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27 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
GitHub Actions 536f2c32a3 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.206 and Agent SDK to 0.3.206 2026-07-09 23:35:14 +00:00
GitHub Actions 37b464ce72 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.205 and Agent SDK to 0.3.205 2026-07-08 21:22:46 +00:00
GitHub Actions ba0aafd430 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.204 and Agent SDK to 0.3.204 2026-07-08 00:28:40 +00:00
GitHub Actions 0fe28cdb64 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.203 and Agent SDK to 0.3.203 2026-07-07 21:07:00 +00:00
GitHub Actions f87768c6d2 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.202 and Agent SDK to 0.3.202 2026-07-06 22:52:16 +00:00
Ashwin BhatandGitHub 58a2944bbc chore: fix prettier formatting (#1463) 2026-07-04 09:31:09 -07:00
Akhilesh AroraandGitHub beb753ed72 fix: propagate curl failures in install pipeline (#1241)
installClaudeCode() pipes `curl -fsSL | bash -s --`. Bash exits with
the status of the last command, so when curl fails (429 rate limit,
403, or connection error) `bash -s` still exits 0 on empty stdin and
the action logs "Claude Code installed successfully". The 3-attempt
retry loop never triggers because the first attempt looks successful,
and the run later dies with "Executable not found in $PATH: claude".

Prefix the pipeline with `set -o pipefail;` so curl's non-zero exit
propagates through the pipe and the retry loop can actually kick in.
Extracted into buildInstallCommand() with regression tests covering
both the old buggy shape and the fixed one.
2026-07-03 22:38:53 -07:00
JerryLeeandGitHub 235b39bf21 fix: preserve repeated add-dir flags in claude args (#1256) 2026-07-03 22:38:30 -07:00
石岳峰andGitHub d060ddc963 fix(restore): handle symlinked CLAUDE.md paths during config snapshot (#1441)
When snapshotting PR-authored sensitive paths into .claude-pr/, cpSync with
dereference:true throws ENOENT if a symlink target is missing on the PR head
(e.g. .claude/CLAUDE.md -> ../AGENTS.md). Fall back to copying the symlink
itself so restoreConfigFromBase can continue and restore trusted base versions.

Fixes #1398
2026-07-03 22:38:23 -07:00
tarunag10andGitHub 0f07aee435 Use modern noreply email for co-author trailers (#1369) 2026-07-03 22:38:02 -07:00
a221ad2dd9 Drop buffered inline comment when it is posted live (#1405) (#1412)
When classify_inline_comments is enabled, create_inline_comment buffers calls
without confirmed=true. The model frequently re-issues the call with confirmed=true
after reading the buffered reply, which posts the comment live but leaves the
original buffered entry behind. The post-session replay step then posts it again,
so every inline comment lands twice.

Reconcile the buffer on a live post: after a confirmed comment is created, remove
any buffered entry matching the same path, line, startLine and body so it cannot be
replayed. Extracts the reconciliation into src/mcp/inline-comment-buffer.ts (the MCP
server module starts a server on import) and adds unit tests.

Co-authored-by: archievi <[email protected]>
2026-07-03 22:37:36 -07:00
GitHub Actions 558b1d6cab chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.201 and Agent SDK to 0.3.201 2026-07-03 23:51:09 +00:00
GitHub Actions 01872ccc02 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.200 and Agent SDK to 0.3.200 2026-07-03 16:53:31 +00:00
GitHub Actions 769e3bdff9 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.199 and Agent SDK to 0.3.199 2026-07-02 23:36:20 +00:00
GitHub Actions 6c0083bb72 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.198 and Agent SDK to 0.3.198 2026-07-01 20:46:29 +00:00
846d5d8993 Add agent-approval-check composite action (#1429)
* Add agent-approval-check composite action

Require N human approvals on PRs that contain agent-authored commits.
Posts an agent-approval-check commit status that repos mark as a
required check on protected branches.

This is a sanitized port of the check Anthropic runs internally on
every agent-authored PR — same detection rules, /approve <sha>
comment flow, sibling-PR-same-SHA guard, and fail-closed semantics,
with the Anthropic-specific path exemptions and kill-switch removed
and config moved to action inputs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <[email protected]>

* Drop stray internal acronym from comment

* agent-approval-check: require write-access approvers, pin deps, pagination + doc fixes

🏠 Remote-Dev: homespace

* agent-approval-check: prettier

🏠 Remote-Dev: homespace

* agent-approval-check: verify approver write permission via REST; commits(last:100); docstring

🏠 Remote-Dev: homespace

* agent-approval-check: use headRefOid; drop pull_request_review trigger and correct threat-model docs

🏠 Remote-Dev: homespace

* agent-approval-check: stale-notification wording, no-retry-on-4xx, docstring API-call count

🏠 Remote-Dev: homespace

* agent-approval-check: fail-closed sibling guard on commits-ordering edge; drop stale 'reviewed' from README

🏠 Remote-Dev: homespace

* agent-approval-check: drop hardcoded API-call counts from logs; clarify author write-access requirement in README

🏠 Remote-Dev: homespace

* agent-approval-check: count all agent-email commits (close-reopen bypass); validate REQUIRED_APPROVALS>=1; exempt_head_branches warning

🏠 Remote-Dev: homespace

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Octavian Guzu <[email protected]>
2026-06-30 14:09:57 -07:00
GitHub Actions fad22eb3fa chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.197 and Agent SDK to 0.3.197 2026-06-30 17:57:23 +00:00
GitHub Actions 4633baf526 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.196 and Agent SDK to 0.3.196 2026-06-29 23:27:52 +00:00
GitHub Actions a92e7c70a4 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.195 and Agent SDK to 0.3.195 2026-06-26 21:30:09 +00:00
tarunag10andGitHub f8076dc008 fix: bound app token revocation cleanup (#1437) 2026-06-25 20:57:44 -07:00
GitHub Actions 5211368122 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.193 and Agent SDK to 0.3.193 2026-06-25 21:46:38 +00:00
GitHub Actions 428971d2ec chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.191 and Agent SDK to 0.3.191 2026-06-24 21:59:09 +00:00
GitHub Actions 74eedf1a18 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.190 and Agent SDK to 0.3.190 2026-06-24 15:55:36 +00:00
GitHub Actions 80b3182633 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.187 and Agent SDK to 0.3.187 2026-06-23 21:05:06 +00:00
360be9c8fc fix: allow @ in branch names (valid per git-check-ref-format) (#1411)
`validateBranchName` rejects branch names containing `@`, even though
`git check-ref-format` permits `@` and GitHub itself accepts such
branches. PRs whose head or base branch contains an `@` fail validation
in-process before any git operation, so the action errors out
immediately.

Branch names with `@` show up in real workflows: ticket conventions
like "TICKET-123@add-feature" (#998), leading-prefix conventions like
"@hotfix/...", and agent tooling that appends "@<sessionid>" (#1305).
There is no workaround other than renaming the branch, which is often
not under the user's control.

Branch names are never passed through a shell (git calls use
execFileSync argv arrays), so `@` carries no injection risk. This is
the same reasoning used to add `#` in #1167, `+` in #1248, and `,` in
#1310. The bare name "@" (HEAD shorthand in git revision syntax) and
the "@{" reflog sequence are still rejected.

- Add `@` to the validateBranchName whitelist regex, including the
  leading position (the leading-character rule blocks option injection
  via `-`, which `@` cannot cause)
- Reject the bare name "@" with a dedicated check
- Update the surrounding comment, JSDoc, and error message to match
- Add test cases for @-containing names and bare "@"

Fixes #998

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-06-22 14:42:36 -07:00
e452eb9dce test: cover format-turns content-type fallbacks and system_other handling (#1421)
Adds unit tests for previously-uncovered branches in
src/entrypoints/format-turns.ts:

- detectContentType: malformed-JSON fall-through (objects and arrays)
  and the default python classification for non-python/non-js code
- formatResultContent: non-string inputs (number, plain object)
- groupTurnsNaturally / formatGroupedContent: the system_other path
  for non-init system turns

Tests only; no source changes. format-turns.ts line coverage rises
from ~86% and the file's non-CLI logic is now fully exercised.

Co-authored-by: hk <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
2026-06-22 14:41:41 -07:00
Steven Zimmerman, CPAandGitHub 6b8063043e fix: filter PR reviews and inline review comments to trigger time (#1385)
Issue/PR comments (#512) and the issue/PR body (#710) are filtered to the
trigger timestamp so content created or edited after an authorized trigger
cannot be injected into Claude's prompt (TOCTOU protection). Reviews and
inline review comments were not: fetchGitHubData returned reviewData filtered
by actor only, and formatReviewComments renders it into the prompt, so a
review submitted or edited after the trigger reached Claude verbatim.

filterReviewsToTriggerTime already existed (added alongside the comment filter
in #512) but was only wired to the image-download list, never to the returned
reviewData.

Filter reviewData.nodes through filterReviewsToTriggerTime and each review's
inline comments through filterCommentsToTriggerTime, alongside the existing
actor filter, then build the review image-processing lists from those
already-filtered nodes (removing a now-redundant second filter pass).
Strengthen the two integration tests to assert post-trigger and edited-after
reviews/comments are dropped.
2026-06-22 14:41:33 -07:00
28 changed files with 2747 additions and 76 deletions
+3 -1
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@@ -439,8 +439,10 @@ runs:
shell: bash
run: |
curl -L \
--connect-timeout 5 \
--max-time 10 \
-X DELETE \
-H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${{ steps.run.outputs.github_token }}" \
-H "X-GitHub-Api-Version: 2022-11-28" \
${GITHUB_API_URL:-https://api.github.com}/installation/token
${GITHUB_API_URL:-https://api.github.com}/installation/token || true
+123
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@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
# Agent Approval Check
Require **N human approvals** on any pull request that contains commits
authored by an AI agent (Claude, Claude Code, or any bot identity you
configure). PRs without agent activity are unaffected.
This is the same gate Anthropic runs internally on every agent-authored PR.
## What it does
When a PR is opened, pushed to, or commented on, this action:
1. Scans the PR's commits, author, and reviews for the configured agent
identities (committer email, bot login, or an `APPROVED` review from a
bot). If none are found it posts `success: No agent activity` and stops.
2. Counts distinct human approvals: the latest `APPROVED` review per login,
plus any `/approve <head-sha>` comment whose SHA matches the current
head. Only users with write access to the repo count (verified per-user
via the collaborators permission API); agent and excluded-bot logins
never count.
3. Posts an `agent-approval-check` commit status (`success` once the count
reaches `required_approvals`, otherwise `pending`) and a sticky PR
comment explaining what's still needed.
4. Re-evaluates on every new push or comment. A push moves the head SHA,
so earlier `/approve <old-sha>` comments are flagged stale. Approving
reviews still count toward the threshold — they're picked up the next
time the workflow runs (on push or `/approve`); they just don't trigger
a run on their own.
Mark `agent-approval-check` as a **required status check** on your protected
branches and GitHub will refuse to merge until it's green.
## Setup
Copy [`examples/agent-approval-check.yml`](../examples/agent-approval-check.yml)
into `.github/workflows/` in your repo, then add `agent-approval-check` to the
required status checks on your protected branch.
This action is designed to run **alongside** GitHub's native branch
protection, not replace it. On the same protected branch you should also:
1. Require at least 1 approving review from someone with write access.
2. Enable **Dismiss stale pull request approvals when new commits are pushed**.
```yaml
name: agent-approval-check
on:
pull_request_target:
types: [opened, synchronize, reopened, ready_for_review]
issue_comment:
types: [created]
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: write
statuses: write
jobs:
check:
if: github.event_name != 'issue_comment' || github.event.issue.pull_request
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: anthropics/claude-code-action/agent-approval-check@main
with:
required_approvals: 2
agent_emails: [email protected]
agent_logins: claude[bot],claude-code[bot]
```
## Inputs
| Input | Default | Meaning |
| ---------------------- | ------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `required_approvals` | `2` | Distinct human approvals needed. |
| `agent_emails` | `[email protected]` | Committer emails that mark a commit agent-authored. |
| `agent_logins` | `claude[bot],claude-code[bot]` | Logins treated as agents (PR author or approving reviewer). |
| `excluded_approvers` | _(empty)_ | Logins whose approvals never count. |
| `exempt_head_branches` | _(empty)_ | Head-branch globs that auto-pass. ⚠️ Leave empty — branch names are attacker-controlled, so this is not a safe place to encode trust. |
| `exempt_path_prefixes` | _(empty)_ | PRs touching only these prefixes auto-pass. |
| `protected_bases` | _(default branch)_ | Base branches this check gates (see threat model). |
| `config_file` | _(empty)_ | Path to an [agent-identities YAML](./agent-identities.example.yaml) replacing the inline inputs. See the warning below. |
| `docs_url` | this README | Link in the PR comment footer. |
| `github_token` | `${{ github.token }}` | Needs `statuses:write` + `pull-requests:write`. |
> ⚠️ **`config_file` and checkout:** if you set `config_file`, your workflow
> must check out the **base** branch to read it (the default behaviour of
> `actions/checkout` under `pull_request_target`). Never check out the PR
> head ref — doing so would let the PR author control the config and bypass
> this check.
## Approving
A human counts as an approver by either:
- submitting a normal GitHub **Approve** review, or
- commenting `/approve <sha>` where `<sha>` is the current head commit
(12–40 hex chars). This path lets the PR author — who can't approve their
own PR in GitHub's UI — vouch for commits an agent pushed on their behalf.
The author's `/approve` is subject to the same write-access verification
as any other approver, so a fork-PR author without write access on the
base repository cannot self-count. The author counts as **one** approval;
the remaining approvals must come from other reviewers with write access.
## Threat model
- **Tamper-proof triggers.** `pull_request_target` and `issue_comment` run
the workflow file from the base/default branch, so the PR under review
cannot edit this check. `pull_request_review` does **not** share this
property — it runs from the merge ref — so the example workflow omits it;
native Approve reviews are picked up on the next synchronize or
`/approve` comment. This tamper-resistance assumes the workflow file
itself is protected: an actor who can push workflow changes to the
default branch can spoof any required status check, including this one,
so protect `.github/workflows/` via branch protection or CODEOWNERS.
- **Fail-closed.** Any unhandled error exits non-zero; the required status
stays non-success and the PR stays blocked. PRs with >100 commits are
treated as agent-authored because the full commit list can't be verified.
- **Sibling-PR guard.** Commit statuses attach to a SHA, not a PR. The
action refuses to post a status on a PR whose base isn't in
`protected_bases`, and withholds `success` while another open PR to a
protected base shares the same head commit — otherwise a green status on
one PR would also unblock the other.
- **No checkout of PR code.** The action never checks out the PR's branch;
it reads PR metadata via the GitHub API, so the usual
`pull_request_target` code-execution risk does not apply.
+72
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@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
name: Agent Approval Check
description: |
Require N human approvals on PRs that contain agent-authored commits
(Claude, Claude Code, or any configured bot identity). Posts an
`agent-approval-check` commit status — mark it as a required check on
protected branches to gate merges.
inputs:
github_token:
description: Token with statuses:write and pull-requests:write on this repo.
default: ${{ github.token }}
required_approvals:
description: Number of distinct human approvals required. Must be >= 1.
default: "2"
agent_emails:
description: Comma-separated committer emails treated as agent-authored.
default: [email protected]
agent_logins:
description: |
Comma-separated GitHub logins treated as agents — a PR opened by, or an
APPROVED review from, one of these triggers the check.
default: claude[bot],claude-code[bot]
excluded_approvers:
description: Comma-separated logins whose approvals never count (e.g. rubber-stamp bots).
default: ""
exempt_head_branches:
description: |
Comma-separated glob patterns; PRs from matching head branches auto-pass.
WARNING: leave empty — branch names are attacker-controlled, so this is
not a safe place to encode trust.
default: ""
exempt_path_prefixes:
description: Comma-separated path prefixes; PRs touching only these auto-pass.
default: ""
protected_bases:
description: |
Comma-separated base branches this check gates. Empty = the repo's
default branch only. PRs targeting any other base are refused (no
status posted) so a sibling PR sharing the head SHA can't get the
shared commit stamped green.
default: ""
config_file:
description: Optional path to an agent-identities YAML file (overrides the inline inputs).
default: ""
docs_url:
description: Link shown in the PR comment footer.
default: "https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code-action/tree/main/agent-approval-check"
runs:
using: composite
steps:
- uses: actions/setup-python@a26af69be951a213d495a4c3e4e4022e16d87065 # v5
with:
python-version: "3.12"
- run: pip install 'httpx==0.28.1' 'pyyaml==6.0.3' 'tenacity==9.1.4'
shell: bash
- run: python "${{ github.action_path }}/agent_approval_check.py"
shell: bash
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ inputs.github_token }}
GH_REPOSITORY: ${{ github.repository }}
GH_EVENT_NAME: ${{ github.event_name }}
GH_EVENT_PATH: ${{ github.event_path }}
REQUIRED_APPROVALS: ${{ inputs.required_approvals }}
AGENT_EMAILS: ${{ inputs.agent_emails }}
AGENT_LOGINS: ${{ inputs.agent_logins }}
EXCLUDED_APPROVERS: ${{ inputs.excluded_approvers }}
EXEMPT_HEAD_BRANCHES: ${{ inputs.exempt_head_branches }}
EXEMPT_PATH_PREFIXES: ${{ inputs.exempt_path_prefixes }}
PROTECTED_BASES: ${{ inputs.protected_bases }}
CONFIG_FILE: ${{ inputs.config_file }}
DOCS_URL: ${{ inputs.docs_url }}
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
---
# Optional config-file form of the agent-approval-check inputs.
# Pass via `with: { config_file: .github/agent-identities.yaml }` instead of
# the inline `agent_emails` / `agent_logins` / … inputs.
# Committer emails that mark a commit as agent-authored.
agent_emails:
- [email protected]
# GitHub logins treated as agents — a PR opened by, or an APPROVED review
# from, one of these triggers the check.
agent_app_logins:
- claude[bot]
- claude-code[bot]
# Logins whose approvals never count toward the required total.
excluded_approver_logins: []
# Head-branch glob patterns that auto-pass. Leave empty: branch names are
# attacker-controlled, so this is not a safe place to encode trust.
exempt_head_branches: []
# Per-repo path prefixes whose PRs auto-pass when ONLY those paths change.
exempt_path_prefixes:
owner/repo:
- docs/
# Per-repo base branches this check gates. A repo with no entry defaults to
# its default branch only. Listing a repo here REPLACES that default.
protected_bases:
owner/repo:
exact: [main]
prefixes: [release/]
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+1 -1
View File
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ runs:
PATH_TO_CLAUDE_CODE_EXECUTABLE: ${{ inputs.path_to_claude_code_executable }}
run: |
if [ -z "$PATH_TO_CLAUDE_CODE_EXECUTABLE" ]; then
CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION="2.1.186"
CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION="2.1.206"
echo "Installing Claude Code v${CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION}..."
for attempt in 1 2 3; do
echo "Installation attempt $attempt..."
+10 -10
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
"name": "@anthropic-ai/claude-code-base-action",
"dependencies": {
"@actions/core": "^1.10.1",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.3.186",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.3.206",
"shell-quote": "^1.8.3",
},
"devDependencies": {
@@ -27,23 +27,23 @@
"@actions/io": ["@actions/[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-wi9JjgKLYS7U/z8PPbco+PvTb/nRWjeoFlJ1Qer83k/3C5PHQi28hiVdeE2kHXmIL99mQFawx8qt/JPjZilJ8Q=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].186", "", { "optionalDependencies": { "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-arm64": "0.3.186", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-x64": "0.3.186", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64": "0.3.186", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64-musl": "0.3.186", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64": "0.3.186", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64-musl": "0.3.186", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-arm64": "0.3.186", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-x64": "0.3.186" }, "peerDependencies": { "@anthropic-ai/sdk": ">=0.93.0", "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.29.0", "zod": "^4.0.0" } }, "sha512-TbxhqYPDNluWL5C50pyHbUy2wWtwJs4iR8qQOxeVkRRTUWn3rdchzpSA8fLWiU+iyiyLDgxfPs6E79OWqrJ8Pw=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].206", "", { "optionalDependencies": { "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-arm64": "0.3.206", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-x64": "0.3.206", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64": "0.3.206", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64-musl": "0.3.206", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64": "0.3.206", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64-musl": "0.3.206", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-arm64": "0.3.206", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-x64": "0.3.206" }, "peerDependencies": { "@anthropic-ai/sdk": ">=0.93.0", "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.29.0", "zod": "^4.0.0" } }, "sha512-KljDh9Pg4YCYpoXS8dnWoVSsOHtU4yLCW268K2iOruSxFXE8/Tay6DPvmJzYuqjP5YLNYfj05ZGykwZSUn6GXA=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-arm64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].186", "", { "os": "darwin", "cpu": "arm64" }, "sha512-xHlzB+61OJkLhrc5QJXVlpldwM9IXJAiQ7cCxWj9o0qu165eYtsGaAaWg9X9NAc9IWhtAdXXNpNSuiZNc+OzWw=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-arm64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].206", "", { "os": "darwin", "cpu": "arm64" }, "sha512-FL2+NKcMMN47vcnCW2Fkt3AOgeRRlQxrisbPNaxrxqPJFzhUKs17x5j0XzLefd0xRbDAr74hd0PK/tnp6PHM6w=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-x64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].186", "", { "os": "darwin", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-+TJSWfoifLLW+7EEbvE4TIHbCj39PL8zEhL1gUudWQjLAgKxWeti+3h4FRDhPI1B/Uwz1eh/eY430od0iMXjfw=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-x64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].206", "", { "os": "darwin", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-mRW8PPMfQN15EunLwpdmcVzk3XuM4DXQUM8DOzaeA1Hr1yxYPaVVBLr9hkdBKOqr8XTl3ueoTR6RZAy6a/n7OA=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].186", "", { "os": "linux", "cpu": "arm64" }, "sha512-bkWmXR3PWcBTrAWAhmJn7+7/ONq/5sIEDe30D6a76qx6Xn8sZICmy9GrbUJec0Mb+XVifcS8LnLjP/Z5GzMc/g=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].206", "", { "os": "linux", "cpu": "arm64" }, "sha512-Id6H8l6EsGb7849EAZDOB4Ic+FQpbzt4D5HGOwp59CTW3o/1c4etjQA/Kl1K+DSEWn3FGo6D5UMVgc/rwhBj8g=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64-musl": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].186", "", { "os": "linux", "cpu": "arm64" }, "sha512-pLEaVXulWqHHEgfTwK/5EILSlxXMN5tRA54Ff0tRmEP/FGye8WhLMYrUqg8TSsM2e1bJSszRbyyJSK10xr9Qtg=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64-musl": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].206", "", { "os": "linux", "cpu": "arm64" }, "sha512-aMZe1Kl+kYv5QlA15W9Ae25MAzBsA9FA40f5TOtJebA+M/xliF0r2LLb2NdyBviiZCDllcE31l0zgYE0rQqFQw=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].186", "", { "os": "linux", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-ARPQwIliHwypU5FQcq4Epi5ahmbSJt89Use5BgzxyeDyrIM3NgK/0c1IKp8DAiKPNntVXNT5R01TwoHdNI3oBA=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].206", "", { "os": "linux", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-egZhOC1RlEVhZyq6Oa1b04AF7hh4hO+8oCsJCZ3gOifJQuHih1oW3lZ8fOUxU85jlT2ytAnt5kRp4uQr6PJgbg=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64-musl": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].186", "", { "os": "linux", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-Zg7htykMkMdQC/00UOPn/gnRJRyDaoY0AeJnyXLUByKEUd0ARshpQEadoJoAS6D//6CscffWaSTsX2ePSvl+aw=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64-musl": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].206", "", { "os": "linux", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-xQBOBhlcmTNc7YeYT5qLZOikpSq3WHlsJ/t6i7kJqUWrcXlOPaAoSMdKp5xO/V0CjAdzdJoWB88I55UAh8mclQ=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-arm64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].186", "", { "os": "win32", "cpu": "arm64" }, "sha512-P/OMuYtKYlgGYs0wMTGCSo8gQfCETfA+0+lGGMAcPMH1xxOn24gjtQ/fLQKdaVh+0DLaSxjYm9W3Ln5jN6ALlQ=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-arm64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].206", "", { "os": "win32", "cpu": "arm64" }, "sha512-oRQk23bFXSz4QRhOxqnnvlLWq/KiF2PtSBYXrMg1AQrCOHJd2k66aOAS7AJ4ZSzejiyV4N6sS6UThfmF6ipHBQ=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-x64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].186", "", { "os": "win32", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-aiBJu0rhlU/gvUsNtwxjIoj377Wj+g3HqoUe6eihcLGbvsR0SE5KpQaYT/B7wspRILegwIM+iUV9K7145SW6sA=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-x64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].206", "", { "os": "win32", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-BdjKmDojZjc5RjN+8Q6K7Yqf1WYhel6I3DkMXc9zdxS/xIuN42sx7zgQpdMGY73pm7ROPLqo3LieOeMhVH161w=="],
"@anthropic-ai/sdk": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "json-schema-to-ts": "^3.1.1" }, "peerDependencies": { "zod": "^3.25.0 || ^4.0.0" }, "optionalPeers": ["zod"], "bin": { "anthropic-ai-sdk": "bin/cli" } }, "sha512-q9vaSZQVFx6B/gPxetGYfLXSJD5v0sOmh0OpZDq7yCrTSA+Rscvrtyol7JJTW40wEpQB4U1B4JXzxQitbQ3CAA=="],
+1 -1
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
},
"dependencies": {
"@actions/core": "^1.10.1",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.3.186",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.3.206",
"shell-quote": "^1.8.3"
},
"devDependencies": {
+11
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ const ACCUMULATING_FLAGS = new Set([
"disallowedTools",
"disallowed-tools",
"mcp-config",
"add-dir",
]);
// Delimiter used to join accumulated flag values
@@ -200,6 +201,14 @@ export function parseSdkOptions(options: ClaudeOptions): ParsedSdkOptions {
// Detect if --json-schema is present (for hasJsonSchema flag)
const hasJsonSchema = "json-schema" in extraArgs;
const additionalDirectories = extraArgs["add-dir"]
? extraArgs["add-dir"]
.split(ACCUMULATE_DELIMITER)
.map((dir) => dir.trim())
.filter(Boolean)
: [];
delete extraArgs["add-dir"];
// Extract and merge allowedTools from all sources:
// 1. From extraArgs (parsed from claudeArgs - contains tag mode's tools)
// - Check both camelCase (--allowedTools) and hyphenated (--allowed-tools) variants
@@ -304,6 +313,8 @@ export function parseSdkOptions(options: ClaudeOptions): ParsedSdkOptions {
systemPrompt,
fallbackModel: options.fallbackModel,
pathToClaudeCodeExecutable: options.pathToClaudeCodeExecutable,
additionalDirectories:
additionalDirectories.length > 0 ? additionalDirectories : undefined,
// Pass through claudeArgs as extraArgs - CLI handles --mcp-config, --json-schema, etc.
// Note: allowedTools and disallowedTools have been removed from extraArgs to prevent duplicates
@@ -402,6 +402,45 @@ describe("parseSdkOptions", () => {
});
});
describe("add-dir handling", () => {
test("should accumulate multiple add-dir flags into additionalDirectories", () => {
const options: ClaudeOptions = {
claudeArgs: '--add-dir "/path/to/dir-a"\n--add-dir "/path/to/dir-b"',
};
const result = parseSdkOptions(options);
expect(result.sdkOptions.additionalDirectories).toEqual([
"/path/to/dir-a",
"/path/to/dir-b",
]);
expect(result.sdkOptions.extraArgs?.["add-dir"]).toBeUndefined();
});
test("should map a single add-dir flag to additionalDirectories", () => {
const options: ClaudeOptions = {
claudeArgs: '--add-dir "/path/to/dir"',
};
const result = parseSdkOptions(options);
expect(result.sdkOptions.additionalDirectories).toEqual(["/path/to/dir"]);
expect(result.sdkOptions.extraArgs?.["add-dir"]).toBeUndefined();
});
test("should preserve other extraArgs when extracting add-dir", () => {
const options: ClaudeOptions = {
claudeArgs: '--model "claude-3-5-sonnet" --add-dir "/path/to/dir"',
};
const result = parseSdkOptions(options);
expect(result.sdkOptions.additionalDirectories).toEqual(["/path/to/dir"]);
expect(result.sdkOptions.extraArgs?.["model"]).toBe("claude-3-5-sonnet");
expect(result.sdkOptions.extraArgs?.["add-dir"]).toBeUndefined();
});
});
describe("other extraArgs passthrough", () => {
test("should pass through json-schema in extraArgs", () => {
const options: ClaudeOptions = {
+10 -10
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
"dependencies": {
"@actions/core": "^1.10.1",
"@actions/github": "^6.0.1",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.3.186",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.3.206",
"@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.11.0",
"@octokit/graphql": "^8.2.2",
"@octokit/rest": "^21.1.1",
@@ -37,23 +37,23 @@
"@actions/io": ["@actions/[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-wi9JjgKLYS7U/z8PPbco+PvTb/nRWjeoFlJ1Qer83k/3C5PHQi28hiVdeE2kHXmIL99mQFawx8qt/JPjZilJ8Q=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].186", "", { "optionalDependencies": { "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-arm64": "0.3.186", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-x64": "0.3.186", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64": "0.3.186", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64-musl": "0.3.186", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64": "0.3.186", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64-musl": "0.3.186", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-arm64": "0.3.186", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-x64": "0.3.186" }, "peerDependencies": { "@anthropic-ai/sdk": ">=0.93.0", "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.29.0", "zod": "^4.0.0" } }, "sha512-TbxhqYPDNluWL5C50pyHbUy2wWtwJs4iR8qQOxeVkRRTUWn3rdchzpSA8fLWiU+iyiyLDgxfPs6E79OWqrJ8Pw=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].206", "", { "optionalDependencies": { "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-arm64": "0.3.206", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-x64": "0.3.206", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64": "0.3.206", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64-musl": "0.3.206", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64": "0.3.206", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64-musl": "0.3.206", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-arm64": "0.3.206", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-x64": "0.3.206" }, "peerDependencies": { "@anthropic-ai/sdk": ">=0.93.0", "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.29.0", "zod": "^4.0.0" } }, "sha512-KljDh9Pg4YCYpoXS8dnWoVSsOHtU4yLCW268K2iOruSxFXE8/Tay6DPvmJzYuqjP5YLNYfj05ZGykwZSUn6GXA=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-arm64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].186", "", { "os": "darwin", "cpu": "arm64" }, "sha512-xHlzB+61OJkLhrc5QJXVlpldwM9IXJAiQ7cCxWj9o0qu165eYtsGaAaWg9X9NAc9IWhtAdXXNpNSuiZNc+OzWw=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-arm64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].206", "", { "os": "darwin", "cpu": "arm64" }, "sha512-FL2+NKcMMN47vcnCW2Fkt3AOgeRRlQxrisbPNaxrxqPJFzhUKs17x5j0XzLefd0xRbDAr74hd0PK/tnp6PHM6w=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-x64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].186", "", { "os": "darwin", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-+TJSWfoifLLW+7EEbvE4TIHbCj39PL8zEhL1gUudWQjLAgKxWeti+3h4FRDhPI1B/Uwz1eh/eY430od0iMXjfw=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-x64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].206", "", { "os": "darwin", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-mRW8PPMfQN15EunLwpdmcVzk3XuM4DXQUM8DOzaeA1Hr1yxYPaVVBLr9hkdBKOqr8XTl3ueoTR6RZAy6a/n7OA=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].186", "", { "os": "linux", "cpu": "arm64" }, "sha512-bkWmXR3PWcBTrAWAhmJn7+7/ONq/5sIEDe30D6a76qx6Xn8sZICmy9GrbUJec0Mb+XVifcS8LnLjP/Z5GzMc/g=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].206", "", { "os": "linux", "cpu": "arm64" }, "sha512-Id6H8l6EsGb7849EAZDOB4Ic+FQpbzt4D5HGOwp59CTW3o/1c4etjQA/Kl1K+DSEWn3FGo6D5UMVgc/rwhBj8g=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64-musl": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].186", "", { "os": "linux", "cpu": "arm64" }, "sha512-pLEaVXulWqHHEgfTwK/5EILSlxXMN5tRA54Ff0tRmEP/FGye8WhLMYrUqg8TSsM2e1bJSszRbyyJSK10xr9Qtg=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64-musl": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].206", "", { "os": "linux", "cpu": "arm64" }, "sha512-aMZe1Kl+kYv5QlA15W9Ae25MAzBsA9FA40f5TOtJebA+M/xliF0r2LLb2NdyBviiZCDllcE31l0zgYE0rQqFQw=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].186", "", { "os": "linux", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-ARPQwIliHwypU5FQcq4Epi5ahmbSJt89Use5BgzxyeDyrIM3NgK/0c1IKp8DAiKPNntVXNT5R01TwoHdNI3oBA=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].206", "", { "os": "linux", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-egZhOC1RlEVhZyq6Oa1b04AF7hh4hO+8oCsJCZ3gOifJQuHih1oW3lZ8fOUxU85jlT2ytAnt5kRp4uQr6PJgbg=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64-musl": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].186", "", { "os": "linux", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-Zg7htykMkMdQC/00UOPn/gnRJRyDaoY0AeJnyXLUByKEUd0ARshpQEadoJoAS6D//6CscffWaSTsX2ePSvl+aw=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64-musl": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].206", "", { "os": "linux", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-xQBOBhlcmTNc7YeYT5qLZOikpSq3WHlsJ/t6i7kJqUWrcXlOPaAoSMdKp5xO/V0CjAdzdJoWB88I55UAh8mclQ=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-arm64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].186", "", { "os": "win32", "cpu": "arm64" }, "sha512-P/OMuYtKYlgGYs0wMTGCSo8gQfCETfA+0+lGGMAcPMH1xxOn24gjtQ/fLQKdaVh+0DLaSxjYm9W3Ln5jN6ALlQ=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-arm64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].206", "", { "os": "win32", "cpu": "arm64" }, "sha512-oRQk23bFXSz4QRhOxqnnvlLWq/KiF2PtSBYXrMg1AQrCOHJd2k66aOAS7AJ4ZSzejiyV4N6sS6UThfmF6ipHBQ=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-x64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].186", "", { "os": "win32", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-aiBJu0rhlU/gvUsNtwxjIoj377Wj+g3HqoUe6eihcLGbvsR0SE5KpQaYT/B7wspRILegwIM+iUV9K7145SW6sA=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-x64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected].206", "", { "os": "win32", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-BdjKmDojZjc5RjN+8Q6K7Yqf1WYhel6I3DkMXc9zdxS/xIuN42sx7zgQpdMGY73pm7ROPLqo3LieOeMhVH161w=="],
"@anthropic-ai/sdk": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "json-schema-to-ts": "^3.1.1" }, "peerDependencies": { "zod": "^3.25.0 || ^4.0.0" }, "optionalPeers": ["zod"], "bin": { "anthropic-ai-sdk": "bin/cli" } }, "sha512-q9vaSZQVFx6B/gPxetGYfLXSJD5v0sOmh0OpZDq7yCrTSA+Rscvrtyol7JJTW40wEpQB4U1B4JXzxQitbQ3CAA=="],
+39
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
# Require human approvals on PRs that contain agent-authored commits.
#
# Both triggers run the workflow file from the BASE/DEFAULT branch, so a PR
# cannot edit this check to approve itself. (`pull_request_review` is not
# used because it runs from the merge ref, not the default branch; native
# Approve reviews are picked up on the next synchronize or `/approve`
# comment.)
#
# After adding this workflow, mark `agent-approval-check` as a required
# status check on your protected branches.
name: agent-approval-check
on:
pull_request_target:
types: [opened, synchronize, reopened, ready_for_review]
issue_comment:
types: [created]
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: write
statuses: write
jobs:
check:
# issue_comment also fires on plain issues; skip those early.
if: github.event_name != 'issue_comment' || github.event.issue.pull_request
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: anthropics/claude-code-action/agent-approval-check@main
with:
required_approvals: 2
agent_emails: [email protected]
agent_logins: claude[bot],claude-code[bot]
# Uncomment to tune:
# excluded_approvers: dependabot[bot]
# exempt_path_prefixes: docs/
# protected_bases: main,release
+1 -1
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
"dependencies": {
"@actions/core": "^1.10.1",
"@actions/github": "^6.0.1",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.3.186",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.3.206",
"@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.11.0",
"@octokit/graphql": "^8.2.2",
"@octokit/rest": "^21.1.1",
+15 -2
View File
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ export function prepareContext(
// Extract trigger username and comment data based on event type
let triggerUsername: string | undefined;
let triggerUserId: number | undefined;
let commentId: string | undefined;
let commentBody: string | undefined;
@@ -129,15 +130,19 @@ export function prepareContext(
commentId = context.payload.comment.id.toString();
commentBody = context.payload.comment.body;
triggerUsername = context.payload.comment.user.login;
triggerUserId = context.payload.comment.user.id;
} else if (isPullRequestReviewEvent(context)) {
commentBody = context.payload.review.body ?? "";
triggerUsername = context.payload.review.user.login;
triggerUserId = context.payload.review.user.id;
} else if (isPullRequestReviewCommentEvent(context)) {
commentId = context.payload.comment.id.toString();
commentBody = context.payload.comment.body;
triggerUsername = context.payload.comment.user.login;
triggerUserId = context.payload.comment.user.id;
} else if (isIssuesEvent(context)) {
triggerUsername = context.payload.issue.user.login;
triggerUserId = context.payload.issue.user.id;
}
// Create infrastructure fields object
@@ -146,6 +151,7 @@ export function prepareContext(
claudeCommentId,
triggerPhrase,
...(triggerUsername && { triggerUsername }),
...(triggerUserId && { triggerUserId }),
...(prompt && { prompt }),
...(claudeBranch && { claudeBranch }),
};
@@ -394,9 +400,16 @@ function getCommitInstructions(
context: PreparedContext,
useCommitSigning: boolean,
): string {
const triggerName = githubData.triggerDisplayName ?? context.triggerUsername;
const triggerEmail =
context.triggerUserId && context.triggerUsername
? `${context.triggerUserId}+${context.triggerUsername}@users.noreply.github.com`
: context.triggerUsername
? `${context.triggerUsername}@users.noreply.github.com`
: undefined;
const coAuthorLine =
(githubData.triggerDisplayName ?? context.triggerUsername) !== "Unknown"
? `Co-authored-by: ${githubData.triggerDisplayName ?? context.triggerUsername} <${context.triggerUsername}@users.noreply.github.com>`
triggerName && triggerName !== "Unknown" && triggerEmail
? `Co-authored-by: ${triggerName} <${triggerEmail}>`
: "";
if (useCommitSigning) {
+1
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ export type CommonFields = {
claudeCommentId: string;
triggerPhrase: string;
triggerUsername?: string;
triggerUserId?: number;
prompt?: string;
claudeBranch?: string;
};
+9 -5
View File
@@ -44,6 +44,13 @@ import { runClaude } from "../../base-action/src/run-claude";
import type { ClaudeRunResult } from "../../base-action/src/run-claude-sdk";
import { setExecutionFileOutputIfPresent } from "../../base-action/src/execution-file";
// Exported for unit testing. `set -o pipefail` makes curl's non-zero exit
// propagate through the pipe so the install retry logic actually triggers
// on 429/403 instead of silently succeeding (see #1136).
export function buildInstallCommand(version: string): string {
return `set -o pipefail; curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash -s -- ${version}`;
}
/**
* Install Claude Code CLI, handling retry logic and custom executable paths.
* Returns the absolute path to the claude executable.
@@ -68,7 +75,7 @@ async function installClaudeCode(): Promise<string> {
return customExecutable;
}
const claudeCodeVersion = "2.1.186";
const claudeCodeVersion = "2.1.206";
console.log(`Installing Claude Code v${claudeCodeVersion}...`);
for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= 3; attempt++) {
@@ -77,10 +84,7 @@ async function installClaudeCode(): Promise<string> {
await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
const child = spawn(
"bash",
[
"-c",
`curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash -s -- ${claudeCodeVersion}`,
],
["-c", buildInstallCommand(claudeCodeVersion)],
{ stdio: "inherit" },
);
child.on("close", (code) => {
+23 -26
View File
@@ -378,34 +378,26 @@ export async function fetchGitHubData({
body: c.body,
}));
// Filter review bodies to trigger time
const filteredReviewBodies = reviewData?.nodes
? filterReviewsToTriggerTime(reviewData.nodes, triggerTime).filter(
(r) => r.body,
)
: [];
const reviewBodies: CommentWithImages[] = filteredReviewBodies.map((r) => ({
type: "review_body" as const,
id: r.databaseId,
pullNumber: prNumber,
body: r.body,
}));
// Filter review comments to trigger time and by actor
// Filter reviews and inline review comments to trigger time and by actor
// before building anything from them. The trigger-time filter is the TOCTOU
// protection applied to issue/PR comments and the body above: it drops
// anything submitted, created, or edited at/after the trigger so an attacker
// cannot inject content into the prompt after an authorized trigger. Without
// it, review bodies and inline review comments would reach the prompt
// verbatim regardless of when they landed.
if (reviewData && reviewData.nodes) {
// Filter reviews by actor
// Drop reviews submitted or edited after the trigger, then filter by actor.
reviewData.nodes = filterCommentsByActor(
reviewData.nodes,
filterReviewsToTriggerTime(reviewData.nodes, triggerTime),
includeCommentsByActor,
excludeCommentsByActor,
);
// Also filter inline review comments within each review
// Apply the same trigger-time + actor filtering to inline review comments.
reviewData.nodes.forEach((review) => {
if (review.comments?.nodes) {
review.comments.nodes = filterCommentsByActor(
review.comments.nodes,
filterCommentsToTriggerTime(review.comments.nodes, triggerTime),
includeCommentsByActor,
excludeCommentsByActor,
);
@@ -413,14 +405,19 @@ export async function fetchGitHubData({
});
}
const allReviewComments =
reviewData?.nodes?.flatMap((r) => r.comments?.nodes ?? []) ?? [];
const filteredReviewComments = filterCommentsToTriggerTime(
allReviewComments,
triggerTime,
);
// Build the image-processing lists from the already-filtered review nodes,
// so reviews/comments excluded from the prompt are not processed for images.
const reviewBodies: CommentWithImages[] = (reviewData?.nodes ?? [])
.filter((r) => r.body)
.map((r) => ({
type: "review_body" as const,
id: r.databaseId,
pullNumber: prNumber,
body: r.body,
}));
const reviewComments: CommentWithImages[] = filteredReviewComments
const reviewComments: CommentWithImages[] = (reviewData?.nodes ?? [])
.flatMap((r) => r.comments?.nodes ?? [])
.filter((c) => c.body && !c.isMinimized)
.map((c) => ({
type: "review_comment" as const,
+18 -5
View File
@@ -27,14 +27,15 @@ function extractFirstLabel(githubData: FetchDataResult): string | undefined {
* This prevents command injection by ensuring only safe characters are used.
*
* Valid branch names:
* - Start with alphanumeric character (not dash, to prevent option injection)
* - Contain only alphanumeric, forward slash, hyphen, underscore, period, or hash (#)
* - Start with alphanumeric character or @ (not dash, to prevent option injection)
* - Contain only alphanumeric, forward slash, hyphen, underscore, period, hash (#), plus (+), comma (,), or at sign (@)
* - Do not start or end with a period
* - Do not end with a slash
* - Do not contain '..' (path traversal)
* - Do not contain '//' (consecutive slashes)
* - Do not end with '.lock'
* - Do not contain '@{'
* - Are not the single character '@' (HEAD shorthand in git revision syntax)
* - Do not contain control characters or special git characters (~^:?*[\])
*/
export function validateBranchName(branchName: string): void {
@@ -58,18 +59,21 @@ export function validateBranchName(branchName: string): void {
);
}
// Strict whitelist pattern: alphanumeric start, then alphanumeric/slash/hyphen/underscore/period/hash/plus/comma.
// Strict whitelist pattern: alphanumeric or @ start, then alphanumeric/slash/hyphen/underscore/period/hash/plus/comma/at-sign.
// # is valid per git-check-ref-format and commonly used in branch names like "fix/#123-description".
// + is valid per git-check-ref-format and generated by Claude Code's EnterWorktree tool when
// converting worktree names containing "/" (e.g. "feat/foo" becomes "worktree-feat+foo").
// , is valid per git-check-ref-format and commonly appears in branch names derived from titles
// or external identifiers (e.g. place names like "feature/paris,france").
// @ is valid per git-check-ref-format anywhere in a ref name, including the first character
// (e.g. ticket conventions like "TICKET-123@add-feature" or prefixes like "@hotfix/...");
// the bare name "@" (HEAD shorthand) and the "@{" sequence (reflog syntax) are rejected below.
// All git calls use execFileSync (not shell interpolation), so none of these characters carry injection risk.
const validPattern = /^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9/_.#+,-]*$/;
const validPattern = /^[a-zA-Z0-9@][a-zA-Z0-9/_.#+,@-]*$/;
if (!validPattern.test(branchName)) {
throw new Error(
`Invalid branch name: "${branchName}". Branch names must start with an alphanumeric character and contain only alphanumeric characters, forward slashes, hyphens, underscores, periods, hashes (#), plus signs (+), or commas (,).`,
`Invalid branch name: "${branchName}". Branch names must start with an alphanumeric character or '@' and contain only alphanumeric characters, forward slashes, hyphens, underscores, periods, hashes (#), plus signs (+), commas (,), or at signs (@).`,
);
}
@@ -112,6 +116,15 @@ export function validateBranchName(branchName: string): void {
`Invalid branch name: "${branchName}". Branch names cannot contain '@{'`,
);
}
// Per git-check-ref-format, a refname cannot be the single character "@"; "@" also
// resolves to HEAD in git revision syntax, so a bare "@" must never reach git as a
// branch argument where it could be interpreted as a revision instead.
if (branchName === "@") {
throw new Error(
`Invalid branch name: "@". Branch names cannot be the single character '@'.`,
);
}
}
/**
+16 -1
View File
@@ -30,6 +30,21 @@ const SENSITIVE_PATHS = [
const CLAUDE_PR_EXCLUDE_PATTERN = "/.claude-pr/";
function snapshotSensitivePath(src: string, dest: string): void {
try {
cpSync(src, dest, { recursive: true, dereference: true });
} catch (error) {
// Symlinks whose targets are absent on the PR head (e.g. `.claude/CLAUDE.md`
// -> `../AGENTS.md` when the PR deleted the target) make dereferenced
// copies throw ENOENT. Preserve the symlink for the review snapshot instead.
if (error instanceof Error && "code" in error && error.code === "ENOENT") {
cpSync(src, dest, { recursive: true });
return;
}
throw error;
}
}
function ensureClaudePrExcludedFromGit(): void {
const excludePath = execFileSync(
"git",
@@ -86,7 +101,7 @@ export function restoreConfigFromBase(baseBranch: string): void {
rmSync(".claude-pr", { recursive: true, force: true });
for (const p of SENSITIVE_PATHS) {
if (existsSync(p)) {
cpSync(p, `.claude-pr/${p}`, { recursive: true, dereference: true });
snapshotSensitivePath(p, `.claude-pr/${p}`);
}
}
if (existsSync(".claude-pr")) {
+11
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import { appendFileSync } from "fs";
import { z } from "zod";
import { createOctokit } from "../github/api/client";
import { sanitizeContent } from "../github/utils/sanitizer";
import { removeBufferedComment } from "./inline-comment-buffer";
// Get repository and PR information from environment variables
const REPO_OWNER = process.env.REPO_OWNER;
@@ -180,6 +181,16 @@ server.tool(
const result = await octokit.rest.pulls.createReviewComment(params);
// The comment is now live. Drop any buffered copy of it so the
// post-session replay step cannot post it a second time (the model often
// re-issues a buffered call with confirmed=true after the buffer reply).
if (CLASSIFY_ENABLED) {
removeBufferedComment(
{ path, line, startLine, body: sanitizedBody },
BUFFER_PATH,
);
}
return {
content: [
{
+54
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "fs";
export type BufferedCommentMatch = {
path: string;
line?: number;
startLine?: number;
body: string;
};
/**
* Remove any buffered inline comment that matches an already-posted comment.
*
* When a comment is posted live (confirmed=true), an earlier buffered copy of
* the same comment must be dropped so the post-session replay step does not
* post it a second time. The model frequently re-issues a buffered call with
* confirmed=true after reading the "Set confirmed=true to post immediately"
* reply; previously the original buffered entry was left behind and replayed,
* producing duplicate inline comments.
*
* Entries are matched on path, line, startLine and body. Lines that cannot be
* parsed are kept untouched.
*/
export function removeBufferedComment(
match: BufferedCommentMatch,
bufferPath: string,
): void {
if (!existsSync(bufferPath)) {
return;
}
const remaining = readFileSync(bufferPath, "utf8")
.split("\n")
.filter((line) => line.trim() !== "")
.filter((line) => {
let entry: BufferedCommentMatch;
try {
entry = JSON.parse(line);
} catch {
// Keep anything we cannot parse rather than silently dropping it.
return true;
}
const isSameComment =
entry.path === match.path &&
entry.line === match.line &&
entry.startLine === match.startLine &&
entry.body === match.body;
return !isSameComment;
});
writeFileSync(
bufferPath,
remaining.length > 0 ? remaining.join("\n") + "\n" : "",
);
}
+26
View File
@@ -495,6 +495,32 @@ describe("generatePrompt", () => {
);
});
test("should use numeric GitHub noreply address when trigger user id is provided", async () => {
const envVars: PreparedContext = {
repository: "owner/repo",
claudeCommentId: "12345",
triggerPhrase: "@claude",
triggerUsername: "johndoe",
triggerUserId: 123456,
eventData: {
eventName: "issue_comment",
commentId: "67890",
isPR: false,
issueNumber: "123",
baseBranch: "main",
claudeBranch: "claude/issue-67890-20240101-1200",
commentBody: "@claude please fix this",
},
};
const prompt = await generatePrompt(envVars, mockGitHubData, false, "tag");
expect(prompt).toContain(
"Co-authored-by: johndoe <[email protected]>",
);
expect(prompt).not.toContain("<[email protected]>");
});
test("should include PR-specific instructions only for PR events", async () => {
const envVars: PreparedContext = {
repository: "owner/repo",
+83 -13
View File
@@ -723,16 +723,17 @@ describe("fetchGitHubData integration with time filtering", () => {
triggerTime: "2024-01-15T12:00:00Z",
});
// The reviewData field returns all reviews (not filtered), but the filtering
// happens when processing review bodies for download
// We can check the image download map to verify filtering
expect(result.reviewData?.nodes?.length).toBe(3); // All reviews are returned
// Only the review submitted before the trigger and not edited afterward
// reaches the prompt. The review submitted after the trigger and the one
// edited after the trigger are dropped (TOCTOU protection), matching the
// issue/PR comment and body handling.
expect(result.reviewData?.nodes?.length).toBe(1);
expect(result.reviewData?.nodes?.[0]?.databaseId).toBe("1");
// Check that only the first review's body would be downloaded (filtered)
// Only that surviving review's body is queued for image download.
const reviewsInMap = Object.keys(result.imageUrlMap).filter((key) =>
key.startsWith("review_body"),
);
// Only review 1 should have its body processed (before trigger and not edited after)
expect(reviewsInMap.length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(1);
});
@@ -805,14 +806,83 @@ describe("fetchGitHubData integration with time filtering", () => {
triggerTime: "2024-01-15T12:00:00Z",
});
// The imageUrlMap contains processed comments for image downloading
// We should have processed review comments, but only those before trigger time
// The exact check depends on how imageUrlMap is structured, but we can verify
// that filtering occurred by checking the review data still has all nodes
expect(result.reviewData?.nodes?.length).toBe(1); // Original review is kept
// The review itself is pre-trigger and kept, but its inline comments are
// filtered to trigger time: the comment created after the trigger (id 11)
// and the one edited after the trigger (id 12) are dropped, leaving only
// the pre-trigger comment (id 10).
expect(result.reviewData?.nodes?.length).toBe(1);
const reviewCommentIds =
result.reviewData?.nodes?.[0]?.comments?.nodes?.map((c) => c.databaseId);
expect(reviewCommentIds).toEqual(["10"]);
});
// The actual filtering happens during processing for image download
// Since the mock doesn't actually download images, we verify the input was correct
it("should filter reviews by both trigger time and actor", async () => {
const mockOctokits = {
graphql: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
repository: {
pullRequest: {
number: 321,
title: "Test PR",
body: "PR body",
author: { login: "author" },
comments: { nodes: [] },
files: { nodes: [] },
reviews: {
nodes: [
{
id: "1",
databaseId: "1",
author: { login: "reviewer1" },
body: "Pre-trigger human review",
state: "APPROVED",
submittedAt: "2024-01-15T11:00:00Z",
comments: { nodes: [] },
},
{
id: "2",
databaseId: "2",
author: { login: "scanner[bot]" },
body: "Pre-trigger bot review",
state: "COMMENTED",
submittedAt: "2024-01-15T11:00:00Z",
comments: { nodes: [] },
},
{
id: "3",
databaseId: "3",
author: { login: "reviewer3" },
body: "Post-trigger human review",
state: "CHANGES_REQUESTED",
submittedAt: "2024-01-15T13:00:00Z",
comments: { nodes: [] },
},
],
},
},
},
user: { login: "trigger-user" },
}),
rest: {
pulls: {
listFiles: jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({ data: [] }),
},
},
};
const result = await fetchGitHubData({
octokits: mockOctokits as any,
repository: "test-owner/test-repo",
prNumber: "321",
isPR: true,
triggerUsername: "trigger-user",
triggerTime: "2024-01-15T12:00:00Z",
excludeCommentsByActor: "*[bot]",
});
// The trigger-time and actor filters compose: the pre-trigger human review
// is kept, the pre-trigger bot review is dropped by actor, and the
// post-trigger human review is dropped by trigger time.
expect(result.reviewData?.nodes?.map((r) => r.databaseId)).toEqual(["1"]);
});
it("should handle backward compatibility when no trigger time provided", async () => {
+48
View File
@@ -437,3 +437,51 @@ describe("integration tests", () => {
expect(actualOutput).toBe(expectedOutput);
});
});
describe("detectContentType fallbacks", () => {
test("falls back to text for malformed JSON objects", () => {
// Looks like an object (starts with { ends with }) but does not parse.
expect(detectContentType("{not valid json}")).toBe("text");
});
test("falls back to text for malformed JSON arrays", () => {
// Looks like an array (starts with [ ends with ]) but does not parse.
expect(detectContentType("[not, valid, json]")).toBe("text");
});
test("classifies non-python, non-js code keywords as python by default", () => {
// Contains a code keyword ("class ") but matches neither the python-specific
// nor the javascript-specific checks, so it hits the default branch.
expect(detectContentType("class Foo {}")).toBe("python");
});
});
describe("formatResultContent non-string input", () => {
test("handles a numeric (non-string) result value", () => {
const result = formatResultContent(42);
expect(result).toContain("42");
});
test("handles a plain object (non-string, non-text-array) result value", () => {
const result = formatResultContent({ status: "ok" });
expect(typeof result).toBe("string");
expect(result.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
});
});
describe("system_other handling", () => {
test("groups a non-init system turn as system_other", () => {
const systemTurn: Turn = { type: "system", subtype: "some_other_subtype" };
const grouped = groupTurnsNaturally([systemTurn]);
expect(grouped).toHaveLength(1);
expect(grouped[0]?.type).toBe("system_other");
expect(grouped[0]?.data).toEqual(systemTurn);
});
test("renders a system_other group as a System Message section", () => {
const markdown = formatGroupedContent([
{ type: "system_other", data: { type: "system" } as Turn },
]);
expect(markdown).toContain("## ⚙️ System Message");
});
});
+139
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach } from "bun:test";
import {
existsSync,
mkdtempSync,
readFileSync,
rmSync,
writeFileSync,
} from "fs";
import { tmpdir } from "os";
import { join } from "path";
import { removeBufferedComment } from "../src/mcp/inline-comment-buffer";
describe("removeBufferedComment", () => {
let dir: string;
let bufferPath: string;
const entryA = {
ts: "2026-06-13T00:00:00.000Z",
path: "src/index.ts",
line: 10,
startLine: undefined,
side: "RIGHT",
body: "Comment A",
};
const entryB = {
ts: "2026-06-13T00:00:01.000Z",
path: "src/other.ts",
line: 20,
startLine: undefined,
side: "RIGHT",
body: "Comment B",
};
const writeBuffer = (entries: object[]): void => {
writeFileSync(
bufferPath,
entries.map((e) => JSON.stringify(e)).join("\n") + "\n",
);
};
const readBuffer = (): Array<{ body: string }> => {
if (!existsSync(bufferPath)) {
return [];
}
return readFileSync(bufferPath, "utf8")
.split("\n")
.filter((line) => line.trim() !== "")
.map((line) => JSON.parse(line));
};
beforeEach(() => {
dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "inline-buffer-"));
bufferPath = join(dir, "buffer.jsonl");
});
afterEach(() => {
rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
it("removes the matching buffered entry and keeps the others", () => {
writeBuffer([entryA, entryB]);
removeBufferedComment(
{
path: "src/index.ts",
line: 10,
startLine: undefined,
body: "Comment A",
},
bufferPath,
);
const remaining = readBuffer();
expect(remaining.map((e) => e.body)).toEqual(["Comment B"]);
});
it("removes every copy when the same comment was buffered more than once", () => {
writeBuffer([entryA, entryA, entryB]);
removeBufferedComment(
{
path: "src/index.ts",
line: 10,
startLine: undefined,
body: "Comment A",
},
bufferPath,
);
expect(readBuffer().map((e) => e.body)).toEqual(["Comment B"]);
});
it("leaves the buffer untouched when nothing matches", () => {
writeBuffer([entryA, entryB]);
removeBufferedComment(
{
path: "src/index.ts",
line: 999,
startLine: undefined,
body: "Comment A",
},
bufferPath,
);
expect(readBuffer().map((e) => e.body)).toEqual(["Comment A", "Comment B"]);
});
it("does nothing when the buffer file does not exist", () => {
expect(() =>
removeBufferedComment(
{ path: "src/index.ts", line: 10, body: "Comment A" },
bufferPath,
),
).not.toThrow();
expect(existsSync(bufferPath)).toBe(false);
});
it("keeps lines that cannot be parsed as JSON", () => {
writeFileSync(
bufferPath,
["not json", JSON.stringify(entryA)].join("\n") + "\n",
);
removeBufferedComment(
{
path: "src/index.ts",
line: 10,
startLine: undefined,
body: "Comment A",
},
bufferPath,
);
const raw = readFileSync(bufferPath, "utf8");
expect(raw).toContain("not json");
expect(raw).not.toContain("Comment A");
});
});
+50
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
import { describe, it, expect } from "bun:test";
import { spawnSync } from "child_process";
import { buildInstallCommand } from "../src/entrypoints/run";
describe("buildInstallCommand (regression for #1136)", () => {
it("includes the pinned claude version in the bash -s args", () => {
const cmd = buildInstallCommand("2.1.114");
expect(cmd).toContain("bash -s -- 2.1.114");
});
it("prefixes the pipeline with `set -o pipefail`", () => {
const cmd = buildInstallCommand("2.1.114");
expect(cmd.startsWith("set -o pipefail;")).toBe(true);
});
it("keeps the curl -fsSL flags so the script is fetched, not inlined", () => {
const cmd = buildInstallCommand("2.1.114");
expect(cmd).toContain(
"curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash -s --",
);
});
});
describe("pipefail semantics (proves the bug shape and the fix)", () => {
// Mirrors the real install invocation: a curl that returns non-zero
// feeding into `bash -s --`. Without pipefail, the pipeline exits 0
// because bash -s receives an empty stdin and does nothing. With
// pipefail, curl's exit code wins and the retry loop in run.ts triggers.
//
// Uses port 1 (reserved/unused) so curl fails deterministically with no
// network access. No shell-escaping traps here: the version argument is
// a numeric literal.
const unreachable = "http://127.0.0.1:1/nope";
const version = "2.1.114";
it("BEFORE FIX: pipeline without pipefail swallows curl failure (exit 0)", () => {
const buggy = `curl -fsSL ${unreachable} | bash -s -- ${version}`;
const result = spawnSync("bash", ["-c", buggy], { stdio: "pipe" });
expect(result.status).toBe(0);
});
it("AFTER FIX: buildInstallCommand (against unreachable host) exits non-zero", () => {
const fixed = buildInstallCommand(version).replace(
"https://claude.ai/install.sh",
unreachable,
);
const result = spawnSync("bash", ["-c", fixed], { stdio: "pipe" });
expect(result.status).not.toBe(0);
});
});
+67
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,12 @@ import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, test } from "bun:test";
import { execFileSync } from "child_process";
import {
existsSync,
lstatSync,
mkdtempSync,
mkdirSync,
readFileSync,
rmSync,
symlinkSync,
writeFileSync,
} from "fs";
import { dirname, isAbsolute, join } from "path";
@@ -121,6 +123,48 @@ describe("restoreConfigFromBase", () => {
}
});
test("restores symlinked CLAUDE.md paths from the PR base branch", () => {
setupSymlinkedMainBranch();
git(["checkout", "pr"]);
writeRepoFile(
".claude/settings.json",
`${JSON.stringify({ source: "pr-with-symlinks" })}\n`,
);
git(["add", ".claude/settings.json"]);
git(["commit", "-m", "pr updates settings"]);
restoreConfigFromBase("main");
expect(lstatRepoFile("CLAUDE.md").isSymbolicLink()).toBe(true);
expect(lstatRepoFile(".claude/CLAUDE.md").isSymbolicLink()).toBe(true);
expect(readRepoFile("CLAUDE.md").trim()).toBe("shared agent instructions");
expect(readRepoFile(".claude/CLAUDE.md").trim()).toBe(
"shared agent instructions",
);
expect(readRepoFile(".claude/settings.json")).toBe(
`${JSON.stringify({ source: "base" })}\n`,
);
});
test("snapshots symlinked sensitive paths even when the PR head target is missing", () => {
setupSymlinkedMainBranch();
git(["checkout", "pr"]);
rmSync(join(repoDir, "AGENTS.md"), { force: true });
git(["add", "-A"]);
git(["commit", "-m", "pr deletes agents file"]);
restoreConfigFromBase("main");
expect(lstatRepoFile(".claude-pr/.claude/CLAUDE.md").isSymbolicLink()).toBe(
true,
);
expect(readRepoFile(".claude/settings.json")).toBe(
`${JSON.stringify({ source: "base" })}\n`,
);
});
test("does not modify an existing .gitignore", () => {
writeRepoFile(".gitignore", "node_modules\n");
git(["add", ".gitignore"]);
@@ -156,6 +200,29 @@ describe("restoreConfigFromBase", () => {
return existsSync(join(repoDir, path));
}
function symlinkRepoFile(path: string, target: string): void {
const fullPath = join(repoDir, path);
mkdirSync(dirname(fullPath), { recursive: true });
symlinkSync(target, fullPath);
}
function lstatRepoFile(path: string) {
return lstatSync(join(repoDir, path));
}
function setupSymlinkedMainBranch(): void {
git(["checkout", "main"]);
rmSync(join(repoDir, "CLAUDE.md"), { force: true });
writeRepoFile("AGENTS.md", "shared agent instructions\n");
symlinkRepoFile("CLAUDE.md", "AGENTS.md");
symlinkRepoFile(".claude/CLAUDE.md", "../AGENTS.md");
git(["add", "AGENTS.md", "CLAUDE.md", ".claude/CLAUDE.md"]);
git(["commit", "-m", "add symlinked claude files"]);
git(["push", "origin", "main"]);
git(["branch", "-D", "pr"]);
git(["checkout", "-b", "pr"]);
}
function countClaudePrExcludeEntries(): number {
return readFileSync(getExcludePath(), "utf8")
.split(/\r?\n/)
+16
View File
@@ -64,6 +64,16 @@ describe("validateBranchName", () => {
expect(() => validateBranchName("feature/paris,france")).not.toThrow();
expect(() => validateBranchName("fix/issue-1,2,3")).not.toThrow();
});
it("should accept branch names containing @ (git-valid, used in team and tooling conventions)", () => {
// Reported in #998: branches like "TICKET-123@add-feature" were rejected, even
// though git check-ref-format and GitHub both accept @ anywhere in a ref name.
// Also common as a leading prefix (e.g. "@hotfix/...") and in agent-generated
// names ("task@sessionid"). Bare "@" and "@{" are still rejected.
expect(() => validateBranchName("TICKET-123@add-feature")).not.toThrow();
expect(() => validateBranchName("@hotfix/login-timeout")).not.toThrow();
expect(() => validateBranchName("agent/task@abc123")).not.toThrow();
});
});
describe("command injection attempts", () => {
@@ -137,6 +147,12 @@ describe("validateBranchName", () => {
expect(() => validateBranchName("HEAD@{yesterday}")).toThrow(/@{/);
});
it("should reject the single character @", () => {
// Per git-check-ref-format, a refname cannot be the single character "@";
// "@" also resolves to HEAD in git revision syntax.
expect(() => validateBranchName("@")).toThrow(/single character '@'/);
});
it("should reject .lock suffix", () => {
expect(() => validateBranchName("branch.lock")).toThrow(/\.lock/);
expect(() => validateBranchName("feature.lock")).toThrow(/\.lock/);