPO_NAME/PR_NUMBER — cannot post buffered comments",
);
return;
}
// Partition: confirmed=false are never posted; the rest are candidates
const neverPost = comments.filter((c) => c.confirmed === false);
const candidates = comments.filter((c) => c.confirmed !== false);
if (neverPost.length > 0) {
console.log(` ${neverPost.length} with confirmed=false — not posting`);
}
if (candidates.length === 0) {
return;
}
// Classify candidates
const verdicts = await classifyComments(candidates.map((c) => c.body));
const toPost =
verdicts === null
? candidates
: candidates.filter((_, i) => verdicts[i] === true);
const filtered =
verdicts === null ? [] : candidates.filter((_, i) => verdicts[i] === false);
if (filtered.length > 0) {
console.log(
`::warning::${filtered.length} buffered comment(s) classified as test/probe — NOT posted:`,
);
for (const c of filtered) {
console.log(` [${c.path}:${c.line}] ${c.body.slice(0, 120)}`);
}
}
if (toPost.length === 0) {
console.log("No real comments to post");
return;
}
const octokit = createOctokit(githubToken).rest;
const pull_number = parseInt(prNumber, 10);
const pr = await octokit.pulls.get({ owner, repo, pull_number });
const headSha = pr.data.head.sha;
console.log(`Posting ${toPost.length} classified-as-real comment(s)`);
let posted = 0;
for (const c of toPost) {
if (await postComment(octokit, owner, repo, pull_number, headSha, c)) {
console.log(` posted ${c.path}:${c.line}`);
posted++;
}
}
console.log(`Posted ${posted}/${toPost.length}`);
}
main().catch((e) => {
console.error("post-buffered-inline-comments failed:", e);
process.exit(1);
});
+35 -3
View File
@@ -15,12 +15,20 @@ import { setupGitHubToken, WorkflowValidationSkipError } from "../github/token";
import { checkWritePermissions } from "../github/validation/permissions";
import { createOctokit } from "../github/api/client";
import type { Octokits } from "../github/api/client";
import { parseGitHubContext, isEntityContext } from "../github/context";
import {
parseGitHubContext,
isEntityContext,
isPullRequestEvent,
isPullRequestReviewEvent,
isPullRequestReviewCommentEvent,
} from "../github/context";
import type { GitHubContext } from "../github/context";
import { detectMode } from "../modes/detector";
import { prepareTagMode } from "../modes/tag";
import { prepareAgentMode } from "../modes/agent";
import { checkContainsTrigger } from "../github/validation/trigger";
import { restoreConfigFromBase } from "../github/operations/restore-config";
import { validateBranchName } from "../github/operations/branch";
import { collectActionInputsPresence } from "./collect-inputs";
import { updateCommentLink } from "./update-comment-link";
import { formatTurnsFromData } from "./format-turns";
@@ -51,7 +59,7 @@ async function installClaudeCode(): Promise<void> {
return;
}
const claudeCodeVersion = "2.1.66";
const claudeCodeVersion = "2.1.92";
console.log(`Installing Claude Code v${claudeCodeVersion}...`);
for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= 3; attempt++) {
@@ -217,6 +225,30 @@ async function run() {
validateEnvironmentVariables();
// On PRs, .claude/ and .mcp.json in the checkout are attacker-controlled.
// Restore them from the base branch before the CLI reads them.
//
// We read pull_request.base.ref from the payload directly because agent
// mode's branchInfo.baseBranch defaults to the repo's default branch rather
// than the PR's actual target (agent/index.ts). For issue_comment on a PR the payload
// lacks base.ref, so we fall back to the mode-provided value — tag mode
// fetches it from GraphQL; agent mode on issue_comment is an edge case
// that at worst restores from the wrong trusted branch (still secure).
if (isEntityContext(context) && context.isPR) {
let restoreBase = baseBranch;
if (
isPullRequestEvent(context) ||
isPullRequestReviewEvent(context) ||
isPullRequestReviewCommentEvent(context)
) {
restoreBase = context.payload.pull_request.base.ref;
validateBranchName(restoreBase);
}
if (restoreBase) {
restoreConfigFromBase(restoreBase);
}
}
await setupClaudeCodeSettings(process.env.INPUT_SETTINGS);
await installPlugins(
@@ -280,7 +312,7 @@ async function run() {
commentId,
githubToken,
claudeBranch,
baseBranch: baseBranch || "main",
baseBranch: baseBranch || context.repository.default_branch || "main",
triggerUsername: context.actor,
context,
octokit,
+2 -1
View File
@@ -253,7 +253,8 @@ async function run() {
commentId: parseInt(process.env.CLAUDE_COMMENT_ID!),
githubToken,
claudeBranch: process.env.CLAUDE_BRANCH,
baseBranch: process.env.BASE_BRANCH || "main",
baseBranch:
process.env.BASE_BRANCH || context.repository.default_branch || "main",
triggerUsername: process.env.TRIGGER_USERNAME,
context,
octokit,
+4
View File
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ type BaseContext = {
owner: string;
repo: string;
full_name: string;
default_branch?: string;
};
actor: string;
inputs: {
@@ -90,6 +91,7 @@ type BaseContext = {
branchPrefix: string;
branchNameTemplate?: string;
useStickyComment: boolean;
classifyInlineComments: boolean;
useCommitSigning: boolean;
sshSigningKey: string;
botId: string;
@@ -139,6 +141,7 @@ export function parseGitHubContext(): GitHubContext {
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
full_name: `${context.repo.owner}/${context.repo.repo}`,
default_branch: context.payload.repository?.default_branch,
},
actor: context.actor,
inputs: {
@@ -150,6 +153,7 @@ export function parseGitHubContext(): GitHubContext {
branchPrefix: process.env.BRANCH_PREFIX ?? "claude/",
branchNameTemplate: process.env.BRANCH_NAME_TEMPLATE,
useStickyComment: process.env.USE_STICKY_COMMENT === "true",
classifyInlineComments: process.env.CLASSIFY_INLINE_COMMENTS !== "false",
useCommitSigning: process.env.USE_COMMIT_SIGNING === "true",
sshSigningKey: process.env.SSH_SIGNING_KEY || "",
botId: process.env.BOT_ID ?? String(CLAUDE_APP_BOT_ID),
+1 -1
View File
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ export async function fetchGitHubData({
includeCommentsByActor,
excludeCommentsByActor,
);
reviewData = pullRequest.reviews || [];
reviewData = pullRequest.reviews || { nodes: [] };
console.log(`Successfully fetched PR #${prNumber} data`);
} else {
+7 -5
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ function extractFirstLabel(githubData: FetchDataResult): string | undefined {
*
* Valid branch names:
* - Start with alphanumeric character (not dash, to prevent option injection)
* - Contain only alphanumeric, forward slash, hyphen, underscore, or period
* - Contain only alphanumeric, forward slash, hyphen, underscore, period, or hash (#)
* - Do not start or end with a period
* - Do not end with a slash
* - Do not contain '..' (path traversal)
@@ -58,12 +58,14 @@ export function validateBranchName(branchName: string): void {
);
}
// Strict whitelist pattern: alphanumeric start, then alphanumeric/slash/hyphen/underscore/period
const validPattern = /^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9/_.-]*$/;
// Strict whitelist pattern: alphanumeric start, then alphanumeric/slash/hyphen/underscore/period/hash.
// # is valid per git-check-ref-format and commonly used in branch names like "fix/#123-description".
// All git calls use execFileSync (not shell interpolation), so # carries no injection risk.
const validPattern = /^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9/_.#-]*$/;
if (!validPattern.test(branchName)) {
throw new Error(
`Invalid branch name: "${branchName}". Branch names must start with an alphanumeric character and contain only alphanumeric characters, forward slashes, hyphens, underscores, or periods.`,
`Invalid branch name: "${branchName}". Branch names must start with an alphanumeric character and contain only alphanumeric characters, forward slashes, hyphens, underscores, periods, or hashes (#).`,
);
}
@@ -118,7 +120,7 @@ export function validateBranchName(branchName: string): void {
* @param args - Git command arguments (e.g., ["checkout", "branch-name"])
*/
function execGit(args: string[]): void {
execFileSync("git", args, { stdio: "inherit" });
execFileSync("git", args, { stdio: "inherit", env: process.env });
}
export type BranchInfo = {
+28 -5
View File
@@ -51,11 +51,34 @@ export async function configureGitAuth(
console.log("No existing authentication headers to remove");
}
// Update the remote URL to include the token for authentication
console.log("Updating remote URL with authentication...");
const remoteUrl = `https://x-access-token:${githubToken}@${serverUrl.host}/${context.repository.owner}/${context.repository.repo}.git`;
await $`git remote set-url origin ${remoteUrl}`;
console.log("✓ Updated remote URL with authentication token");
if (process.env.ALLOWED_NON_WRITE_USERS) {
// When processing content from non-write users, use a credential helper
// instead of embedding the token in the remote URL. The helper script reads
// from GH_TOKEN at auth time, so .git/config stays token-free. Written as a
// file to avoid shell-escaping the helper body; placed under
// GITHUB_ACTION_PATH so it sits alongside the action source.
console.log("Configuring git credential helper...");
process.env.GH_TOKEN = githubToken;
const helperPath = join(
process.env.GITHUB_ACTION_PATH || homedir(),
".git-credential-gh-token",
);
await writeFile(
helperPath,
'#!/bin/sh\necho username=x-access-token\necho password="$GH_TOKEN"\n',
{ mode: 0o700 },
);
const cleanUrl = `https://${serverUrl.host}/${context.repository.owner}/${context.repository.repo}.git`;
await $`git remote set-url origin ${cleanUrl}`;
await $`git config credential.helper ${helperPath}`;
console.log("✓ Configured credential helper");
} else {
// Update the remote URL to include the token for authentication
console.log("Updating remote URL with authentication...");
const remoteUrl = `https://x-access-token:${githubToken}@${serverUrl.host}/${context.repository.owner}/${context.repository.repo}.git`;
await $`git remote set-url origin ${remoteUrl}`;
console.log("✓ Updated remote URL with authentication token");
}
console.log("Git authentication configured successfully");
}
+109
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
import { execFileSync } from "child_process";
import { cpSync, existsSync, rmSync } from "fs";
// Paths that are both PR-controllable and read from cwd at CLI startup.
//
// Deliberately excluded from the CLI's broader auto-edit blocklist:
// .git/ — not tracked by git; PR commits cannot place files there.
// Restoring it would also undo the PR checkout entirely.
// .gitconfig — git reads ~/.gitconfig and .git/config, never cwd/.gitconfig.
// .bashrc etc. — shells source these from $HOME; checkout cannot reach $HOME.
// .vscode/.idea— IDE config; nothing in the CLI's startup path reads them.
const SENSITIVE_PATHS = [
".claude",
".mcp.json",
".claude.json",
".gitmodules",
".ripgreprc",
"CLAUDE.md",
"CLAUDE.local.md",
".husky",
];
/**
* Restores security-sensitive config paths from the PR base branch.
*
* The CLI's non-interactive mode trusts cwd: it reads `.mcp.json`,
* `.claude/settings.json`, and `.claude/settings.local.json` from the working
* directory and acts on them before any tool-permission gating — executing
* hooks (including SessionStart), setting env vars (NODE_OPTIONS, LD_PRELOAD,
* PATH), running apiKeyHelper/awsAuthRefresh shell commands, and auto-approving
* MCP servers. When this action checks out a PR head, all of these are
* attacker-controlled.
*
* Rather than enumerate every dangerous key, this replaces the entire `.claude/`
* tree and `.mcp.json` with the versions from the PR base branch, which a
* maintainer has reviewed and merged. Paths absent on base are deleted.
*
* Known limitation: if a PR legitimately modifies `.claude/` and the CLI later
* commits with `git add -A`, the revert will be included in that commit. This
* is a narrow UX tradeoff for closing the RCE surface.
*
* @param baseBranch - PR base branch name. Must be pre-validated (branch.ts
* calls validateBranchName on it before returning).
*/
export function restoreConfigFromBase(baseBranch: string): void {
console.log(
`Restoring ${SENSITIVE_PATHS.join(", ")} from origin/${baseBranch} (PR head is untrusted)`,
);
// Snapshot every PR-authored sensitive path into .claude-pr/ before deletion
// so review agents can inspect what the PR changes without those files ever
// being executed. Captured before the security delete so it reflects the
// PR-authored version.
rmSync(".claude-pr", { recursive: true, force: true });
for (const p of SENSITIVE_PATHS) {
if (existsSync(p)) {
cpSync(p, `.claude-pr/${p}`, { recursive: true });
}
}
if (existsSync(".claude-pr")) {
console.log(
"Preserved PR's sensitive paths → .claude-pr/ for review agents (not executed)",
);
}
// Delete PR-controlled versions BEFORE fetching so the attacker-controlled
// .gitmodules is absent during the network operation. If git reads .gitmodules
// during fetch (fetch.recurseSubmodules=on-demand, the git default), it will
// attempt to fetch submodule objects and block on credential prompts in CI —
// causing an indefinite hang. Deleting first closes that window.
//
// If the restore below fails for a given path, that path stays deleted —
// the safe fallback (no attacker-controlled config). A bare `git checkout`
// alone wouldn't remove files the PR added, so nuke first.
for (const p of SENSITIVE_PATHS) {
rmSync(p, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
// --no-recurse-submodules: explicitly suppress submodule fetching regardless of
// fetch.recurseSubmodules config. Defense-in-depth alongside the delete above.
execFileSync(
"git",
["fetch", "origin", baseBranch, "--depth=1", "--no-recurse-submodules"],
{
stdio: "inherit",
env: process.env,
},
);
for (const p of SENSITIVE_PATHS) {
try {
execFileSync("git", ["checkout", `origin/${baseBranch}`, "--", p], {
stdio: "pipe",
});
} catch {
// Path doesn't exist on base — it stays deleted.
}
}
// `git checkout <ref> -- <path>` stages the restored files. Unstage so the
// revert doesn't silently leak into commits the CLI makes later.
try {
execFileSync("git", ["reset", "--", ...SENSITIVE_PATHS], {
stdio: "pipe",
});
} catch {
// Nothing was staged, or paths don't exist on HEAD — either is fine.
}
}
+6 -2
View File
@@ -141,10 +141,14 @@ export async function setupGitHubToken(): Promise<string> {
const permissions = parseAdditionalPermissions();
console.log("Exchanging OIDC token for app token...");
const appToken = await retryWithBackoff(() =>
exchangeForAppToken(oidcToken, permissions),
const appToken = await retryWithBackoff(
() => exchangeForAppToken(oidcToken, permissions),
{
shouldRetry: (error) => !(error instanceof WorkflowValidationSkipError),
},
);
console.log("App token successfully obtained");
core.setSecret(appToken);
console.log("Using GITHUB_TOKEN from OIDC");
return appToken;
+57 -3
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
#!/usr/bin/env node
import { McpServer } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js";
import { StdioServerTransport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/stdio.js";
import { appendFileSync } from "fs";
import { z } from "zod";
import { createOctokit } from "../github/api/client";
import { sanitizeContent } from "../github/utils/sanitizer";
@@ -10,6 +11,13 @@ const REPO_OWNER = process.env.REPO_OWNER;
const REPO_NAME = process.env.REPO_NAME;
const PR_NUMBER = process.env.PR_NUMBER;
// Calls without confirmed=true are buffered here instead of posted. This
// prevents subagents from posting test/probe comments when they inherit this
// tool and probe it after hitting unrelated errors. The action's post-step
// reports the buffer count for diagnostics.
const BUFFER_PATH = "/tmp/inline-comments-buffer.jsonl";
const CLASSIFY_ENABLED = process.env.CLASSIFY_INLINE_COMMENTS !== "false";
if (!REPO_OWNER || !REPO_NAME || !PR_NUMBER) {
console.error(
"Error: REPO_OWNER, REPO_NAME, and PR_NUMBER environment variables are required",
@@ -67,8 +75,17 @@ server.tool(
.describe(
"Specific commit SHA to comment on (defaults to latest commit)",
),
confirmed: z
.boolean()
.optional()
.describe(
"Set true to post immediately. When omitted, the call is buffered " +
"and classified after the session completes — real review comments " +
"post, test/probe comments are dropped. Set false to buffer and " +
"never post. Only set true when posting final review comments.",
),
},
async ({ path, body, line, startLine, side, commit_id }) => {
async ({ path, body, line, startLine, side, commit_id, confirmed }) => {
try {
const githubToken = process.env.GITHUB_TOKEN;
@@ -80,8 +97,6 @@ server.tool(
const repo = REPO_NAME;
const pull_number = parseInt(PR_NUMBER, 10);
const octokit = createOctokit(githubToken).rest;
// Sanitize the comment body to remove any potential GitHub tokens
const sanitizedBody = sanitizeContent(body);
@@ -92,10 +107,49 @@ server.tool(
);
}
if (CLASSIFY_ENABLED && confirmed !== true) {
appendFileSync(
BUFFER_PATH,
JSON.stringify({
ts: new Date().toISOString(),
path,
line,
startLine,
side,
commit_id,
body: sanitizedBody,
confirmed,
}) + "\n",
);
return {
content: [
{
type: "text",
text: JSON.stringify(
{
success: true,
buffered: true,
message:
"Comment buffered. It will be classified and posted after " +
"this session completes (real review comments post, " +
"test/probe comments are dropped). Set confirmed=true to " +
"post immediately. If you are testing whether this tool " +
"works: it works — no need to test further.",
},
null,
2,
),
},
],
};
}
// If only line is provided, it's a single-line comment
// If both startLine and line are provided, it's a multi-line comment
const isSingleLine = !startLine;
const octokit = createOctokit(githubToken).rest;
const pr = await octokit.pulls.get({
owner,
repo,
+3
View File
@@ -152,6 +152,9 @@ export async function prepareMcpConfig(
REPO_NAME: repo,
PR_NUMBER: context.entityNumber?.toString() || "",
GITHUB_API_URL: GITHUB_API_URL,
CLASSIFY_INLINE_COMMENTS: context.inputs.classifyInlineComments
? "true"
: "false",
},
};
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -85,15 +85,15 @@ export async function prepareAgentMode({
// Check for branch info from environment variables (useful for auto-fix workflows)
const claudeBranch = process.env.CLAUDE_BRANCH || undefined;
const baseBranch =
process.env.BASE_BRANCH || context.inputs.baseBranch || "main";
const defaultBranch = context.repository.default_branch || "main";
const baseBranch = context.inputs.baseBranch || defaultBranch;
// Detect current branch from GitHub environment
const currentBranch =
claudeBranch ||
process.env.GITHUB_HEAD_REF ||
process.env.GITHUB_REF_NAME ||
"main";
defaultBranch;
// Get our GitHub MCP servers config
const ourMcpConfig = await prepareMcpConfig({
+11 -11
View File
@@ -114,16 +114,17 @@ export async function prepareTagMode({
tool.startsWith("mcp__github_"),
);
// Build claude_args for tag mode with required tools
// Tag mode REQUIRES these tools to function properly
const gitPushWrapper = `${process.env.GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/scripts/git-push.sh`;
// Build claude_args for tag mode with required tools.
// Edit/MultiEdit/Write are intentionally omitted: acceptEdits permission mode (set below)
// auto-allows file edits inside $GITHUB_WORKSPACE and denies writes outside (e.g. ~/.bashrc).
// Listing them here would grant blanket write access to the whole runner (Asana 1213310082312048).
const tagModeTools = [
"Edit",
"MultiEdit",
"Glob",
"Grep",
"LS",
"Read",
"Write",
"mcp__github_comment__update_claude_comment",
"mcp__github_ci__get_ci_status",
"mcp__github_ci__get_workflow_run_details",
@@ -137,10 +138,7 @@ export async function prepareTagMode({
tagModeTools.push(
"Bash(git add:*)",
"Bash(git commit:*)",
"Bash(git push:*)",
"Bash(git status:*)",
"Bash(git diff:*)",
"Bash(git log:*)",
`Bash(${gitPushWrapper}:*)`,
"Bash(git rm:*)",
);
} else {
@@ -171,8 +169,10 @@ export async function prepareTagMode({
const escapedOurConfig = ourMcpConfig.replace(/'/g, "'\\''");
claudeArgs = `--mcp-config '${escapedOurConfig}'`;
// Add required tools for tag mode
claudeArgs += ` --allowedTools "${tagModeTools.join(",")}"`;
// Add required tools for tag mode.
// acceptEdits: file edits auto-allowed inside cwd ($GITHUB_WORKSPACE), denied outside.
// Headless SDK has no prompt handler, so anything that falls through to "ask" is denied.
claudeArgs += ` --permission-mode acceptEdits --allowedTools "${tagModeTools.join(",")}"`;
// Append user's claude_args (which may have more --mcp-config flags)
if (userClaudeArgs) {
+7
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ export type RetryOptions = {
initialDelayMs?: number;
maxDelayMs?: number;
backoffFactor?: number;
shouldRetry?: (error: Error) => boolean;
};
export async function retryWithBackoff<T>(
@@ -14,6 +15,7 @@ export async function retryWithBackoff<T>(
initialDelayMs = 5000,
maxDelayMs = 20000,
backoffFactor = 2,
shouldRetry,
} = options;
let delayMs = initialDelayMs;
@@ -27,6 +29,11 @@ export async function retryWithBackoff<T>(
lastError = error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error));
console.error(`Attempt ${attempt} failed:`, lastError.message);
if (shouldRetry && !shouldRetry(lastError)) {
console.error("Error is not retryable, giving up immediately");
throw lastError;
}
if (attempt < maxAttempts) {
console.log(`Retrying in ${delayMs / 1000} seconds...`);
await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, delayMs));
+23 -21
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bun
import { describe, test, expect } from "bun:test";
import { describe, test, expect, beforeAll } from "bun:test";
import {
generatePrompt,
getEventTypeAndContext,
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@ import {
} from "../src/create-prompt";
import type { PreparedContext } from "../src/create-prompt";
beforeAll(() => {
process.env.GITHUB_ACTION_PATH = "/test/action/path";
});
describe("generatePrompt", () => {
const mockGitHubData = {
contextData: {
@@ -505,7 +509,7 @@ describe("generatePrompt", () => {
const prompt = await generatePrompt(envVars, mockGitHubData, false, "tag");
// Should contain PR-specific instructions (git commands when not using signing)
expect(prompt).toContain("git push");
expect(prompt).toContain("scripts/git-push.sh origin");
expect(prompt).toContain(
"Always push to the existing branch when triggered on a PR",
);
@@ -643,7 +647,7 @@ describe("generatePrompt", () => {
const prompt = await generatePrompt(envVars, mockGitHubData, false, "tag");
// Should contain open PR instructions (git commands when not using signing)
expect(prompt).toContain("git push");
expect(prompt).toContain("scripts/git-push.sh origin");
expect(prompt).toContain(
"Always push to the existing branch when triggered on a PR",
);
@@ -757,7 +761,7 @@ describe("generatePrompt", () => {
expect(prompt).toContain("Use git commands via the Bash tool");
expect(prompt).toContain("git add");
expect(prompt).toContain("git commit");
expect(prompt).toContain("git push");
expect(prompt).toContain("scripts/git-push.sh origin");
// Should use the minimal comment tool
expect(prompt).toContain("mcp__github_comment__update_claude_comment");
@@ -886,17 +890,18 @@ describe("buildAllowedToolsString", () => {
const result = buildAllowedToolsString();
// The base tools should be in the result
expect(result).toContain("Edit");
// Edit/MultiEdit/Write are NOT in allowedTools — acceptEdits permission mode handles them
expect(result).not.toContain("Edit");
expect(result).not.toContain("Write");
expect(result).toContain("Glob");
expect(result).toContain("Grep");
expect(result).toContain("LS");
expect(result).toContain("Read");
expect(result).toContain("Write");
// Default is no commit signing, so should have specific Bash git commands
expect(result).toContain("Bash(git add:*)");
expect(result).toContain("Bash(git commit:*)");
expect(result).toContain("Bash(git push:*)");
expect(result).toContain("scripts/git-push.sh:*)");
expect(result).toContain("mcp__github_comment__update_claude_comment");
// Should not have commit signing tools
@@ -908,12 +913,12 @@ describe("buildAllowedToolsString", () => {
const result = buildAllowedToolsString([], false, false);
// The base tools should be in the result
expect(result).toContain("Edit");
expect(result).not.toContain("Edit");
expect(result).toContain("Glob");
expect(result).toContain("Grep");
expect(result).toContain("LS");
expect(result).toContain("Read");
expect(result).toContain("Write");
expect(result).not.toContain("Write");
// Should have specific Bash git commands for non-signing mode
expect(result).toContain("Bash(git add:*)");
@@ -930,7 +935,7 @@ describe("buildAllowedToolsString", () => {
const result = buildAllowedToolsString(customTools);
// Base tools should be present
expect(result).toContain("Edit");
expect(result).toContain("Read");
expect(result).toContain("Glob");
// Custom tools should be appended
@@ -950,7 +955,7 @@ describe("buildAllowedToolsString", () => {
const result = buildAllowedToolsString([], true);
// Base tools should be present
expect(result).toContain("Edit");
expect(result).toContain("Read");
expect(result).toContain("Glob");
// GitHub Actions tools should be included
@@ -964,7 +969,7 @@ describe("buildAllowedToolsString", () => {
const result = buildAllowedToolsString(customTools, true);
// Base tools should be present
expect(result).toContain("Edit");
expect(result).toContain("Read");
// Custom tools should be included
expect(result).toContain("Tool1");
@@ -980,12 +985,12 @@ describe("buildAllowedToolsString", () => {
const result = buildAllowedToolsString([], false, true);
// Base tools should be present
expect(result).toContain("Edit");
expect(result).not.toContain("Edit");
expect(result).toContain("Glob");
expect(result).toContain("Grep");
expect(result).toContain("LS");
expect(result).toContain("Read");
expect(result).toContain("Write");
expect(result).not.toContain("Write");
// Commit signing tools should be included
expect(result).toContain("mcp__github_file_ops__commit_files");
@@ -1001,20 +1006,17 @@ describe("buildAllowedToolsString", () => {
const result = buildAllowedToolsString([], false, false);
// Base tools should be present
expect(result).toContain("Edit");
expect(result).not.toContain("Edit");
expect(result).toContain("Glob");
expect(result).toContain("Grep");
expect(result).toContain("LS");
expect(result).toContain("Read");
expect(result).toContain("Write");
expect(result).not.toContain("Write");
// Specific Bash git commands should be included
expect(result).toContain("Bash(git add:*)");
expect(result).toContain("Bash(git commit:*)");
expect(result).toContain("Bash(git push:*)");
expect(result).toContain("Bash(git status:*)");
expect(result).toContain("Bash(git diff:*)");
expect(result).toContain("Bash(git log:*)");
expect(result).toContain("scripts/git-push.sh:*)");
expect(result).toContain("Bash(git rm:*)");
// Comment tool from minimal server should be included
@@ -1030,7 +1032,7 @@ describe("buildAllowedToolsString", () => {
const result = buildAllowedToolsString(customTools, true, false);
// Base tools should be present
expect(result).toContain("Edit");
expect(result).toContain("Read");
expect(result).toContain("Bash(git add:*)");
// Custom tools should be included
+1
View File
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ describe("prepareMcpConfig", () => {
labelTrigger: "",
branchPrefix: "",
useStickyComment: false,
classifyInlineComments: true,
useCommitSigning: false,
sshSigningKey: "",
botId: String(CLAUDE_APP_BOT_ID),
+2
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ const defaultInputs = {
labelTrigger: "",
branchPrefix: "claude/",
useStickyComment: false,
classifyInlineComments: true,
useCommitSigning: false,
sshSigningKey: "",
botId: String(CLAUDE_APP_BOT_ID),
@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ const defaultRepository = {
owner: "test-owner",
repo: "test-repo",
full_name: "test-owner/test-repo",
default_branch: "main",
};
type MockContextOverrides = Omit<Partial<ParsedGitHubContext>, "inputs"> & {
+55 -1
View File
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ describe("Agent Mode", () => {
expect(result.claudeArgs).toBe("--model claude-sonnet-4 --max-turns 10");
expect(result.claudeArgs).not.toContain("--mcp-config");
// Verify return structure - should use "main" as fallback when no env vars set
// Verify return structure - should fall back to repository.default_branch when no env vars set
expect(result).toEqual({
commentId: undefined,
branchInfo: {
@@ -108,6 +108,60 @@ describe("Agent Mode", () => {
process.env.GITHUB_REF_NAME = originalRefName;
});
test("prepare falls back to repository.default_branch when not 'main'", async () => {
const contextWithDevelop = createMockAutomationContext({
eventName: "workflow_dispatch",
repository: {
owner: "test-owner",
repo: "test-repo",
full_name: "test-owner/test-repo",
default_branch: "develop",
},
});
// Save and clear env vars that would otherwise override the fallback
const originalClaudeBranch = process.env.CLAUDE_BRANCH;
const originalHeadRef = process.env.GITHUB_HEAD_REF;
const originalRefName = process.env.GITHUB_REF_NAME;
delete process.env.CLAUDE_BRANCH;
delete process.env.GITHUB_HEAD_REF;
delete process.env.GITHUB_REF_NAME;
const mockOctokit = {
rest: {
users: {
getAuthenticated: mock(() =>
Promise.resolve({
data: { login: "test-user", id: 12345, type: "User" },
}),
),
getByUsername: mock(() =>
Promise.resolve({
data: { login: "test-user", id: 12345, type: "User" },
}),
),
},
},
} as any;
const result = await prepareAgentMode({
context: contextWithDevelop,
octokit: mockOctokit,
githubToken: "test-token",
});
expect(result.branchInfo.baseBranch).toBe("develop");
expect(result.branchInfo.currentBranch).toBe("develop");
// Restore env vars
if (originalClaudeBranch !== undefined)
process.env.CLAUDE_BRANCH = originalClaudeBranch;
if (originalHeadRef !== undefined)
process.env.GITHUB_HEAD_REF = originalHeadRef;
if (originalRefName !== undefined)
process.env.GITHUB_REF_NAME = originalRefName;
});
test("prepare rejects bot actors without allowed_bots", async () => {
const contextWithPrompts = createMockAutomationContext({
eventName: "workflow_dispatch",
+1
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ describe("detectMode with enhanced routing", () => {
labelTrigger: "",
branchPrefix: "claude/",
useStickyComment: false,
classifyInlineComments: true,
useCommitSigning: false,
sshSigningKey: "",
botId: "123456",
+1
View File
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ describe("checkWritePermissions", () => {
labelTrigger: "",
branchPrefix: "claude/",
useStickyComment: false,
classifyInlineComments: true,
useCommitSigning: false,
sshSigningKey: "",
botId: String(CLAUDE_APP_BOT_ID),
+1 -1
View File
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ describe("pull_request_target event support", () => {
const prompt = generatePrompt(envVars, mockGitHubData, false, "tag");
// Should include git commands for non-commit-signing mode
expect(prompt).toContain("git push");
expect(prompt).toContain("scripts/git-push.sh origin");
expect(prompt).toContain(
"Always push to the existing branch when triggered on a PR",
);
+120
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach, mock } from "bun:test";
import { retryWithBackoff } from "../src/utils/retry";
describe("retryWithBackoff", () => {
let originalConsoleLog: typeof console.log;
let originalConsoleError: typeof console.error;
beforeEach(() => {
originalConsoleLog = console.log;
originalConsoleError = console.error;
console.log = mock(() => {});
console.error = mock(() => {});
});
afterEach(() => {
console.log = originalConsoleLog;
console.error = originalConsoleError;
});
it("returns the result on first success", async () => {
const result = await retryWithBackoff(() => Promise.resolve("ok"), {
maxAttempts: 3,
initialDelayMs: 1,
});
expect(result).toBe("ok");
});
it("retries on failure and succeeds", async () => {
let attempt = 0;
const result = await retryWithBackoff(
() => {
attempt++;
if (attempt < 3) throw new Error("transient");
return Promise.resolve("recovered");
},
{ maxAttempts: 3, initialDelayMs: 1 },
);
expect(result).toBe("recovered");
expect(attempt).toBe(3);
});
it("throws after exhausting all attempts", async () => {
await expect(
retryWithBackoff(() => Promise.reject(new Error("permanent")), {
maxAttempts: 2,
initialDelayMs: 1,
}),
).rejects.toThrow("permanent");
});
it("stops retrying immediately when shouldRetry returns false", async () => {
class NonRetryableError extends Error {
constructor() {
super("non-retryable");
this.name = "NonRetryableError";
}
}
let attempts = 0;
await expect(
retryWithBackoff(
() => {
attempts++;
throw new NonRetryableError();
},
{
maxAttempts: 3,
initialDelayMs: 1,
shouldRetry: (error) => !(error instanceof NonRetryableError),
},
),
).rejects.toThrow("non-retryable");
expect(attempts).toBe(1);
});
it("continues retrying when shouldRetry returns true", async () => {
let attempts = 0;
await expect(
retryWithBackoff(
() => {
attempts++;
throw new Error("retryable");
},
{
maxAttempts: 3,
initialDelayMs: 1,
shouldRetry: () => true,
},
),
).rejects.toThrow("retryable");
expect(attempts).toBe(3);
});
it("preserves the original error when shouldRetry aborts", async () => {
class SpecificError extends Error {
code = 401;
constructor() {
super("unauthorized");
this.name = "SpecificError";
}
}
try {
await retryWithBackoff(
() => {
throw new SpecificError();
},
{
maxAttempts: 3,
initialDelayMs: 1,
shouldRetry: (error) => !(error instanceof SpecificError),
},
);
expect.unreachable("should have thrown");
} catch (error) {
expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(SpecificError);
expect((error as SpecificError).code).toBe(401);
}
});
});
+5
View File
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ describe("checkContainsTrigger", () => {
labelTrigger: "",
branchPrefix: "claude/",
useStickyComment: false,
classifyInlineComments: true,
useCommitSigning: false,
allowedBots: "",
},
@@ -62,6 +63,7 @@ describe("checkContainsTrigger", () => {
labelTrigger: "",
branchPrefix: "claude/",
useStickyComment: false,
classifyInlineComments: true,
useCommitSigning: false,
allowedBots: "",
},
@@ -274,6 +276,7 @@ describe("checkContainsTrigger", () => {
labelTrigger: "",
branchPrefix: "claude/",
useStickyComment: false,
classifyInlineComments: true,
useCommitSigning: false,
allowedBots: "",
},
@@ -303,6 +306,7 @@ describe("checkContainsTrigger", () => {
labelTrigger: "",
branchPrefix: "claude/",
useStickyComment: false,
classifyInlineComments: true,
useCommitSigning: false,
allowedBots: "",
},
@@ -332,6 +336,7 @@ describe("checkContainsTrigger", () => {
labelTrigger: "",
branchPrefix: "claude/",
useStickyComment: false,
classifyInlineComments: true,
useCommitSigning: false,
allowedBots: "",
},
+9
View File
@@ -36,6 +36,15 @@ describe("validateBranchName", () => {
expect(() => validateBranchName("refs/heads/main")).not.toThrow();
expect(() => validateBranchName("bugfix/JIRA-1234")).not.toThrow();
});
it("should accept branch names containing # (git-valid, common in issue-linked branches)", () => {
// Reported in #1137: branches like "put-back-arm64-#2" were rejected
expect(() => validateBranchName("put-back-arm64-#2")).not.toThrow();
expect(() =>
validateBranchName("feature/#123-description"),
).not.toThrow();
expect(() => validateBranchName("fix/issue-#42")).not.toThrow();
});
});
describe("command injection attempts", () => {