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Author SHA1 Message Date
GitHub Actions 51705da45e chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.183 and Agent SDK to 0.3.183 2026-06-19 01:21:31 +00:00
GitHub Actions 806af32823 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.181 and Agent SDK to 0.3.181 2026-06-17 22:08:47 +00:00
Ryan NoonanandGitHub 0a08a86780 fix: skip workflow validation token exchange failures (#1417) 2026-06-17 13:53:35 -07:00
GitHub Actions 9dd8b95a39 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.179 and Agent SDK to 0.3.179 2026-06-16 20:23:28 +00:00
GitHub Actions 4d7e1f0cd8 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.178 and Agent SDK to 0.3.178 2026-06-15 21:37:45 +00:00
3d9f0dc7dc fix(mcp): align allowed-tools parser with SDK option parser (#1373)
parseAllowedTools (used to decide which GitHub MCP servers to install)
hand-rolled a regex parse of claude_args, while the tools actually
granted to Claude are parsed by parseClaudeArgsToExtraArgs in
base-action/src/parse-sdk-options.ts using shell-quote. The two parsers
diverged on two inputs (#1357):

- Multiple values after a single flag: for
  `--allowedTools "Read" "Grep" "mcp__github__get_commit"` the regex
  captured only "Read", so the github MCP server was not installed even
  though mcp__github__get_commit was granted — tool calls then failed.
- Commented-out lines: the regex counted tools on `#`-prefixed lines
  that the SDK parser strips, installing servers that were never used.

Reimplement parseAllowedTools on the same shell-quote tokenizer and the
same "accumulating flag consumes all consecutive non-flag values"
semantics, stripping comment lines first, so the install decision agrees
with the tools that are actually granted. Unquoted glob patterns (e.g.
`mcp__github__*`), which shell-quote yields as glob objects, are
recovered to their literal text to preserve existing behavior.

Closes #1357

Co-authored-by: bymle <[email protected]>
2026-06-13 22:49:34 -07:00
a5e5d3b82e fix(parse-sdk-options): prevent shell-quote from collapsing unquoted Bash(X:*) rules to bare Bash (#1350)
* fix(parse-sdk-options): prevent shell-quote from collapsing unquoted Bash(X:*) rules to bare Bash

shell-quote's parse() tokenizes unquoted `(`, `)` as control operators
and barewords containing `*` as glob ops, all returned as non-string
objects. parseClaudeArgsToExtraArgs filtered those out, so an unquoted
`--allowedTools View,Bash(gh:*),Bash(cat:*)` collapsed to bare `Bash` —
silently widening scoped permission rules to unrestricted Bash(*).

Escape shell control metachars to Unicode private-use placeholders
before parse() and restore after; extract .pattern from glob ops.
Preserves existing quote/whitespace handling.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <[email protected]>

* ci: retrigger

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <[email protected]>
2026-06-13 22:45:14 -07:00
GitHub Actions d5726de019 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.177 and Agent SDK to 0.3.177 2026-06-13 01:25:48 +00:00
GitHub Actions 56fa348258 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.176 and Agent SDK to 0.3.176 2026-06-12 21:54:44 +00:00
Ashwin BhatandGitHub 82d95d45af Add pr-stamp-sweep review workflow (#1409)
* Add pr-stamp-sweep review workflow

Adds a reusable workflow script that fans out one reviewer agent per
candidate PR to judge whether it can be approved as-is, then runs an
adversarial verification pass on each approval recommendation before
including it in the final list.

Reviewers read pre-fetched PR dossiers from /tmp/claude/pr-sweep/<n>.md
(metadata, body, comments, full diff) rather than calling gh directly,
and verify diff claims against the local checkout. PR numbers are
passed via args; the script fails fast if none are provided.

* Sharpen security checklist in reviewer prompts

Replace the general security-history note with explicit attack classes
both reviewer stages must check: prompt injection (untrusted content
reaching Claude's context, including via tool output), code execution
(shell commands, eval/spawn, workflow expressions), path traversal,
and credential exposure.
2026-06-11 21:54:48 -07:00
GitHub Actions 0cb4f3e5e7 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.175 and Agent SDK to 0.3.175 2026-06-12 04:24:54 +00:00
8551f4b0aa fix(image-downloader): detect image type from magic bytes (#1396)
GitHub serves pasted attachments from /user-attachments/assets/<uuid>
with no file extension, so getImageExtension() silently defaulted to
".png". When the bytes are actually JPEG/GIF/WebP the downloaded file is
mislabeled, and the Read tool then sends a base64 image whose declared
media_type doesn't match its magic bytes — which the Anthropic API
rejects with `400 invalid_request_error` ("image was specified using the
image/png media type, but the image appears to be a image/jpeg image").

Sniff the real format from the buffer's magic bytes after download and
only fall back to the URL-based extension when the signature is
unrecognized. Adds a regression test for a JPEG at an extensionless URL.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
2026-06-11 21:23:35 -07:00
looooownandGitHub eba921ff6f docs: fix execution file parsing example (#1297) 2026-06-11 21:19:57 -07:00
36617bd48b fix(sanitizer): match attribute quotes by type to avoid mangling content (#1371)
stripHiddenAttributes used the pattern `["'][^"']*["']` for each quoted
attribute, which matches an opening quote of either type and stops at the
first quote of either type. When a value contained the other quote
character — e.g. an apostrophe inside a double-quoted attribute like
`title="We'll do it"` — the match terminated at the apostrophe, so the
wrong span was removed and the surrounding text was corrupted (e.g.
`<Tooltip title="We'll do it" placement="top">` became
`<Tooltipll do it" placement="top">`).

This surfaced via the github_inline_comment MCP tool: suggestion blocks
whose code lines contain quotes were mangled before posting (#1366).

Match each quoted form per quote type (`"[^"]*"` and `'[^']*'`),
mirroring stripMarkdownLinkTitles, so a value may freely contain the
other quote character. The unquoted fallback is unchanged.

Closes #1366

Co-authored-by: bymle <[email protected]>
2026-06-11 21:19:44 -07:00
24b915648e Include labels in formatContext() output for issues and PRs (#1298)
The formatted_context block sent to the agent omitted labels for both
issues and pull requests, even though the GraphQL queries already
fetched them. This caused agents to incorrectly report "no labels"
when labels existed, breaking any workflow that routes on label state
(e.g., drift-fix routing on drift:* labels in a Drift Watcher pattern).

Changes:
- Add 'PR Labels:' line to PR context output
- Add 'Issue Labels:' line to issue context output
- Both emit 'none' when no labels are present (explicit > omitted)
- Bump labels(first: 1) → labels(first: 100) in both queries; the
  previous cap meant only one label would appear even after the
  formatter fix
- Update existing tests + add 'with labels' tests for both PR and
  issue branches

Discovered while building a GitHub Actions workflow that uses this
action for drift-watcher routing in an internal seed framework
(joshpayne-joby/slim-routines#6). The agent self-diagnosed the gap
by inspecting this action's source — a satisfying full-loop.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <[email protected]>
2026-06-11 21:19:15 -07:00
Kyungil ParkandGitHub 9441a7fe22 fix: clear stale claude-prompts dir before each write (#1288)
Previously, prompt files at `${RUNNER_TEMP}/claude-prompts/` from a prior
invocation could persist on non-ephemeral self-hosted runners (where the
documented `RUNNER_TEMP` cleanup contract is not reliably honored). In
particular, `claude-user-request.txt` is only written by `create-prompt`
when a user request exists; an `agent`-mode invocation does not overwrite
it, so a stale value left by an earlier mention-mode job in another repo
would leak into a later agent-mode job's effective context on the same
runner agent.

Fix: `rm -rf` the directory before `mkdir` in both write sites
(`src/create-prompt/index.ts`, `src/modes/agent/index.ts`). Idempotent,
safe on hosted runners (where the dir is already empty), and self-heals
on self-hosted runners.

Closes #1287
2026-06-11 21:18:57 -07:00
KiwiandGitHub b371255139 pin setup-bun path for post steps (#1365)
Signed-off-by: kiwigitops <[email protected]>
2026-06-11 21:18:24 -07:00
Stephen CobbeandGitHub 84d317e8f9 fix: break SDK iterator after result message to prevent hang (#1339)
In some workflow contexts — reliably reproducible for us on
pull_request-triggered runs of this action — the Claude Agent SDK
query() async iterator does not close after the terminal result
message is emitted. The for-await loop in runClaudeWithSdk blocks
indefinitely after Claude has finished its work, until the workflow's
timeout-minutes cap kills the job.

Symptoms observed in production (4× in our scan-reviewer workflow):
- Claude completes successfully: SDK emits { type: "result",
  subtype: "success", ... } with the cost / turns / duration set.
- The action then sits with zero log output for the rest of
  timeout-minutes (we measured 18-19 min of dead time after result).
- The job is cancelled at timeout. writeExecutionFile is never
  called → no claude-execution-output.json → cost-tracker and other
  post-steps see nothing.
- Run shows as cancelled, even though Claude did its work and any
  verdict it posted via gh tools already landed.

Author-mode (workflow_dispatch) runs from the same codebase
terminate cleanly the same day, so the hang is specific to certain
event triggers.

By SDK contract the result message is terminal — no further messages
follow. Break out of the loop immediately after capturing it,
regardless of whether the upstream iterator ever closes. If the SDK
is later fixed to close cleanly in all contexts, this break becomes
a no-op.
2026-06-11 21:17:47 -07:00
Nikita KirsanovandGitHub cd59d5df0d fix: fall back to inherited env for auth when inputs are empty (#1342)
The "Run Claude Code Action" step maps the auth inputs into env
unconditionally:

    ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: ${{ inputs.anthropic_api_key }}
    CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN: ${{ inputs.claude_code_oauth_token }}

When the input is empty — whether because the caller supplied auth via
the step `env:` block (as reported in #676) or because the `with:` value
resolves empty in some runner/secret configurations — this assignment
overwrites the inherited env value with an empty string. validate-env
then fails with the misleading "Either ANTHROPIC_API_KEY or
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN is required" error even though the caller did
provide a token.

Fall back to the inherited env var when the input is empty, mirroring the
existing `${{ env.X }}` pattern already used a few lines below for
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL / ANTHROPIC_CUSTOM_HEADERS. The input still takes
precedence; nothing changes for workflows that pass auth via `with:`.

Fixes #676
2026-06-11 21:17:22 -07:00
8046d850b5 docs(faq): correct rebase FAQ to match actual behavior (#1370)
The "Why won't Claude rebase my branch?" FAQ told users they could
enable rebasing by passing `--allowedTools "Bash(git rebase:*)"` via
claude_args. This does not work: the system prompt built in
src/create-prompt/index.ts unconditionally instructs Claude that it
cannot merge, rebase, or perform branch operations beyond creating and
pushing commits, so Claude declines rebase requests regardless of the
allowed tools.

Update the FAQ to describe the actual behavior and point users to the
real workaround (rebase locally or via the Claude Code CLI).

Closes #1286

Co-authored-by: bymle <[email protected]>
2026-06-11 21:16:55 -07:00
ee2b19d882 test: add unit tests for parseGitHubContext and context type guards (#1404)
* test: add unit tests for parseGitHubContext and context type guards

Covers all supported webhook event types (entity and automation),
the pull_request_target normalization, isPR detection for comments
on pull requests, env-derived input defaults and parsing, and the
nine type guard functions. Raises src/github/context.ts line
coverage from 26.5% to 100%.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

* test: assert all env-derived inputs to close mutation testing gaps

Mutation testing (StrykerJS, 138 mutants) showed 22 surviving mutants
in the env input parsing of parseGitHubContext: fields like
trackProgress, includeFixLinks, allowedBots and the comment actor
filters were never asserted. Asserting every input field in both the
defaults and the explicit-values tests, plus covering the optional
chaining on payload.repository, brings the mutation score for
src/github/context.ts from 84.06% to 100%.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-06-11 21:16:45 -07:00
GitHub Actions ebcdfe6dc6 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.174 and Agent SDK to 0.3.174 2026-06-12 01:17:25 +00:00
GitHub Actions 0f97b95b65 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.173 and Agent SDK to 0.3.173 2026-06-11 05:43:00 +00:00
GitHub Actions eee73e2ae5 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.172 and Agent SDK to 0.3.172 2026-06-10 21:01:40 +00:00
232c9a15f4 Drop --tsconfig-override from Bun invocations to avoid runtime crash (#1315)
* Drop --tsconfig-override from Bun invocations to avoid runtime crash

Passing --tsconfig-override to `bun run` triggers a Bun runtime bug
("Internal error: directory mismatch for directory .../tsconfig.json")
that aborts the action with exit code 1 before any work is done.

Bun already auto-discovers the action's own tsconfig.json by walking up
the directory tree from the entry file, so the override is redundant —
the workspace's tsconfig is never an ancestor of the action checkout.
Dropping the flag preserves tsconfig resolution while avoiding the crash.

Refs: oven-sh/bun#25730

https://claude.ai/code/session_01L763e4S7zBnzDqmYYEJS1A

* Fix prettier formatting in create-prompt/index.ts

Removes redundant outer parentheses that were tripping format:check.
Pre-existing on main; unrelated to the action.yml change but needed
to keep CI green on this branch.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01L763e4S7zBnzDqmYYEJS1A

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <[email protected]>
2026-06-09 14:12:16 -07:00
GitHub Actions 11ba60486e chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.170 and Agent SDK to 0.3.170 2026-06-09 17:27:26 +00:00
GitHub Actions 593d7a5c4e chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.169 and Agent SDK to 0.3.169 2026-06-08 21:57:59 +00:00
GitHub Actions fbda2eb1bd chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.168 and Agent SDK to 0.3.168 2026-06-06 23:42:46 +00:00
GitHub Actions 64de744025 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.167 and Agent SDK to 0.3.167 2026-06-06 01:34:14 +00:00
GitHub Actions 410165836e chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.166 and Agent SDK to 0.3.166 2026-06-06 00:56:12 +00:00
GitHub Actions 41ea7642c1 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.165 and Agent SDK to 0.3.165 2026-06-05 05:45:57 +00:00
GitHub Actions 0b1b620029 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.163 and Agent SDK to 0.3.163 2026-06-04 21:54:01 +00:00
GitHub Actions 70a6e5256e chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.162 and Agent SDK to 0.3.162 2026-06-03 21:32:44 +00:00
GitHub Actions 36a69b6a90 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.161 and Agent SDK to 0.3.161 2026-06-02 21:59:11 +00:00
bfad70d6a1 ci: bump checkout and setup-bun in test workflows to Node 24 releases (#1379)
actions/checkout v4 and oven-sh/setup-bun v2.0.2 run on the deprecated
Node 20 action runtime and emit a deprecation warning on every run.
Bump to checkout v6.0.2 and setup-bun v2.2.0 (both Node 24).

Co-authored-by: ant-kurt <[email protected]>
2026-06-02 12:03:04 -07:00
dc081a3809 chore: bump actions/setup-node from v4.4.0 to v6.4.0 (Node.js 24) (#1377)
* chore: bump actions/setup-node from v4.4.0 to v6.4.0 (Node.js 24)

setup-node v4 runs on the deprecated Node.js 20 action runtime, producing
a deprecation warning on every workflow run that uses base-action. v6 runs
on Node 24. This only changes the action's own runtime — the node-version
it installs for user code is unaffected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>

* Disable setup-node v5+ automatic package-manager caching

Preserves v4 behavior: caching only when use_node_cache=true.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: ant-kurt <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
2026-06-02 12:02:35 -07:00
Ashwin BhatandGitHub 420335da51 Add workload identity federation support to base-action (#1378)
* Add workload identity federation support to base-action

Move the workload identity module into base-action so the standalone
action can fetch and refresh the GitHub OIDC identity token itself, and
expose the same federation inputs as the outer action. Switch the
base-action test workflows from the anthropic_api_key secret to the
federation repo variables and grant them id-token: write.

* Verify MCP test tool invocation instead of init connection status

MCP servers can connect asynchronously, so the init event may report a
server as pending. Check that the server is registered at init, then
assert the test tool was actually called and returned its response.
Also pass the MCP config through claude_args --mcp-config, replacing the
removed mcp_config input.
2026-06-02 11:52:23 -07:00
GitHub Actions 7f37f2e373 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.160 and Agent SDK to 0.3.160 2026-06-02 02:11:04 +00:00
GitHub Actions fb53c379a0 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.159 and Agent SDK to 0.3.159 2026-05-31 19:43:36 +00:00
GitHub Actions c5c315c8a1 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.158 and Agent SDK to 0.3.158 2026-05-30 02:42:43 +00:00
GitHub Actions f809dea0ba chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.157 and Agent SDK to 0.3.157 2026-05-29 20:21:24 +00:00
GitHub Actions 0fb1b8f303 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.156 and Agent SDK to 0.3.156 2026-05-29 01:43:14 +00:00
GitHub Actions 3d4c9fde8e chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.154 and Agent SDK to 0.3.154 2026-05-28 18:02:04 +00:00
GitHub Actions 324957b26b chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.153 and Agent SDK to 0.3.153 2026-05-28 00:52:58 +00:00
GitHub Actions 73c91f04a8 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.152 and Agent SDK to 0.3.152 2026-05-27 01:31:47 +00:00
GitHub Actions 787c5a0ce9 chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.150 and Agent SDK to 0.3.150 2026-05-23 04:04:43 +00:00
Ashwin BhatandGitHub 4257c8e059 Use workload identity federation for Claude auth in CI workflows (#1344)
Switch claude.yml, claude-review.yml, and issue-triage.yml from the
anthropic_api_key secret to the workload identity federation inputs.
The federation rule, organization, and service account IDs are read
from repository variables; issue-triage.yml additionally gains the
id-token: write permission required to request the OIDC token.
2026-05-22 15:46:06 -07:00
GitHub Actions bbfaf8e1ff chore: bump Claude Code to 2.1.149 and Agent SDK to 0.3.149 2026-05-22 22:10:12 +00:00
43 changed files with 1782 additions and 275 deletions
+162
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
export const meta = {
name: "pr-stamp-sweep",
description:
"Review candidate PRs for stampability, then adversarially verify security of stamp candidates",
whenToUse:
"Sweep candidate PRs for stampability: per-PR review + adversarial security verify. Requires pre-fetched PR dossiers in /tmp/claude/pr-sweep/<n>.md and args {prs: [...]}.",
phases: [
{ title: "Review", detail: "one reviewer agent per PR" },
{
title: "Verify",
detail: "adversarial security skeptic per stamp candidate",
},
],
};
// PRECONDITION: before invoking this workflow, pre-fetch each candidate PR to
// /tmp/claude/pr-sweep/<n>.md, containing the PR's metadata, body, existing
// reviews/comments, and the full diff (e.g. via `gh pr view` + `gh pr diff`).
// Sandboxed agents can't reliably call gh themselves, so they read these
// dossier files instead. Pass the PR numbers as args: {prs: [<PR numbers>]}.
const REVIEW_SCHEMA = {
type: "object",
properties: {
number: { type: "number" },
verdict: { type: "string", enum: ["stamp", "skip", "needs-discussion"] },
category: {
type: "string",
description: "docs | tests | bugfix | nicety | security-fix | other",
},
summary: {
type: "string",
description: "1-2 sentence plain-language summary of what the PR does",
},
reasoning: {
type: "string",
description: "why this verdict — correctness, scope, quality",
},
behaviorChange: {
type: "string",
description: 'what user-visible behavior changes, or "none"',
},
concerns: { type: "array", items: { type: "string" } },
securitySensitive: {
type: "boolean",
description:
"true if it touches auth, sanitization, parsers of untrusted input, actor checks, file restore, or shell construction",
},
duplicateOf: {
type: "string",
description: "PR number(s) this duplicates, or empty string",
},
},
required: [
"number",
"verdict",
"category",
"summary",
"reasoning",
"behaviorChange",
"concerns",
"securitySensitive",
"duplicateOf",
],
};
const VERDICT_SCHEMA = {
type: "object",
properties: {
number: { type: "number" },
safeToStamp: { type: "boolean" },
findings: {
type: "array",
items: { type: "string" },
description:
"concrete security/correctness problems found, empty if clean",
},
confidence: { type: "string", enum: ["high", "medium", "low"] },
},
required: ["number", "safeToStamp", "findings", "confidence"],
};
if (!args || !Array.isArray(args.prs) || args.prs.length === 0)
throw new Error(
"pass {prs: [<PR numbers>]} as args; pre-fetch each PR to /tmp/claude/pr-sweep/<n>.md first",
);
const prs = args.prs;
log(`Reviewing ${prs.length} candidate PRs`);
const results = await pipeline(
prs,
(n) =>
agent(
`You are reviewing open PR #${n} on anthropics/claude-code-action to decide if it is safe for a maintainer to approve ("stamp") with minimal further discussion.
The full PR (metadata, body, existing reviews/comments, and complete diff) is in /tmp/claude/pr-sweep/${n}.md — read it first. The repo is checked out at the current working directory. Read the actual current source files the diff touches to verify the diff applies cleanly conceptually and the claims in the PR body are true. Do NOT modify anything or run git commands that change state.
Context about this repo:
- It's a GitHub Action that runs Claude on issues/PRs. It processes UNTRUSTED content (PR bodies, comments, branch names, file contents from forks). Treat any change touching content sanitization, actor/bot allowlists, config restoration, prompt construction, or shell command construction as high-risk.
- Most candidate PRs are from EXTERNAL contributors. Treat the diff with suspicion: look for subtle malicious changes, weakened validation, injection vectors, overly broad permissions, or changes whose description doesn't match the code.
- Runtime is Bun; strict TypeScript (noUnusedLocals/noUnusedParameters). Tests are unit tests run with bun test.
Stamp criteria (ALL must hold):
1. Small, focused, and the code does exactly what the title/body says.
2. No major behavior change — bug fixes restoring intended behavior, docs fixes, test-only additions, and small niceties qualify. New inputs/features, behavior redesigns, or large refactors do NOT.
3. Correct: you verified the logic against the actual current source, not just the diff. Check edge cases.
4. No security concern. Check explicitly for: prompt injection (untrusted text reaching Claude's prompt without sanitization), code execution (untrusted data reaching shell commands, eval/spawn, or GitHub workflow expressions), path traversal (untrusted input influencing filesystem paths), credential exposure (tokens reaching logs, comments, or attacker-readable output), weakened validation or permission checks, and suspicious hunks unrelated to the stated purpose.
5. Wouldn't break the public API of base-action/ or action.yml output wiring.
If the PR is a docs change, verify the docs claims against the actual code behavior. If test-only, check tests actually pass conceptually (assert the right things, match real implementations) and don't weaken or skip anything.
Verdicts: "stamp" = approve as-is; "needs-discussion" = plausible but has questions/issues worth a comment; "skip" = too big, wrong, redundant, or risky.
If this PR appears to duplicate another open PR (same fix, same files), still judge it on its own merits but note the duplication in duplicateOf.
Return structured output only.`,
{ label: `review:#${n}`, phase: "Review", schema: REVIEW_SCHEMA },
),
(review, n) => {
if (!review) return null;
if (review.verdict !== "stamp") return { review, verify: null };
return agent(
`You are an adversarial security skeptic. Another reviewer recommended APPROVING open PR #${n} on anthropics/claude-code-action. Your job is to REFUTE that recommendation — find any reason it should NOT be stamped.
Their assessment: ${JSON.stringify(review)}
Read the full PR at /tmp/claude/pr-sweep/${n}.md and the touched source files in the current working directory. This repo processes untrusted PR/issue content from forks; anything that lets untrusted content reach Claude's prompt, a shell command, a workflow expression, or a filesystem path unsanitized is a critical vulnerability.
Hunt specifically for:
- Subtle malice or scope creep: hunks that don't match the stated purpose, weakened validation, regex changes that widen acceptance, removed escaping.
- Prompt injection: untrusted data (comment bodies, branch names, file contents, command output, downloaded files) reaching Claude's prompt or context without sanitization, including indirect routes like tool output Claude later reads.
- Code execution: untrusted data reaching shell commands, eval/spawn argv, GitHub workflow \${{ }} expressions, or API call templates; new process spawning; path traversal letting untrusted input write or read outside intended directories.
- Credential exposure: tokens or secrets flowing into logs, posted comments, error messages, env passed to untrusted code, or files Claude can read.
- Logic errors the first reviewer missed: off-by-one, wrong polarity, unhandled edge cases (empty strings, unicode, very long inputs).
- Supply-chain angles: pinned versions that don't match the claimed SHA/tag, new dependencies, fetched URLs.
- For docs PRs: claims that would mislead users into insecure configurations.
- For test-only PRs: tests that codify wrong behavior, or that would mask future regressions.
If the diff pins a version/SHA, verify the claim is plausible from local information; flag if unverifiable. Be strict: if uncertain whether something is a real problem, lean toward reporting it as a finding with your uncertainty noted. Only return safeToStamp=true if you genuinely failed to find any disqualifying issue.
Return structured output only.`,
{ label: `verify:#${n}`, phase: "Verify", schema: VERDICT_SCHEMA },
).then((v) => ({ review, verify: v }));
},
);
const clean = results.filter(Boolean);
const stamped = clean.filter(
(r) => r.review.verdict === "stamp" && r.verify && r.verify.safeToStamp,
);
const demoted = clean.filter(
(r) => r.review.verdict === "stamp" && (!r.verify || !r.verify.safeToStamp),
);
const discuss = clean.filter((r) => r.review.verdict === "needs-discussion");
const skipped = clean.filter((r) => r.review.verdict === "skip");
log(
`stamp: ${stamped.length}, demoted by verifier: ${demoted.length}, needs-discussion: ${discuss.length}, skip: ${skipped.length}`,
);
return { stamped, demoted, discuss, skipped };
+3 -5
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ on:
permissions:
contents: read
# Lets the test workflows mint the GitHub OIDC token they exchange for a
# Claude API access token (workload identity federation). See docs/setup.md.
id-token: write
jobs:
ci:
@@ -18,20 +21,15 @@ jobs:
test-base-action:
uses: ./.github/workflows/test-base-action.yml
secrets: inherit # Required for ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
test-custom-executables:
uses: ./.github/workflows/test-custom-executables.yml
secrets: inherit
test-mcp-servers:
uses: ./.github/workflows/test-mcp-servers.yml
secrets: inherit
test-settings:
uses: ./.github/workflows/test-settings.yml
secrets: inherit
test-structured-output:
uses: ./.github/workflows/test-structured-output.yml
secrets: inherit
+6 -1
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,12 @@ jobs:
- name: PR Review with Progress Tracking
uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@v1
with:
anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
# Authenticate to the Claude API via Workload Identity Federation
# (the workflow's OIDC token is exchanged for a short-lived access
# token) instead of a static API key. See docs/setup.md.
anthropic_federation_rule_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_FEDERATION_RULE_ID }}
anthropic_organization_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_ORGANIZATION_ID }}
anthropic_service_account_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_ID }}
prompt: "/review-pr REPO: ${{ github.repository }} PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}"
claude_args: |
+6 -1
View File
@@ -33,7 +33,12 @@ jobs:
id: claude
uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@main
with:
anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
# Authenticate to the Claude API via Workload Identity Federation
# (the workflow's OIDC token is exchanged for a short-lived access
# token) instead of a static API key. See docs/setup.md.
anthropic_federation_rule_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_FEDERATION_RULE_ID }}
anthropic_organization_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_ORGANIZATION_ID }}
anthropic_service_account_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_ID }}
claude_args: |
--allowedTools "Bash(bun install),Bash(bun test:*),Bash(bun run format),Bash(bun typecheck)"
--model "claude-opus-4-7"
+9 -1
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ jobs:
permissions:
contents: read
issues: write
# Required to mint the OIDC token that is exchanged for a Claude API
# access token (Workload Identity Federation).
id-token: write
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
@@ -24,6 +27,11 @@ jobs:
CLAUDE_CODE_SCRIPT_CAPS: '{"edit-issue-labels.sh":2}'
with:
prompt: "/label-issue REPO: ${{ github.repository }} ISSUE_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.issue.number }}"
anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
# Authenticate to the Claude API via Workload Identity Federation
# (the workflow's OIDC token is exchanged for a short-lived access
# token) instead of a static API key. See docs/setup.md.
anthropic_federation_rule_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_FEDERATION_RULE_ID }}
anthropic_organization_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_ORGANIZATION_ID }}
anthropic_service_account_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_ID }}
allowed_non_write_users: "*" # Required for issue triage workflow, if users without repo write access create issues
github_token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ jobs:
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- name: Checkout source repository
uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4
uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
with:
fetch-depth: 1
+15 -4
View File
@@ -10,18 +10,27 @@ on:
default: "List the files in the current directory starting with 'package'"
workflow_call:
# The Claude API is authenticated via workload identity federation: id-token
# lets the action mint the GitHub OIDC token it exchanges for a short-lived
# access token. See docs/setup.md.
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write
jobs:
test-inline-prompt:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
- name: Test with inline prompt
id: inline-test
uses: ./base-action
with:
prompt: ${{ github.event.inputs.test_prompt || 'List the files in the current directory starting with "package"' }}
anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
anthropic_federation_rule_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_FEDERATION_RULE_ID }}
anthropic_organization_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_ORGANIZATION_ID }}
anthropic_service_account_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_ID }}
allowed_tools: "LS,Read"
- name: Verify inline prompt output
@@ -63,7 +72,7 @@ jobs:
test-prompt-file:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
- name: Create test prompt file
run: |
@@ -78,7 +87,9 @@ jobs:
uses: ./base-action
with:
prompt_file: "test-prompt.txt"
anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
anthropic_federation_rule_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_FEDERATION_RULE_ID }}
anthropic_organization_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_ORGANIZATION_ID }}
anthropic_service_account_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_ID }}
allowed_tools: "LS,Read"
- name: Verify prompt file output
+11 -2
View File
@@ -5,11 +5,18 @@ on:
workflow_dispatch:
workflow_call:
# The Claude API is authenticated via workload identity federation: id-token
# lets the action mint the GitHub OIDC token it exchanges for a short-lived
# access token. See docs/setup.md.
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write
jobs:
test-custom-executables:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
- name: Install Bun manually
run: |
@@ -47,7 +54,9 @@ jobs:
with:
prompt: |
List the files in the current directory starting with "package"
anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
anthropic_federation_rule_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_FEDERATION_RULE_ID }}
anthropic_organization_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_ORGANIZATION_ID }}
anthropic_service_account_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_ID }}
path_to_claude_code_executable: /home/runner/.local/bin/claude
path_to_bun_executable: /home/runner/.bun/bin/bun
allowed_tools: "LS,Read"
+59 -29
View File
@@ -5,15 +5,22 @@ on:
workflow_dispatch:
workflow_call:
# The Claude API is authenticated via workload identity federation: id-token
# lets the action mint the GitHub OIDC token it exchanges for a short-lived
# access token. See docs/setup.md.
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write
jobs:
test-mcp-integration:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 #v4
uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
- name: Setup Bun
uses: oven-sh/setup-bun@735343b667d3e6f658f44d0eca948eb6282f2b76 #v2
uses: oven-sh/setup-bun@0c5077e51419868618aeaa5fe8019c62421857d6 # v2.2.0
- name: Install dependencies
run: |
@@ -25,8 +32,11 @@ jobs:
uses: ./base-action
id: claude-test
with:
prompt: "List all available tools"
anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
prompt: "Call the test_tool tool and report its response."
anthropic_federation_rule_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_FEDERATION_RULE_ID }}
anthropic_organization_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_ORGANIZATION_ID }}
anthropic_service_account_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_ID }}
claude_args: --allowedTools mcp__test-server__test_tool
env:
# Change to test directory so it finds .mcp.json
CLAUDE_WORKING_DIR: ${{ github.workspace }}/base-action/test/mcp-test
@@ -50,21 +60,29 @@ jobs:
if jq -e '.[] | select(.type == "system" and .subtype == "init") | .mcp_servers' "$OUTPUT_FILE" > /dev/null; then
echo "✓ Found mcp_servers in output"
# Check if test-server is connected
if jq -e '.[] | select(.type == "system" and .subtype == "init") | .mcp_servers[] | select(.name == "test-server" and .status == "connected")' "$OUTPUT_FILE" > /dev/null; then
echo "✓ test-server is connected"
# MCP servers can connect asynchronously, so the init event may
# report the server as pending — check registration there, then
# verify the tool actually ran.
if jq -e '.[] | select(.type == "system" and .subtype == "init") | .mcp_servers[] | select(.name == "test-server")' "$OUTPUT_FILE" > /dev/null; then
echo "✓ test-server is registered"
else
echo "✗ test-server not found or not connected"
echo "✗ test-server not found"
jq '.[] | select(.type == "system" and .subtype == "init") | .mcp_servers' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
exit 1
fi
# Check if mcp tools are available
if jq -e '.[] | select(.type == "system" and .subtype == "init") | .tools[] | select(. == "mcp__test-server__test_tool")' "$OUTPUT_FILE" > /dev/null; then
echo "✓ MCP test tool found"
if jq -e '.[] | select(.type == "assistant") | .message.content[]? | select(.type == "tool_use" and .name == "mcp__test-server__test_tool")' "$OUTPUT_FILE" > /dev/null; then
echo "✓ MCP test tool was called"
else
echo "✗ MCP test tool not found"
jq '.[] | select(.type == "system" and .subtype == "init") | .tools' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
echo "✗ MCP test tool was not called"
jq '[.[] | select(.type == "assistant") | .message.content[]? | select(.type == "tool_use") | .name]' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
exit 1
fi
if jq -e '.[] | select(.type == "user") | .message.content[]? | select(.type == "tool_result") | select(.content | tostring | contains("Test tool response"))' "$OUTPUT_FILE" > /dev/null; then
echo "✓ MCP test tool returned its response"
else
echo "✗ MCP test tool response not found"
exit 1
fi
else
@@ -79,10 +97,10 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 #v4
uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
- name: Setup Bun
uses: oven-sh/setup-bun@735343b667d3e6f658f44d0eca948eb6282f2b76 #v2
uses: oven-sh/setup-bun@0c5077e51419868618aeaa5fe8019c62421857d6 # v2.2.0
- name: Install dependencies
run: |
@@ -106,9 +124,13 @@ jobs:
uses: ./base-action
id: claude-config-test
with:
prompt: "List all available tools"
anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
mcp_config: '{"mcpServers":{"test-server":{"type":"stdio","command":"bun","args":["simple-mcp-server.ts"],"env":{}}}}'
prompt: "Call the test_tool tool and report its response."
anthropic_federation_rule_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_FEDERATION_RULE_ID }}
anthropic_organization_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_ORGANIZATION_ID }}
anthropic_service_account_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_ID }}
claude_args: |
--allowedTools mcp__test-server__test_tool
--mcp-config '{"mcpServers":{"test-server":{"type":"stdio","command":"bun","args":["simple-mcp-server.ts"],"env":{}}}}'
env:
# Change to test directory so bun can find the MCP server script
CLAUDE_WORKING_DIR: ${{ github.workspace }}/base-action/test/mcp-test
@@ -132,21 +154,29 @@ jobs:
if jq -e '.[] | select(.type == "system" and .subtype == "init") | .mcp_servers' "$OUTPUT_FILE" > /dev/null; then
echo "✓ Found mcp_servers in output"
# Check if test-server is connected
if jq -e '.[] | select(.type == "system" and .subtype == "init") | .mcp_servers[] | select(.name == "test-server" and .status == "connected")' "$OUTPUT_FILE" > /dev/null; then
echo "✓ test-server is connected"
# MCP servers can connect asynchronously, so the init event may
# report the server as pending — check registration there, then
# verify the tool actually ran.
if jq -e '.[] | select(.type == "system" and .subtype == "init") | .mcp_servers[] | select(.name == "test-server")' "$OUTPUT_FILE" > /dev/null; then
echo "✓ test-server is registered"
else
echo "✗ test-server not found or not connected"
echo "✗ test-server not found"
jq '.[] | select(.type == "system" and .subtype == "init") | .mcp_servers' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
exit 1
fi
# Check if mcp tools are available
if jq -e '.[] | select(.type == "system" and .subtype == "init") | .tools[] | select(. == "mcp__test-server__test_tool")' "$OUTPUT_FILE" > /dev/null; then
echo "✓ MCP test tool found"
if jq -e '.[] | select(.type == "assistant") | .message.content[]? | select(.type == "tool_use" and .name == "mcp__test-server__test_tool")' "$OUTPUT_FILE" > /dev/null; then
echo "✓ MCP test tool was called"
else
echo "✗ MCP test tool not found"
jq '.[] | select(.type == "system" and .subtype == "init") | .tools' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
echo "✗ MCP test tool was not called"
jq '[.[] | select(.type == "assistant") | .message.content[]? | select(.type == "tool_use") | .name]' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
exit 1
fi
if jq -e '.[] | select(.type == "user") | .message.content[]? | select(.type == "tool_result") | select(.content | tostring | contains("Test tool response"))' "$OUTPUT_FILE" > /dev/null; then
echo "✓ MCP test tool returned its response"
else
echo "✗ MCP test tool response not found"
exit 1
fi
else
+23 -8
View File
@@ -5,11 +5,18 @@ on:
workflow_dispatch:
workflow_call:
# The Claude API is authenticated via workload identity federation: id-token
# lets the action mint the GitHub OIDC token it exchanges for a short-lived
# access token. See docs/setup.md.
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write
jobs:
test-settings-inline-allow:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
- name: Test with inline settings JSON (echo allowed)
id: inline-settings-test
@@ -17,7 +24,9 @@ jobs:
with:
prompt: |
Use Bash to echo "Hello from settings test"
anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
anthropic_federation_rule_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_FEDERATION_RULE_ID }}
anthropic_organization_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_ORGANIZATION_ID }}
anthropic_service_account_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_ID }}
settings: |
{
"permissions": {
@@ -58,7 +67,7 @@ jobs:
test-settings-inline-deny:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
- name: Test with inline settings JSON (echo denied)
id: inline-settings-test
@@ -66,7 +75,9 @@ jobs:
with:
prompt: |
Run the command `echo $HOME` to check the home directory path
anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
anthropic_federation_rule_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_FEDERATION_RULE_ID }}
anthropic_organization_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_ORGANIZATION_ID }}
anthropic_service_account_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_ID }}
settings: |
{
"permissions": {
@@ -90,7 +101,7 @@ jobs:
test-settings-file-allow:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
- name: Create settings file (echo allowed)
run: |
@@ -108,7 +119,9 @@ jobs:
with:
prompt: |
Use Bash to echo "Hello from settings file test"
anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
anthropic_federation_rule_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_FEDERATION_RULE_ID }}
anthropic_organization_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_ORGANIZATION_ID }}
anthropic_service_account_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_ID }}
settings: "test-settings.json"
- name: Verify echo worked
@@ -144,7 +157,7 @@ jobs:
test-settings-file-deny:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
- name: Create settings file (echo denied)
run: |
@@ -162,7 +175,9 @@ jobs:
with:
prompt: |
Run the command `echo $HOME` to check the home directory path
anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
anthropic_federation_rule_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_FEDERATION_RULE_ID }}
anthropic_organization_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_ORGANIZATION_ID }}
anthropic_service_account_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_ID }}
settings: "test-settings.json"
- name: Verify echo was denied
+24 -10
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,12 @@ on:
workflow_dispatch:
workflow_call:
# The Claude API is authenticated via workload identity federation: id-token
# lets the action mint the GitHub OIDC token it exchanges for a short-lived
# access token. See docs/setup.md.
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write
jobs:
test-basic-types:
@@ -14,7 +18,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4
uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
- name: Test with explicit values
id: test
@@ -28,7 +32,9 @@ jobs:
- number_field: 42
- boolean_true: true
- boolean_false: false
anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
anthropic_federation_rule_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_FEDERATION_RULE_ID }}
anthropic_organization_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_ORGANIZATION_ID }}
anthropic_service_account_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_ID }}
claude_args: |
--allowedTools Bash
--json-schema '{"type":"object","properties":{"text_field":{"type":"string"},"number_field":{"type":"number"},"boolean_true":{"type":"boolean"},"boolean_false":{"type":"boolean"}},"required":["text_field","number_field","boolean_true","boolean_false"]}'
@@ -73,7 +79,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4
uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
- name: Test complex types
id: test
@@ -86,7 +92,9 @@ jobs:
- items: ["apple", "banana", "cherry"]
- config: {"key": "value", "count": 3}
- empty_array: []
anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
anthropic_federation_rule_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_FEDERATION_RULE_ID }}
anthropic_organization_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_ORGANIZATION_ID }}
anthropic_service_account_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_ID }}
claude_args: |
--allowedTools Bash
--json-schema '{"type":"object","properties":{"items":{"type":"array","items":{"type":"string"}},"config":{"type":"object"},"empty_array":{"type":"array"}},"required":["items","config","empty_array"]}'
@@ -124,7 +132,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4
uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
- name: Test edge cases
id: test
@@ -138,7 +146,9 @@ jobs:
- empty_string: ""
- negative: -5
- decimal: 3.14
anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
anthropic_federation_rule_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_FEDERATION_RULE_ID }}
anthropic_organization_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_ORGANIZATION_ID }}
anthropic_service_account_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_ID }}
claude_args: |
--allowedTools Bash
--json-schema '{"type":"object","properties":{"zero":{"type":"number"},"empty_string":{"type":"string"},"negative":{"type":"number"},"decimal":{"type":"number"}},"required":["zero","empty_string","negative","decimal"]}'
@@ -183,7 +193,7 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4
uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
- name: Test special characters in field names
id: test
@@ -192,7 +202,9 @@ jobs:
prompt: |
Run: echo "test"
Return EXACTLY: {test-result: "passed", item_count: 10}
anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
anthropic_federation_rule_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_FEDERATION_RULE_ID }}
anthropic_organization_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_ORGANIZATION_ID }}
anthropic_service_account_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_ID }}
claude_args: |
--allowedTools Bash
--json-schema '{"type":"object","properties":{"test-result":{"type":"string"},"item_count":{"type":"number"}},"required":["test-result","item_count"]}'
@@ -223,14 +235,16 @@ jobs:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4
uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
- name: Run with structured output
id: test
uses: ./base-action
with:
prompt: "Run: echo 'complete'. Return: {done: true}"
anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
anthropic_federation_rule_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_FEDERATION_RULE_ID }}
anthropic_organization_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_ORGANIZATION_ID }}
anthropic_service_account_id: ${{ vars.ANTHROPIC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_ID }}
claude_args: |
--allowedTools Bash
--json-schema '{"type":"object","properties":{"done":{"type":"boolean"}},"required":["done"]}'
+21 -7
View File
@@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ runs:
using: "composite"
steps:
- name: Install Bun
id: setup-bun
if: inputs.path_to_bun_executable == ''
uses: oven-sh/setup-bun@0c5077e51419868618aeaa5fe8019c62421857d6 # https://github.com/oven-sh/setup-bun/releases/tag/v2.2.0
with:
@@ -238,11 +239,20 @@ runs:
if: ${{ inputs.allowed_non_write_users != '' }}
continue-on-error: true
shell: bash
env:
PATH_TO_BUN_EXECUTABLE: ${{ inputs.path_to_bun_executable }}
SETUP_BUN_PATH: ${{ steps.setup-bun.outputs.bun-path }}
run: |
# Keep a copy of the bun binary alongside the action's own files so
# post-steps use the same version that was on PATH at action start.
# post-steps use the same version the action installed or was given.
mkdir -p "$GITHUB_ACTION_PATH/bin"
cp "$(command -v bun)" "$GITHUB_ACTION_PATH/bin/bun"
for bun_path in "$PATH_TO_BUN_EXECUTABLE" "$SETUP_BUN_PATH" "$(command -v bun || true)"; do
if [ -n "$bun_path" ] && [ -x "$bun_path" ]; then
cp "$bun_path" "$GITHUB_ACTION_PATH/bin/bun"
break
fi
done
test -x "$GITHUB_ACTION_PATH/bin/bun"
- name: Prepend system bin dirs to PATH
if: ${{ inputs.allowed_non_write_users != '' && runner.os != 'Windows' }}
@@ -256,9 +266,13 @@ runs:
id: run
shell: bash
run: |
# Do NOT pass --tsconfig-override here. It triggers a Bun runtime bug
# ("Internal error: directory mismatch for directory .../tsconfig.json")
# that aborts the run with exit code 1. Bun already auto-discovers the
# action's own tsconfig.json by walking up from the entry file, so the
# override is redundant. See oven-sh/bun#25730.
bun --no-env-file \
--config="${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/bunfig.toml" \
--tsconfig-override="${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/tsconfig.json" \
run ${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/src/entrypoints/run.ts
env:
# Prepare inputs
@@ -307,8 +321,8 @@ runs:
NODE_VERSION: ${{ env.NODE_VERSION }}
# Provider configuration
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: ${{ inputs.anthropic_api_key }}
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN: ${{ inputs.claude_code_oauth_token }}
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: ${{ inputs.anthropic_api_key || env.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN: ${{ inputs.claude_code_oauth_token || env.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN }}
ANTHROPIC_FEDERATION_RULE_ID: ${{ inputs.anthropic_federation_rule_id }}
ANTHROPIC_ORGANIZATION_ID: ${{ inputs.anthropic_organization_id }}
ANTHROPIC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_ID: ${{ inputs.anthropic_service_account_id }}
@@ -398,9 +412,9 @@ runs:
run: |
BUN_BIN="${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/bin/bun"
[ -x "$BUN_BIN" ] || BUN_BIN="bun"
# No --tsconfig-override: see the "Run Claude Code Action" step above.
"$BUN_BIN" --no-env-file \
--config="${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/bunfig.toml" \
--tsconfig-override="${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/tsconfig.json" \
run ${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/src/entrypoints/cleanup-ssh-signing.ts
- name: Post buffered inline comments
@@ -415,9 +429,9 @@ runs:
run: |
BUN_BIN="${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/bin/bun"
[ -x "$BUN_BIN" ] || BUN_BIN="bun"
# No --tsconfig-override: see the "Run Claude Code Action" step above.
"$BUN_BIN" --no-env-file \
--config="${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/bunfig.toml" \
--tsconfig-override="${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/tsconfig.json" \
run ${GITHUB_ACTION_PATH}/src/entrypoints/post-buffered-inline-comments.ts
- name: Revoke app token
+76 -41
View File
@@ -93,45 +93,53 @@ Add the following to your workflow file:
### Workload Identity Federation
Instead of a static API key or OAuth token, you can authenticate via [Workload Identity Federation](https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/manage-claude/workload-identity-federation) by setting the federation environment variables on the step. Fetch an OIDC identity token from your provider, write it to a file, and point the action at it:
Instead of a static API key or OAuth token, you can authenticate via [Workload Identity Federation](https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/manage-claude/workload-identity-federation): the action fetches the workflow's GitHub OIDC token and the Claude Code CLI exchanges it for a short-lived access token. Requires the `id-token: write` permission on the job:
```yaml
- name: Run Claude Code with workload identity federation
uses: anthropics/claude-code-base-action@beta
with:
prompt: "Your prompt here"
env:
ANTHROPIC_FEDERATION_RULE_ID: fdrl_xxxxxxxxxxxx
ANTHROPIC_ORGANIZATION_ID: 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
ANTHROPIC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_ID: svac_xxxxxxxxxxxx
ANTHROPIC_IDENTITY_TOKEN_FILE: /path/to/identity-token
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write
steps:
- name: Run Claude Code with workload identity federation
uses: anthropics/claude-code-base-action@beta
with:
prompt: "Your prompt here"
anthropic_federation_rule_id: fdrl_xxxxxxxxxxxx
anthropic_organization_id: 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
anthropic_service_account_id: svac_xxxxxxxxxxxx
```
Note: the base action does not fetch or refresh the identity token itself — you are responsible for providing a valid token file. [`anthropics/claude-code-action`](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code-action) handles fetching and refreshing the GitHub Actions OIDC token automatically via its `anthropic_federation_rule_id` input.
Do not set `anthropic_api_key` or `claude_code_oauth_token` alongside the federation inputs — a static credential takes precedence and federation will not be used.
## Inputs
| Input | Description | Required | Default |
| ------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ---------------------------- |
| `prompt` | The prompt to send to Claude Code | No\* | '' |
| `prompt_file` | Path to a file containing the prompt to send to Claude Code | No\* | '' |
| `allowed_tools` | Comma-separated list of allowed tools for Claude Code to use | No | '' |
| `disallowed_tools` | Comma-separated list of disallowed tools that Claude Code cannot use | No | '' |
| `max_turns` | Maximum number of conversation turns (default: no limit) | No | '' |
| `mcp_config` | Path to the MCP configuration JSON file, or MCP configuration JSON string | No | '' |
| `settings` | Path to Claude Code settings JSON file, or settings JSON string | No | '' |
| `system_prompt` | Override system prompt | No | '' |
| `append_system_prompt` | Append to system prompt | No | '' |
| `claude_env` | Custom environment variables to pass to Claude Code execution (YAML multiline format) | No | '' |
| `model` | Model to use (provider-specific format required for Bedrock/Vertex) | No | 'claude-4-0-sonnet-20250219' |
| `anthropic_model` | DEPRECATED: Use 'model' instead | No | 'claude-4-0-sonnet-20250219' |
| `fallback_model` | Enable automatic fallback to specified model when default model is overloaded | No | '' |
| `anthropic_api_key` | Anthropic API key (required for direct Anthropic API) | No | '' |
| `claude_code_oauth_token` | Claude Code OAuth token (alternative to anthropic_api_key) | No | '' |
| `use_bedrock` | Use Amazon Bedrock with OIDC authentication instead of direct Anthropic API | No | 'false' |
| `use_vertex` | Use Google Vertex AI with OIDC authentication instead of direct Anthropic API | No | 'false' |
| `use_node_cache` | Whether to use Node.js dependency caching (set to true only for Node.js projects with lock files) | No | 'false' |
| `show_full_output` | Show full JSON output (⚠️ May expose secrets - see [security docs](../docs/security.md#️-full-output-security-warning)) | No | 'false'\*\* |
| Input | Description | Required | Default |
| ------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ---------------------------- |
| `prompt` | The prompt to send to Claude Code | No\* | '' |
| `prompt_file` | Path to a file containing the prompt to send to Claude Code | No\* | '' |
| `allowed_tools` | Comma-separated list of allowed tools for Claude Code to use | No | '' |
| `disallowed_tools` | Comma-separated list of disallowed tools that Claude Code cannot use | No | '' |
| `max_turns` | Maximum number of conversation turns (default: no limit) | No | '' |
| `mcp_config` | Path to the MCP configuration JSON file, or MCP configuration JSON string | No | '' |
| `settings` | Path to Claude Code settings JSON file, or settings JSON string | No | '' |
| `system_prompt` | Override system prompt | No | '' |
| `append_system_prompt` | Append to system prompt | No | '' |
| `claude_env` | Custom environment variables to pass to Claude Code execution (YAML multiline format) | No | '' |
| `model` | Model to use (provider-specific format required for Bedrock/Vertex) | No | 'claude-4-0-sonnet-20250219' |
| `anthropic_model` | DEPRECATED: Use 'model' instead | No | 'claude-4-0-sonnet-20250219' |
| `fallback_model` | Enable automatic fallback to specified model when default model is overloaded | No | '' |
| `anthropic_api_key` | Anthropic API key (required for direct Anthropic API) | No | '' |
| `claude_code_oauth_token` | Claude Code OAuth token (alternative to anthropic_api_key) | No | '' |
| `anthropic_federation_rule_id` | Workload identity federation rule ID (fdrl\_...). Requires `id-token: write` permission | No | '' |
| `anthropic_organization_id` | Anthropic organization UUID used for workload identity federation | No | '' |
| `anthropic_service_account_id` | Service account ID (svac\_...) the federated token acts as (optional) | No | '' |
| `anthropic_workspace_id` | Workspace ID (wrkspc\_...) for federation. Optional when the rule targets a single workspace | No | '' |
| `anthropic_oidc_audience` | Audience to request on the GitHub OIDC token. Defaults to https://api.anthropic.com | No | '' |
| `use_bedrock` | Use Amazon Bedrock with OIDC authentication instead of direct Anthropic API | No | 'false' |
| `use_vertex` | Use Google Vertex AI with OIDC authentication instead of direct Anthropic API | No | 'false' |
| `use_node_cache` | Whether to use Node.js dependency caching (set to true only for Node.js projects with lock files) | No | 'false' |
| `show_full_output` | Show full JSON output (⚠️ May expose secrets - see [security docs](../docs/security.md#️-full-output-security-warning)) | No | 'false'\*\* |
\*Either `prompt` or `prompt_file` must be provided, but not both.
@@ -139,10 +147,12 @@ Note: the base action does not fetch or refresh the identity token itself — yo
## Outputs
| Output | Description |
| ---------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------- |
| `conclusion` | Execution status of Claude Code ('success' or 'failure') |
| `execution_file` | Path to the JSON file containing Claude Code execution log |
| Output | Description |
| ------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `conclusion` | Execution status of Claude Code ('success' or 'failure') |
| `execution_file` | Path to the JSON file containing Claude Code execution log |
| `structured_output` | JSON string containing structured output fields when `--json-schema` is provided in `claude_args` |
| `session_id` | The Claude Code session ID that can be used with `--resume` to continue this conversation |
## Environment Variables
@@ -387,18 +397,39 @@ jobs:
const executionFile = '${{ steps.code-review.outputs.execution_file }}';
const executionLog = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(executionFile, 'utf8'));
// Extract the review content from the execution log
// The execution log contains the full conversation including Claude's responses
// Extract the review content from the execution log.
// The SDK writes top-level events with `type`; assistant text is nested
// under `message.content`.
let review = '';
// Find the last assistant message which should contain the review
// Prefer the final result event when it is available.
for (let i = executionLog.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
if (executionLog[i].role === 'assistant') {
review = executionLog[i].content;
const entry = executionLog[i];
if (entry?.type === 'result' && typeof entry.result === 'string') {
review = entry.result;
break;
}
}
// Fallback to the last assistant text block if no result event was written.
if (!review) {
for (let i = executionLog.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
const entry = executionLog[i];
if (entry?.type !== 'assistant' || !Array.isArray(entry.message?.content)) {
continue;
}
review = entry.message.content
.filter((block) => block?.type === 'text' && typeof block.text === 'string')
.map((block) => block.text)
.join('\n');
if (review) {
break;
}
}
}
if (review) {
github.rest.issues.createComment({
issue_number: context.issue.number,
@@ -409,6 +440,10 @@ jobs:
}
```
For typed automation output, prefer passing `--json-schema` in `claude_args`
and reading `steps.<id>.outputs.structured_output` instead of parsing the full
execution log.
Check out additional examples in [`./examples`](./examples).
## Using Cloud Providers
+28 -2
View File
@@ -34,6 +34,26 @@ inputs:
description: "Claude Code OAuth token (alternative to anthropic_api_key)"
required: false
default: ""
anthropic_federation_rule_id:
description: "Workload identity federation rule ID (fdrl_...). When set with anthropic_organization_id, the action authenticates to the Claude API by exchanging the workflow's GitHub OIDC token instead of using a static API key. Requires `id-token: write` permission."
required: false
default: ""
anthropic_organization_id:
description: "Anthropic organization UUID used for workload identity federation"
required: false
default: ""
anthropic_service_account_id:
description: "Service account ID (svac_...) the federated token acts as (optional, used with workload identity federation)"
required: false
default: ""
anthropic_workspace_id:
description: "Workspace ID (wrkspc_...) for workload identity federation. Optional when the federation rule targets a single workspace."
required: false
default: ""
anthropic_oidc_audience:
description: "Audience to request on the GitHub OIDC token used for workload identity federation. Defaults to https://api.anthropic.com."
required: false
default: ""
use_bedrock:
description: "Use Amazon Bedrock with OIDC authentication instead of direct Anthropic API"
required: false
@@ -90,10 +110,11 @@ runs:
using: "composite"
steps:
- name: Setup Node.js
uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # https://github.com/actions/setup-node/releases/tag/v4.4.0
uses: actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # https://github.com/actions/setup-node/releases/tag/v6.4.0
with:
node-version: ${{ env.NODE_VERSION || '18.x' }}
cache: ${{ inputs.use_node_cache == 'true' && 'npm' || '' }}
package-manager-cache: false
- name: Install Bun
if: inputs.path_to_bun_executable == ''
@@ -124,7 +145,7 @@ runs:
PATH_TO_CLAUDE_CODE_EXECUTABLE: ${{ inputs.path_to_claude_code_executable }}
run: |
if [ -z "$PATH_TO_CLAUDE_CODE_EXECUTABLE" ]; then
CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION="2.1.148"
CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION="2.1.183"
echo "Installing Claude Code v${CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION}..."
for attempt in 1 2 3; do
echo "Installation attempt $attempt..."
@@ -175,6 +196,11 @@ runs:
# Provider configuration
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: ${{ inputs.anthropic_api_key }}
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN: ${{ inputs.claude_code_oauth_token }}
ANTHROPIC_FEDERATION_RULE_ID: ${{ inputs.anthropic_federation_rule_id }}
ANTHROPIC_ORGANIZATION_ID: ${{ inputs.anthropic_organization_id }}
ANTHROPIC_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_ID: ${{ inputs.anthropic_service_account_id }}
ANTHROPIC_WORKSPACE_ID: ${{ inputs.anthropic_workspace_id }}
ANTHROPIC_OIDC_AUDIENCE: ${{ inputs.anthropic_oidc_audience }}
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: ${{ env.ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL }}
ANTHROPIC_CUSTOM_HEADERS: ${{ env.ANTHROPIC_CUSTOM_HEADERS }}
# Only set provider flags if explicitly true, since any value (including "false") is truthy
+10 -10
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
"name": "@anthropic-ai/claude-code-base-action",
"dependencies": {
"@actions/core": "^1.10.1",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.3.148",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.3.183",
"shell-quote": "^1.8.3",
},
"devDependencies": {
@@ -27,23 +27,23 @@
"@actions/io": ["@actions/[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-wi9JjgKLYS7U/z8PPbco+PvTb/nRWjeoFlJ1Qer83k/3C5PHQi28hiVdeE2kHXmIL99mQFawx8qt/JPjZilJ8Q=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]48", "", { "optionalDependencies": { "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-arm64": "0.3.148", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-x64": "0.3.148", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64": "0.3.148", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64-musl": "0.3.148", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64": "0.3.148", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64-musl": "0.3.148", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-arm64": "0.3.148", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-x64": "0.3.148" }, "peerDependencies": { "@anthropic-ai/sdk": ">=0.93.0", "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.29.0", "zod": "^4.0.0" } }, "sha512-S+KsA5ssz8/GJYjU3HqbGHq1ve75hKlRcd0JZRMQAjLI5G+VH2wJ74Yo7ZC8Q7ZrKVcZJwdLnio5o2zntKw/7w=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]3", "", { "optionalDependencies": { "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-arm64": "0.3.183", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-x64": "0.3.183", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64": "0.3.183", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64-musl": "0.3.183", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64": "0.3.183", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64-musl": "0.3.183", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-arm64": "0.3.183", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-x64": "0.3.183" }, "peerDependencies": { "@anthropic-ai/sdk": ">=0.93.0", "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.29.0", "zod": "^4.0.0" } }, "sha512-rAKws76RKdFu+DK5q9wYN0AGLRdPrw0vGd+TMzSFynFdxwUAehYc9vUKJoK27j2xRoHFdNt+JDsih5BzsUzi+Q=="],
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"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-arm64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]3", "", { "os": "win32", "cpu": "arm64" }, "sha512-cGyMC9YDsrCQ4av74dMVa2liOb5oLFX4+1SxwJGRCW7mBVBazcM6rg7ifWbd9XfkDhNPKOIfyiloipyMfoaE4g=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-x64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]48", "", { "os": "win32", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-592gVLIKVVFWQkOMIlfJF7r2ofzB9dRuG8xEx2pzh2QvRL4E0agP7qLSmiqBHAXkJL5vSLQff/wmBoQPFFc8rg=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-x64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]3", "", { "os": "win32", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-h/XzbrSmXGroTk/FYKR6J4/8G9vDb1HUUUeNXeBGqGW1kppIiWPJKLRzjtSe0brVjADOKOT6tE5IHK0mV/1gBw=="],
"@anthropic-ai/sdk": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "json-schema-to-ts": "^3.1.1" }, "peerDependencies": { "zod": "^3.25.0 || ^4.0.0" }, "optionalPeers": ["zod"], "bin": { "anthropic-ai-sdk": "bin/cli" } }, "sha512-q9vaSZQVFx6B/gPxetGYfLXSJD5v0sOmh0OpZDq7yCrTSA+Rscvrtyol7JJTW40wEpQB4U1B4JXzxQitbQ3CAA=="],
+1 -1
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
},
"dependencies": {
"@actions/core": "^1.10.1",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.3.148",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.3.183",
"shell-quote": "^1.8.3"
},
"devDependencies": {
+10
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,16 @@ import { setupClaudeCodeSettings } from "./setup-claude-code-settings";
import { validateEnvironmentVariables } from "./validate-env";
import { installPlugins } from "./install-plugins";
import { setExecutionFileOutputIfPresent } from "./execution-file";
import { setupWorkloadIdentity } from "./workload-identity";
import type { WorkloadIdentityHandle } from "./workload-identity";
async function run() {
let workloadIdentity: WorkloadIdentityHandle | undefined;
try {
// When workload identity federation is configured, fetch the GitHub OIDC
// identity token and expose it to the CLI before validating auth env vars.
workloadIdentity = await setupWorkloadIdentity();
validateEnvironmentVariables();
// The composite action's "Install Claude Code" step writes the binary to
@@ -67,6 +74,9 @@ async function run() {
core.setFailed(`Action failed with error: ${error}`);
core.setOutput("conclusion", "failure");
process.exit(1);
} finally {
// Stop refreshing the workload identity token file so the process can exit
workloadIdentity?.stop();
}
}
+42 -3
View File
@@ -24,6 +24,35 @@ const ACCUMULATING_FLAGS = new Set([
// Delimiter used to join accumulated flag values
const ACCUMULATE_DELIMITER = "\x00";
// shell-quote treats ()|&;<> as control operators and splits adjacent text
// around them into separate tokens (returned as `{op}` objects, which we then
// dropped). For CLI args these must be literal characters — e.g. unquoted
// `--allowedTools Bash(gh:*)` was being mangled into bare `Bash`, silently
// widening a scoped permission rule to Bash(*). We escape each metachar to a
// Unicode private-use codepoint before parsing and restore it afterward,
// keeping shell-quote's quote/whitespace handling intact.
const SHELL_META_PAIRS: [string, string][] = [
["(", ""],
[")", ""],
["|", ""],
["&", ""],
[";", ""],
["<", ""],
[">", ""],
];
const SHELL_META_ESCAPE = new Map(SHELL_META_PAIRS);
const SHELL_META_UNESCAPE = new Map(SHELL_META_PAIRS.map(([k, v]) => [v, k]));
const SHELL_META_ESCAPE_RE = /[()|&;<>]/g;
const SHELL_META_UNESCAPE_RE = /[-]/g;
function escapeShellMeta(s: string): string {
return s.replace(SHELL_META_ESCAPE_RE, (c) => SHELL_META_ESCAPE.get(c)!);
}
function unescapeShellMeta(s: string): string {
return s.replace(SHELL_META_UNESCAPE_RE, (c) => SHELL_META_UNESCAPE.get(c)!);
}
type McpConfig = {
mcpServers?: Record<string, unknown>;
};
@@ -106,9 +135,19 @@ function parseClaudeArgsToExtraArgs(
if (!claudeArgs?.trim()) return {};
const result: Record<string, string | null> = {};
const args = parseShellArgs(stripShellComments(claudeArgs)).filter(
(arg): arg is string => typeof arg === "string",
);
const args = parseShellArgs(escapeShellMeta(stripShellComments(claudeArgs)))
.map((arg) => {
if (typeof arg === "string") return unescapeShellMeta(arg);
// With control metachars escaped above, the only non-string shell-quote
// can still emit is a glob op (bareword containing *, ?, or [). Its
// `pattern` field is the verbatim token text — use it as-is so values
// like `Bash(cmd:*)` and `Read(path/**)` round-trip intact.
if (typeof arg === "object" && arg !== null && "pattern" in arg) {
return unescapeShellMeta((arg as { pattern: string }).pattern);
}
return undefined;
})
.filter((arg): arg is string => typeof arg === "string");
for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
const arg = args[i];
+47
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
export type RetryOptions = {
maxAttempts?: number;
initialDelayMs?: number;
maxDelayMs?: number;
backoffFactor?: number;
shouldRetry?: (error: Error) => boolean;
};
export async function retryWithBackoff<T>(
operation: () => Promise<T>,
options: RetryOptions = {},
): Promise<T> {
const {
maxAttempts = 3,
initialDelayMs = 5000,
maxDelayMs = 20000,
backoffFactor = 2,
shouldRetry,
} = options;
let delayMs = initialDelayMs;
let lastError: Error | undefined;
for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= maxAttempts; attempt++) {
try {
console.log(`Attempt ${attempt} of ${maxAttempts}...`);
return await operation();
} catch (error) {
lastError = error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error));
console.error(`Attempt ${attempt} failed:`, lastError.message);
if (shouldRetry && !shouldRetry(lastError)) {
console.error("Error is not retryable, giving up immediately");
throw lastError;
}
if (attempt < maxAttempts) {
console.log(`Retrying in ${delayMs / 1000} seconds...`);
await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, delayMs));
delayMs = Math.min(delayMs * backoffFactor, maxDelayMs);
}
}
}
console.error(`Operation failed after ${maxAttempts} attempts`);
throw lastError;
}
+10
View File
@@ -167,6 +167,16 @@ export async function runClaudeWithSdk(
if (message.type === "result") {
resultMessage = message as SDKResultMessage;
// The SDK's query() iterator should close itself after the
// result message, but in some workflow contexts (notably
// pull_request-triggered runs) it stays open indefinitely and
// the for-await hangs until the workflow's timeout-minutes
// kills the job. This causes the action to "succeed" inside
// Claude (verdict posted, $cost recorded) but be reported as
// cancelled with no execution-output.json written. Break
// explicitly: by SDK contract no further messages follow a
// result, so the break is safe.
break;
}
}
} catch (error) {
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
import * as core from "@actions/core";
import { mkdirSync, writeFileSync } from "fs";
import { join } from "path";
import { retryWithBackoff } from "../utils/retry";
import { retryWithBackoff } from "./retry";
/** How often the GitHub OIDC identity token file is rewritten. */
const REFRESH_INTERVAL_MS = 4 * 60 * 1000;
+104
View File
@@ -137,6 +137,110 @@ describe("parseSdkOptions", () => {
]);
});
test("should preserve unquoted Bash(cmd:*) rules instead of collapsing to bare Bash", () => {
// Regression: shell-quote tokenizes unquoted `(`/`)` as control ops and
// `*` as a glob, which were filtered out — collapsing scoped rules like
// `Bash(gh:*)` into bare `Bash` (= Bash(*), unrestricted shell).
const options: ClaudeOptions = {
claudeArgs: "--allowedTools View,Bash(gh:*),Bash(cat:*)",
};
const result = parseSdkOptions(options);
expect(result.sdkOptions.allowedTools).toEqual([
"View",
"Bash(gh:*)",
"Bash(cat:*)",
]);
expect(result.sdkOptions.allowedTools).not.toContain("Bash");
});
test("should preserve unquoted space-separated Bash(cmd:*) rules", () => {
const options: ClaudeOptions = {
claudeArgs: "--allowed-tools Bash(gh:*) Bash(cat:*) Read(//tmp/**)",
};
const result = parseSdkOptions(options);
expect(result.sdkOptions.allowedTools).toEqual([
"Bash(gh:*)",
"Bash(cat:*)",
"Read(//tmp/**)",
]);
expect(result.sdkOptions.allowedTools).not.toContain("Bash");
});
test("should preserve unquoted Tool(content) rules without glob chars", () => {
const options: ClaudeOptions = {
claudeArgs:
"--allowedTools Read(~/file),WebFetch(domain:example.com),Edit",
};
const result = parseSdkOptions(options);
expect(result.sdkOptions.allowedTools).toEqual([
"Read(~/file)",
"WebFetch(domain:example.com)",
"Edit",
]);
});
test("should still preserve quoted Bash(cmd:*) rules (no regression)", () => {
const options: ClaudeOptions = {
claudeArgs: '--allowedTools "Bash(gh:*),Bash(cat:*)"',
};
const result = parseSdkOptions(options);
expect(result.sdkOptions.allowedTools).toEqual([
"Bash(gh:*)",
"Bash(cat:*)",
]);
});
test("should merge quoted tag-mode tools with unquoted user tools without widening", () => {
// Real-world shape: the action's tag mode wraps its own --allowedTools in
// double quotes, then appends the user's claude_args (typically unquoted
// in workflow YAML). Both halves must round-trip.
const options: ClaudeOptions = {
claudeArgs:
'--permission-mode acceptEdits --allowedTools "Glob,Grep,Read,Bash(git add:*),Bash(git commit:*)" ' +
"--model claude-opus-4-7\n" +
"--allowedTools View,Bash(gh:*),Bash(printf:*),Bash(cat:*)",
};
const result = parseSdkOptions(options);
expect(result.sdkOptions.allowedTools).toEqual([
"Glob",
"Grep",
"Read",
"Bash(git add:*)",
"Bash(git commit:*)",
"View",
"Bash(gh:*)",
"Bash(printf:*)",
"Bash(cat:*)",
]);
expect(result.sdkOptions.allowedTools).not.toContain("Bash");
});
test("should preserve unquoted disallowedTools rules without widening", () => {
// Same bug class on the deny side: a scoped deny collapsing to bare
// `Bash` would block all shell instead of the intended prefix.
const options: ClaudeOptions = {
claudeArgs: "--disallowedTools Bash(rm:*),Bash(sudo:*)",
};
const result = parseSdkOptions(options);
expect(result.sdkOptions.disallowedTools).toEqual([
"Bash(rm:*)",
"Bash(sudo:*)",
]);
expect(result.sdkOptions.disallowedTools).not.toContain("Bash");
});
test("should handle mixed camelCase and hyphenated allowedTools flags", () => {
const options: ClaudeOptions = {
claudeArgs: '--allowedTools "Edit,Read" --allowed-tools "Write,Glob"',
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach, mock } from "bun:test";
import { retryWithBackoff } from "../src/utils/retry";
import { retryWithBackoff } from "../src/retry";
describe("retryWithBackoff", () => {
let originalConsoleLog: typeof console.log;
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import { join } from "path";
import {
isWorkloadIdentityConfigured,
setupWorkloadIdentity,
} from "../src/auth/workload-identity";
} from "../src/workload-identity";
describe("workload identity federation", () => {
let originalEnv: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
+10 -10
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
"dependencies": {
"@actions/core": "^1.10.1",
"@actions/github": "^6.0.1",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.3.148",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.3.183",
"@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.11.0",
"@octokit/graphql": "^8.2.2",
"@octokit/rest": "^21.1.1",
@@ -37,23 +37,23 @@
"@actions/io": ["@actions/[email protected]", "", {}, "sha512-wi9JjgKLYS7U/z8PPbco+PvTb/nRWjeoFlJ1Qer83k/3C5PHQi28hiVdeE2kHXmIL99mQFawx8qt/JPjZilJ8Q=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]48", "", { "optionalDependencies": { "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-arm64": "0.3.148", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-x64": "0.3.148", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64": "0.3.148", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64-musl": "0.3.148", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64": "0.3.148", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64-musl": "0.3.148", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-arm64": "0.3.148", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-x64": "0.3.148" }, "peerDependencies": { "@anthropic-ai/sdk": ">=0.93.0", "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.29.0", "zod": "^4.0.0" } }, "sha512-S+KsA5ssz8/GJYjU3HqbGHq1ve75hKlRcd0JZRMQAjLI5G+VH2wJ74Yo7ZC8Q7ZrKVcZJwdLnio5o2zntKw/7w=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]3", "", { "optionalDependencies": { "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-arm64": "0.3.183", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-x64": "0.3.183", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64": "0.3.183", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64-musl": "0.3.183", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64": "0.3.183", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64-musl": "0.3.183", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-arm64": "0.3.183", "@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-x64": "0.3.183" }, "peerDependencies": { "@anthropic-ai/sdk": ">=0.93.0", "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.29.0", "zod": "^4.0.0" } }, "sha512-rAKws76RKdFu+DK5q9wYN0AGLRdPrw0vGd+TMzSFynFdxwUAehYc9vUKJoK27j2xRoHFdNt+JDsih5BzsUzi+Q=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-arm64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]48", "", { "os": "darwin", "cpu": "arm64" }, "sha512-DNkhbT0Jiqo5iM+9HmejIg2eJVFQyvq2SC9h6iqOQSGRkFrbP1FN7rJpflHMb1nb3sAHZzjaDc5/tTczy5H3/Q=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-arm64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]3", "", { "os": "darwin", "cpu": "arm64" }, "sha512-o/+sxwKgXuw6RG5cERWjvcvL1CDSPe/TaXMhax+dq+V4lDOI5iTqg3y5Wfb6dL3xlWoTA2OhWowDQllKbE04LQ=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-x64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]48", "", { "os": "darwin", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-bN5eu5wV+7Wu/LJgVwW6rhkd/y0cxk5xDujPelsAdHYSSrKDU/VPGuVcX8xA8PWgaag4pjKuXYTm1CHevB09ew=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-darwin-x64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]3", "", { "os": "darwin", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-V7Cf8JeD5EPf4MPomFUlEblCIQI0wg+aWdOSqvfMsDmCBEHljd52CQ3a7W263oVt6I7QUfRTpX2KNvdma56rDA=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]48", "", { "os": "linux", "cpu": "arm64" }, "sha512-gCJBxAXt4Av8Y9PWmdVidnv83TZtPM7DpI5YqQ3G3gVyp/5S203XcaDta0vPjeMa595Dca6a8XIY/Xq3bcxjhA=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]3", "", { "os": "linux", "cpu": "arm64" }, "sha512-qqnSf85D3uBH7kRHLGOMhr7aQrREUZ4hUlCztrkJe/twUT4bmJsO86zamnAf7vOYeCul/sHYwBMmXtOfI+cHZg=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64-musl": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]48", "", { "os": "linux", "cpu": "arm64" }, "sha512-6BYRuSyKzEPWXWjkXIQkWaOa+9z1FHEMcB+lHUZ3jf+aaEAqTomHiZrsF8nGF5rKSp79TjiZWoJNs225x/k4eQ=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-arm64-musl": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]3", "", { "os": "linux", "cpu": "arm64" }, "sha512-ua6XaiCcYYKfd0CY9cjoyYnTQWI2GocpbP7Gwvmr+9taW/lTpQGVQH3FrF2VFKXVSt7AaVE6Z7WN9oPxcxl3VA=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]48", "", { "os": "linux", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-SDjTBE8WismSmWxHFLciPaE+mQBAuwsBqbI5LvRXwYi8Ig/8D+1FElSRt1VyXkEkIzSyGzgTxusc8p07z8edIA=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]3", "", { "os": "linux", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-GvfNp9XsKWFvr0EH3NgX2pqzHPYhFeqhOmVc4A+2e+GdxBMYUEa0ylfPLJItahQU9FkTJAw2oQNnzTHPPm1GxA=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64-musl": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]48", "", { "os": "linux", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-dKWZYKCPXCYzP1CknqXzC4QaIuM+3YnCIHZ8Th0WMRHfSIisqAyrrXl42x4nPD7z5gnVwFwBmQ63pyhOxbMQRQ=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-linux-x64-musl": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]3", "", { "os": "linux", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-wp+p+4xeZOW+h4InMKR7nIdGlgYftXyR+ErOVz7i2tMRcKuYMoc5jRIYjdJkuETMSr5nsRj0rDeO5gG7M6MGZQ=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-arm64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]48", "", { "os": "win32", "cpu": "arm64" }, "sha512-4+JXXrWXGNIgzbhGQ45Wx6VRXhY22EU70Y9XCb0ju2SRDDZbjNn8vAFUFDSFxxMXGbo9PDlc0LTU62U8CqyYiA=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-arm64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]3", "", { "os": "win32", "cpu": "arm64" }, "sha512-cGyMC9YDsrCQ4av74dMVa2liOb5oLFX4+1SxwJGRCW7mBVBazcM6rg7ifWbd9XfkDhNPKOIfyiloipyMfoaE4g=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-x64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]48", "", { "os": "win32", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-592gVLIKVVFWQkOMIlfJF7r2ofzB9dRuG8xEx2pzh2QvRL4E0agP7qLSmiqBHAXkJL5vSLQff/wmBoQPFFc8rg=="],
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk-win32-x64": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]3", "", { "os": "win32", "cpu": "x64" }, "sha512-h/XzbrSmXGroTk/FYKR6J4/8G9vDb1HUUUeNXeBGqGW1kppIiWPJKLRzjtSe0brVjADOKOT6tE5IHK0mV/1gBw=="],
"@anthropic-ai/sdk": ["@anthropic-ai/[email protected]", "", { "dependencies": { "json-schema-to-ts": "^3.1.1" }, "peerDependencies": { "zod": "^3.25.0 || ^4.0.0" }, "optionalPeers": ["zod"], "bin": { "anthropic-ai-sdk": "bin/cli" } }, "sha512-q9vaSZQVFx6B/gPxetGYfLXSJD5v0sOmh0OpZDq7yCrTSA+Rscvrtyol7JJTW40wEpQB4U1B4JXzxQitbQ3CAA=="],
+3 -6
View File
@@ -63,17 +63,14 @@ The GitHub App for Claude doesn't have workflow write access for security reason
### Why won't Claude rebase my branch?
By default, Claude only uses commit tools for non-destructive changes to the branch. Claude is configured to:
Claude only creates and pushes commits. It does not merge branches, rebase, force push, or perform other destructive git operations. Specifically, Claude is configured to:
- Never push to branches other than where it was invoked (either its own branch or the PR branch)
- Never force push or perform destructive operations
You can grant additional tools via the `claude_args` input if needed:
This restriction is enforced in Claude's system prompt, so it applies even if you grant the underlying git tools (for example `--allowedTools "Bash(git rebase:*)"`). In that case Claude will still decline rebase requests and explain the limitation rather than running the command.
```yaml
claude_args: |
--allowedTools "Bash(git rebase:*)" # Use with caution
```
If you need to rebase, do it yourself locally — or with the Claude Code CLI outside of this action — and push the result.
### Why won't Claude create a pull request?
+1 -1
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
"dependencies": {
"@actions/core": "^1.10.1",
"@actions/github": "^6.0.1",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.3.148",
"@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk": "^0.3.183",
"@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.11.0",
"@octokit/graphql": "^8.2.2",
"@octokit/rest": "^21.1.1",
+11 -12
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bun
import * as core from "@actions/core";
import { writeFile, mkdir } from "fs/promises";
import { writeFile, mkdir, rm } from "fs/promises";
import type { FetchDataResult } from "../github/data/fetcher";
import {
formatContext,
@@ -930,9 +930,14 @@ export async function createPrompt(
claudeBranch,
);
await mkdir(`${process.env.RUNNER_TEMP || "/tmp"}/claude-prompts`, {
recursive: true,
});
// Clear any stale prompt files from a prior invocation. RUNNER_TEMP is documented
// to be emptied between jobs, but on non-ephemeral self-hosted runners this is
// not reliably honored — a stale claude-user-request.txt left behind by a prior
// mention-mode invocation would not be overwritten by a subsequent agent-mode
// invocation, and would leak into the model's context.
const promptDir = `${process.env.RUNNER_TEMP || "/tmp"}/claude-prompts`;
await rm(promptDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
await mkdir(promptDir, { recursive: true });
// Generate the prompt directly
const promptContent = generatePrompt(
@@ -948,10 +953,7 @@ export async function createPrompt(
console.log("=======================");
// Write the prompt file
await writeFile(
`${process.env.RUNNER_TEMP || "/tmp"}/claude-prompts/claude-prompt.txt`,
promptContent,
);
await writeFile(`${promptDir}/claude-prompt.txt`, promptContent);
// Extract and write the user request separately for SDK multi-block messaging
// This allows the CLI to process slash commands (e.g., "@claude /review-pr")
@@ -960,10 +962,7 @@ export async function createPrompt(
githubData,
);
if (userRequest) {
await writeFile(
`${process.env.RUNNER_TEMP || "/tmp"}/claude-prompts/${USER_REQUEST_FILENAME}`,
userRequest,
);
await writeFile(`${promptDir}/${USER_REQUEST_FILENAME}`, userRequest);
console.log("===== USER REQUEST =====");
console.log(userRequest);
console.log("========================");
+3 -3
View File
@@ -29,13 +29,13 @@ import { prepareAgentMode } from "../modes/agent";
import { checkContainsTrigger } from "../github/validation/trigger";
import { restoreConfigFromBase } from "../github/operations/restore-config";
import { validateBranchName } from "../github/operations/branch";
import { setupWorkloadIdentity } from "../auth/workload-identity";
import type { WorkloadIdentityHandle } from "../auth/workload-identity";
import { collectActionInputsPresence } from "./collect-inputs";
import { updateCommentLink } from "./update-comment-link";
import { formatTurnsFromData } from "./format-turns";
import type { Turn } from "./format-turns";
// Base-action imports (used directly instead of subprocess)
import { setupWorkloadIdentity } from "../../base-action/src/workload-identity";
import type { WorkloadIdentityHandle } from "../../base-action/src/workload-identity";
import { validateEnvironmentVariables } from "../../base-action/src/validate-env";
import { setupClaudeCodeSettings } from "../../base-action/src/setup-claude-code-settings";
import { installPlugins } from "../../base-action/src/install-plugins";
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ async function installClaudeCode(): Promise<string> {
return customExecutable;
}
const claudeCodeVersion = "2.1.148";
const claudeCodeVersion = "2.1.183";
console.log(`Installing Claude Code v${claudeCodeVersion}...`);
for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= 3; attempt++) {
+2 -2
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ export const PR_QUERY = `
additions
deletions
state
labels(first: 1) {
labels(first: 100) {
nodes {
name
}
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ export const ISSUE_QUERY = `
updatedAt
lastEditedAt
state
labels(first: 1) {
labels(first: 100) {
nodes {
name
}
+8 -1
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,11 @@ import type {
import type { GitHubFileWithSHA } from "./fetcher";
import { sanitizeContent } from "../utils/sanitizer";
function formatLabels(labelNodes: Array<{ name: string }>): string {
if (labelNodes.length === 0) return "none";
return labelNodes.map((l) => l.name).join(", ");
}
export function formatContext(
contextData: GitHubPullRequest | GitHubIssue,
isPR: boolean,
@@ -19,6 +24,7 @@ export function formatContext(
PR Author: ${prData.author.login}
PR Branch: ${prData.headRefName} -> ${prData.baseRefName}
PR State: ${prData.state}
PR Labels: ${formatLabels(prData.labels.nodes)}
PR Additions: ${prData.additions}
PR Deletions: ${prData.deletions}
Total Commits: ${prData.commits.totalCount}
@@ -28,7 +34,8 @@ Changed Files: ${prData.files.nodes.length} files`;
const sanitizedTitle = sanitizeContent(issueData.title);
return `Issue Title: ${sanitizedTitle}
Issue Author: ${issueData.author.login}
Issue State: ${issueData.state}`;
Issue State: ${issueData.state}
Issue Labels: ${formatLabels(issueData.labels.nodes)}`;
}
}
+50 -20
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,49 @@ export class WorkflowValidationSkipError extends Error {
}
}
type AppTokenExchangeErrorResponse = {
error?: {
message?: string;
details?: {
error_code?: string;
};
};
type?: string;
message?: string;
};
const WORKFLOW_VALIDATION_ERROR_CODES = new Set([
"workflow_not_found_on_default_branch",
]);
function getAppTokenExchangeErrorMessage(
responseJson: AppTokenExchangeErrorResponse,
): string {
return responseJson.error?.message ?? responseJson.message ?? "Unknown error";
}
function isWorkflowValidationError(
status: number,
responseJson: AppTokenExchangeErrorResponse,
): boolean {
const errorCode = responseJson.error?.details?.error_code;
if (
errorCode !== undefined &&
WORKFLOW_VALIDATION_ERROR_CODES.has(errorCode)
) {
return true;
}
if (status !== 401) {
return false;
}
const workflowValidationMessage = "workflow validation failed";
return [responseJson.message, responseJson.error?.message].some((message) =>
message?.toLowerCase().includes(workflowValidationMessage),
);
}
async function getOidcToken(): Promise<string> {
try {
const oidcToken = await core.getIDToken("claude-code-github-action");
@@ -80,25 +123,11 @@ async function exchangeForAppToken(
);
if (!response.ok) {
const responseJson = (await response.json()) as {
error?: {
message?: string;
details?: {
error_code?: string;
};
};
type?: string;
message?: string;
};
const responseJson =
(await response.json()) as AppTokenExchangeErrorResponse;
// Check for specific workflow validation error codes that should skip the action
const errorCode = responseJson.error?.details?.error_code;
if (errorCode === "workflow_not_found_on_default_branch") {
const message =
responseJson.message ??
responseJson.error?.message ??
"Workflow validation failed";
if (isWorkflowValidationError(response.status, responseJson)) {
const message = getAppTokenExchangeErrorMessage(responseJson);
core.warning(`Skipping action due to workflow validation: ${message}`);
console.log(
"Action skipped due to workflow validation error. This is expected when adding Claude Code workflows to new repositories or on PRs with workflow changes. If you're seeing this, your workflow will begin working once you merge your PR.",
@@ -106,10 +135,11 @@ async function exchangeForAppToken(
throw new WorkflowValidationSkipError(message);
}
const message = getAppTokenExchangeErrorMessage(responseJson);
console.error(
`App token exchange failed: ${response.status} ${response.statusText} - ${responseJson?.error?.message ?? "Unknown error"}`,
`App token exchange failed: ${response.status} ${response.statusText} - ${message}`,
);
throw new Error(`${responseJson?.error?.message ?? "Unknown error"}`);
throw new Error(message);
}
const appTokenData = (await response.json()) as {
+66 -4
View File
@@ -192,10 +192,6 @@ export async function downloadCommentImages(
continue;
}
const fileExtension = getImageExtension(originalUrl);
const filename = `image-${Date.now()}-${i}${fileExtension}`;
const localPath = path.join(downloadsDir, filename);
try {
console.log(`Downloading ${originalUrl}...`);
@@ -209,6 +205,19 @@ export async function downloadCommentImages(
const arrayBuffer = await imageResponse.arrayBuffer();
const buffer = Buffer.from(arrayBuffer);
// GitHub user-attachment URLs (/user-attachments/assets/<uuid>) carry
// no file extension, so the URL-based guess silently falls back to
// ".png". When the bytes are actually JPEG/GIF/WebP, the saved file is
// mislabeled and the Read tool sends a base64 image with the wrong
// media_type, which the Anthropic API rejects (400 invalid_request).
// Detect the real type from the magic bytes and only fall back to the
// URL extension when the signature is unrecognized.
const fileExtension =
detectImageExtensionFromBuffer(buffer) ??
getImageExtension(originalUrl);
const filename = `image-${Date.now()}-${i}${fileExtension}`;
const localPath = path.join(downloadsDir, filename);
await fs.writeFile(localPath, buffer);
console.log(`✓ Saved: ${localPath}`);
@@ -244,3 +253,56 @@ function getImageExtension(url: string): string {
const match = filename.match(/\.(png|jpg|jpeg|gif|webp|svg)$/i);
return match ? match[0] : ".png";
}
/**
* Determine an image's file extension from its magic bytes, independent of the
* (often extensionless) source URL. Returns undefined when the signature is not
* a format we can confidently identify, so the caller can fall back to the
* URL-based extension. Covers the raster formats the Anthropic API accepts.
*/
function detectImageExtensionFromBuffer(buffer: Buffer): string | undefined {
// PNG: 89 50 4E 47 0D 0A 1A 0A
if (
buffer.length >= 8 &&
buffer[0] === 0x89 &&
buffer[1] === 0x50 &&
buffer[2] === 0x4e &&
buffer[3] === 0x47
) {
return ".png";
}
// JPEG: FF D8 FF
if (
buffer.length >= 3 &&
buffer[0] === 0xff &&
buffer[1] === 0xd8 &&
buffer[2] === 0xff
) {
return ".jpg";
}
// GIF: "GIF8" (47 49 46 38)
if (
buffer.length >= 6 &&
buffer[0] === 0x47 &&
buffer[1] === 0x49 &&
buffer[2] === 0x46 &&
buffer[3] === 0x38
) {
return ".gif";
}
// WebP: "RIFF" (52 49 46 46) .... "WEBP" (57 45 42 50) at offset 8
if (
buffer.length >= 12 &&
buffer[0] === 0x52 &&
buffer[1] === 0x49 &&
buffer[2] === 0x46 &&
buffer[3] === 0x46 &&
buffer[8] === 0x57 &&
buffer[9] === 0x45 &&
buffer[10] === 0x42 &&
buffer[11] === 0x50
) {
return ".webp";
}
return undefined;
}
+13 -5
View File
@@ -20,15 +20,23 @@ export function stripMarkdownLinkTitles(content: string): string {
}
export function stripHiddenAttributes(content: string): string {
content = content.replace(/\salt\s*=\s*["'][^"']*["']/gi, "");
// Quoted values are matched per quote type so that a value containing the
// other quote character (e.g. an apostrophe inside a double-quoted value)
// does not terminate the match early and mangle surrounding content (#1366).
content = content.replace(/\salt\s*=\s*"[^"]*"/gi, "");
content = content.replace(/\salt\s*=\s*'[^']*'/gi, "");
content = content.replace(/\salt\s*=\s*[^\s>]+/gi, "");
content = content.replace(/\stitle\s*=\s*["'][^"']*["']/gi, "");
content = content.replace(/\stitle\s*=\s*"[^"]*"/gi, "");
content = content.replace(/\stitle\s*=\s*'[^']*'/gi, "");
content = content.replace(/\stitle\s*=\s*[^\s>]+/gi, "");
content = content.replace(/\saria-label\s*=\s*["'][^"']*["']/gi, "");
content = content.replace(/\saria-label\s*=\s*"[^"]*"/gi, "");
content = content.replace(/\saria-label\s*=\s*'[^']*'/gi, "");
content = content.replace(/\saria-label\s*=\s*[^\s>]+/gi, "");
content = content.replace(/\sdata-[a-zA-Z0-9-]+\s*=\s*["'][^"']*["']/gi, "");
content = content.replace(/\sdata-[a-zA-Z0-9-]+\s*=\s*"[^"]*"/gi, "");
content = content.replace(/\sdata-[a-zA-Z0-9-]+\s*=\s*'[^']*'/gi, "");
content = content.replace(/\sdata-[a-zA-Z0-9-]+\s*=\s*[^\s>]+/gi, "");
content = content.replace(/\splaceholder\s*=\s*["'][^"']*["']/gi, "");
content = content.replace(/\splaceholder\s*=\s*"[^"]*"/gi, "");
content = content.replace(/\splaceholder\s*=\s*'[^']*'/gi, "");
content = content.replace(/\splaceholder\s*=\s*[^\s>]+/gi, "");
return content;
}
+8 -9
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
import { mkdir, writeFile } from "fs/promises";
import { mkdir, rm, writeFile } from "fs/promises";
import { prepareMcpConfig } from "../../mcp/install-mcp-server";
import { parseAllowedTools } from "./parse-tools";
import {
@@ -64,20 +64,19 @@ export async function prepareAgentMode({
}
}
// Create prompt directory
await mkdir(`${process.env.RUNNER_TEMP || "/tmp"}/claude-prompts`, {
recursive: true,
});
// Create prompt directory. Clear any stale files from a prior invocation first —
// see src/create-prompt/index.ts for context (non-ephemeral self-hosted runners
// do not reliably honor the RUNNER_TEMP cleanup contract).
const promptDir = `${process.env.RUNNER_TEMP || "/tmp"}/claude-prompts`;
await rm(promptDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
await mkdir(promptDir, { recursive: true });
// Write the prompt file - use the user's prompt directly
const promptContent =
context.inputs.prompt ||
`Repository: ${context.repository.owner}/${context.repository.repo}`;
await writeFile(
`${process.env.RUNNER_TEMP || "/tmp"}/claude-prompts/claude-prompt.txt`,
promptContent,
);
await writeFile(`${promptDir}/claude-prompt.txt`, promptContent);
// Parse allowed tools from user's claude_args
const userClaudeArgs = process.env.CLAUDE_ARGS || "";
+70 -22
View File
@@ -1,29 +1,77 @@
export function parseAllowedTools(claudeArgs: string): string[] {
// Match --allowedTools or --allowed-tools followed by the value
// Handle both quoted and unquoted values
// Use /g flag to find ALL occurrences, not just the first one
const patterns = [
/--(?:allowedTools|allowed-tools)\s+"([^"]+)"/g, // Double quoted
/--(?:allowedTools|allowed-tools)\s+'([^']+)'/g, // Single quoted
/--(?:allowedTools|allowed-tools)\s+([^'"\s][^\s]*)/g, // Unquoted (must not start with quote)
];
import { parse as parseShellArgs } from "shell-quote";
// Flags whose values make up the allowed-tools list.
// Include both camelCase and hyphenated variants for CLI compatibility.
const ALLOWED_TOOLS_FLAGS = new Set(["allowedTools", "allowed-tools"]);
/**
* Strip comment lines from a shell argument string.
* Lines whose first non-whitespace character is `#` are removed entirely.
* Mirrors stripShellComments in base-action/src/parse-sdk-options.ts.
*/
function stripShellComments(input: string): string {
return input
.split("\n")
.filter((line) => !line.trim().startsWith("#"))
.join("\n");
}
/**
* Tokenize a claude_args string the same way base-action/src/parse-sdk-options.ts
* does: strip full comment lines, then run shell-quote. shell-quote returns
* unquoted glob patterns (e.g. `mcp__github__*`) as `{ op: "glob", pattern }`
* objects rather than strings, so recover their literal text; drop operator
* tokens (`|`, `>`, `;`, ...) which carry no value.
*/
function tokenize(claudeArgs: string): string[] {
return parseShellArgs(stripShellComments(claudeArgs))
.map((token) => {
if (typeof token === "string") return token;
if (token && typeof token === "object" && "pattern" in token) {
return (token as { pattern: string }).pattern;
}
return null;
})
.filter((token): token is string => token !== null);
}
/**
* Parse the list of allowed tool names from a user-provided claude_args string.
*
* This is used to decide which GitHub MCP servers to install. It MUST stay in
* agreement with how the actual tool list is built for the SDK in
* base-action/src/parse-sdk-options.ts (parseClaudeArgsToExtraArgs): otherwise a
* tool can be granted to Claude without its MCP server being installed, or a
* server can be installed for a tool that was never granted (#1357).
*
* To stay in agreement it uses the same shell-quote tokenizer and the same
* "an accumulating flag consumes all consecutive non-flag values" semantics,
* so `--allowedTools "Read" "Grep" "mcp__github__get_commit"` captures all
* three values, and commented-out lines are ignored.
*/
export function parseAllowedTools(claudeArgs: string): string[] {
if (!claudeArgs?.trim()) return [];
const args = tokenize(claudeArgs);
const tools: string[] = [];
const seen = new Set<string>();
for (const pattern of patterns) {
for (const match of claudeArgs.matchAll(pattern)) {
if (match[1]) {
// Don't add if the value starts with -- (another flag)
if (match[1].startsWith("--")) {
continue;
}
for (const tool of match[1].split(",")) {
const trimmed = tool.trim();
if (trimmed && !seen.has(trimmed)) {
seen.add(trimmed);
tools.push(trimmed);
}
for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
const arg = args[i];
if (!arg?.startsWith("--")) continue;
const flag = arg.slice(2);
if (!ALLOWED_TOOLS_FLAGS.has(flag)) continue;
// Consume all consecutive non-flag values, e.g.
// --allowedTools "Read" "Grep" "mcp__github__get_commit"
while (i + 1 < args.length && !args[i + 1]!.startsWith("--")) {
i++;
for (const tool of args[i]!.split(",")) {
const trimmed = tool.trim();
if (trimmed && !seen.has(trimmed)) {
seen.add(trimmed);
tools.push(trimmed);
}
}
}
+4 -47
View File
@@ -1,47 +1,4 @@
export type RetryOptions = {
maxAttempts?: number;
initialDelayMs?: number;
maxDelayMs?: number;
backoffFactor?: number;
shouldRetry?: (error: Error) => boolean;
};
export async function retryWithBackoff<T>(
operation: () => Promise<T>,
options: RetryOptions = {},
): Promise<T> {
const {
maxAttempts = 3,
initialDelayMs = 5000,
maxDelayMs = 20000,
backoffFactor = 2,
shouldRetry,
} = options;
let delayMs = initialDelayMs;
let lastError: Error | undefined;
for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= maxAttempts; attempt++) {
try {
console.log(`Attempt ${attempt} of ${maxAttempts}...`);
return await operation();
} catch (error) {
lastError = error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error));
console.error(`Attempt ${attempt} failed:`, lastError.message);
if (shouldRetry && !shouldRetry(lastError)) {
console.error("Error is not retryable, giving up immediately");
throw lastError;
}
if (attempt < maxAttempts) {
console.log(`Retrying in ${delayMs / 1000} seconds...`);
await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, delayMs));
delayMs = Math.min(delayMs * backoffFactor, maxDelayMs);
}
}
}
console.error(`Operation failed after ${maxAttempts} attempts`);
throw lastError;
}
export {
retryWithBackoff,
type RetryOptions,
} from "../../base-action/src/retry";
+77 -1
View File
@@ -54,6 +54,53 @@ describe("formatContext", () => {
PR Author: test-user
PR Branch: feature/test -> main
PR State: OPEN
PR Labels: none
PR Additions: 50
PR Deletions: 30
Total Commits: 3
Changed Files: 2 files`,
);
});
test("formats PR context with labels", () => {
const prData: GitHubPullRequest = {
title: "Test PR",
body: "PR body",
author: { login: "test-user" },
baseRefName: "main",
headRefName: "feature/test",
headRefOid: "abc123",
isCrossRepository: false,
headRepository: { owner: { login: "testowner" }, name: "testrepo" },
createdAt: "2023-01-01T00:00:00Z",
additions: 50,
deletions: 30,
state: "OPEN",
labels: {
nodes: [{ name: "bug" }, { name: "enhancement" }],
},
commits: {
totalCount: 3,
nodes: [],
},
files: {
nodes: [{} as GitHubFile, {} as GitHubFile],
},
comments: {
nodes: [],
},
reviews: {
nodes: [],
},
};
const result = formatContext(prData, true);
expect(result).toBe(
`PR Title: Test PR
PR Author: test-user
PR Branch: feature/test -> main
PR State: OPEN
PR Labels: bug, enhancement
PR Additions: 50
PR Deletions: 30
Total Commits: 3
@@ -80,7 +127,36 @@ Changed Files: 2 files`,
expect(result).toBe(
`Issue Title: Test Issue
Issue Author: test-user
Issue State: OPEN`,
Issue State: OPEN
Issue Labels: none`,
);
});
test("formats Issue context with labels", () => {
const issueData: GitHubIssue = {
title: "Test Issue",
body: "Issue body",
author: { login: "test-user" },
createdAt: "2023-01-01T00:00:00Z",
state: "OPEN",
labels: {
nodes: [
{ name: "architecture" },
{ name: "agent-sdk" },
{ name: "drift:functional" },
],
},
comments: {
nodes: [],
},
};
const result = formatContext(issueData, false);
expect(result).toBe(
`Issue Title: Test Issue
Issue Author: test-user
Issue State: OPEN
Issue Labels: architecture, agent-sdk, drift:functional`,
);
});
});
+520
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,520 @@
import { afterAll, beforeEach, describe, expect, mock, test } from "bun:test";
import type {
IssuesEvent,
IssueCommentEvent,
PullRequestEvent,
PullRequestReviewEvent,
PullRequestReviewCommentEvent,
WorkflowRunEvent,
} from "@octokit/webhooks-types";
// parseGitHubContext() reads the singleton `github.context` from
// @actions/github, so the module is mocked with a mutable context object
// that each test configures. Nothing else in the codebase imports
// @actions/github, so the mock does not leak into other suites.
const fakeGithubContext = {
eventName: "",
payload: {} as Record<string, unknown>,
repo: { owner: "test-owner", repo: "test-repo" },
actor: "test-actor",
};
mock.module("@actions/github", () => ({
context: fakeGithubContext,
}));
import {
parseGitHubContext,
isIssuesEvent,
isIssueCommentEvent,
isPullRequestEvent,
isPullRequestReviewEvent,
isPullRequestReviewCommentEvent,
isIssuesAssignedEvent,
isEntityContext,
isAutomationContext,
} from "../src/github/context";
import { CLAUDE_APP_BOT_ID, CLAUDE_BOT_LOGIN } from "../src/github/constants";
import { createMockContext, createMockAutomationContext } from "./mockContext";
const ENV_KEYS = [
"GITHUB_RUN_ID",
"PROMPT",
"TRIGGER_PHRASE",
"ASSIGNEE_TRIGGER",
"LABEL_TRIGGER",
"BASE_BRANCH",
"BRANCH_PREFIX",
"BRANCH_NAME_TEMPLATE",
"USE_STICKY_COMMENT",
"CLASSIFY_INLINE_COMMENTS",
"USE_COMMIT_SIGNING",
"SSH_SIGNING_KEY",
"BOT_ID",
"BOT_NAME",
"ALLOWED_BOTS",
"ALLOWED_NON_WRITE_USERS",
"TRACK_PROGRESS",
"INCLUDE_FIX_LINKS",
"INCLUDE_COMMENTS_BY_ACTOR",
"EXCLUDE_COMMENTS_BY_ACTOR",
] as const;
const originalEnv: Record<string, string | undefined> = {};
for (const key of ENV_KEYS) {
originalEnv[key] = process.env[key];
}
beforeEach(() => {
for (const key of ENV_KEYS) {
delete process.env[key];
}
process.env.GITHUB_RUN_ID = "9876543210";
fakeGithubContext.eventName = "";
fakeGithubContext.payload = {};
fakeGithubContext.repo = { owner: "test-owner", repo: "test-repo" };
fakeGithubContext.actor = "test-actor";
});
afterAll(() => {
for (const key of ENV_KEYS) {
if (originalEnv[key] === undefined) {
delete process.env[key];
} else {
process.env[key] = originalEnv[key];
}
}
});
const repositoryPayload = {
name: "test-repo",
full_name: "test-owner/test-repo",
private: false,
default_branch: "main",
owner: { login: "test-owner" },
};
function setEvent(eventName: string, payload: unknown) {
fakeGithubContext.eventName = eventName;
fakeGithubContext.payload = payload as Record<string, unknown>;
}
describe("parseGitHubContext", () => {
describe("entity events (one test per equivalence partition)", () => {
test("issues event extracts issue number and isPR false", () => {
setEvent("issues", {
action: "opened",
issue: { number: 42 },
repository: repositoryPayload,
} as unknown as IssuesEvent);
const context = parseGitHubContext();
expect(context.eventName).toBe("issues");
expect(context.eventAction).toBe("opened");
if (!isEntityContext(context)) {
throw new Error("expected entity context");
}
expect(context.entityNumber).toBe(42);
expect(context.isPR).toBe(false);
});
test("issue_comment on a plain issue has isPR false", () => {
setEvent("issue_comment", {
action: "created",
issue: { number: 55 },
comment: { id: 1, body: "hello" },
repository: repositoryPayload,
} as unknown as IssueCommentEvent);
const context = parseGitHubContext();
expect(context.eventName).toBe("issue_comment");
if (!isEntityContext(context)) {
throw new Error("expected entity context");
}
expect(context.entityNumber).toBe(55);
expect(context.isPR).toBe(false);
});
test("issue_comment on a pull request has isPR true", () => {
setEvent("issue_comment", {
action: "created",
issue: {
number: 789,
pull_request: {
url: "https://api.github.com/repos/test-owner/test-repo/pulls/789",
},
},
comment: { id: 2, body: "hello" },
repository: repositoryPayload,
} as unknown as IssueCommentEvent);
const context = parseGitHubContext();
if (!isEntityContext(context)) {
throw new Error("expected entity context");
}
expect(context.entityNumber).toBe(789);
expect(context.isPR).toBe(true);
});
test("pull_request event extracts PR number and isPR true", () => {
setEvent("pull_request", {
action: "opened",
number: 456,
pull_request: { number: 456 },
repository: repositoryPayload,
} as unknown as PullRequestEvent);
const context = parseGitHubContext();
expect(context.eventName).toBe("pull_request");
if (!isEntityContext(context)) {
throw new Error("expected entity context");
}
expect(context.entityNumber).toBe(456);
expect(context.isPR).toBe(true);
});
test("pull_request_target is normalized to pull_request", () => {
setEvent("pull_request_target", {
action: "opened",
number: 457,
pull_request: { number: 457 },
repository: repositoryPayload,
} as unknown as PullRequestEvent);
const context = parseGitHubContext();
expect(context.eventName).toBe("pull_request");
if (!isEntityContext(context)) {
throw new Error("expected entity context");
}
expect(context.entityNumber).toBe(457);
expect(context.isPR).toBe(true);
});
test("pull_request_review event extracts PR number and isPR true", () => {
setEvent("pull_request_review", {
action: "submitted",
review: { id: 9, state: "approved" },
pull_request: { number: 321 },
repository: repositoryPayload,
} as unknown as PullRequestReviewEvent);
const context = parseGitHubContext();
expect(context.eventName).toBe("pull_request_review");
if (!isEntityContext(context)) {
throw new Error("expected entity context");
}
expect(context.entityNumber).toBe(321);
expect(context.isPR).toBe(true);
});
test("pull_request_review_comment event extracts PR number and isPR true", () => {
setEvent("pull_request_review_comment", {
action: "created",
comment: { id: 7, body: "inline" },
pull_request: { number: 999 },
repository: repositoryPayload,
} as unknown as PullRequestReviewCommentEvent);
const context = parseGitHubContext();
expect(context.eventName).toBe("pull_request_review_comment");
if (!isEntityContext(context)) {
throw new Error("expected entity context");
}
expect(context.entityNumber).toBe(999);
expect(context.isPR).toBe(true);
});
});
describe("automation events (no entityNumber, no isPR)", () => {
test("workflow_dispatch produces an automation context", () => {
setEvent("workflow_dispatch", {
inputs: { task: "run" },
repository: repositoryPayload,
sender: { login: "test-actor" },
workflow: "ci.yml",
});
const context = parseGitHubContext();
expect(context.eventName).toBe("workflow_dispatch");
expect(isAutomationContext(context)).toBe(true);
expect("entityNumber" in context).toBe(false);
expect("isPR" in context).toBe(false);
});
test("repository_dispatch produces an automation context", () => {
setEvent("repository_dispatch", {
action: "trigger-analysis",
client_payload: { issue_number: 42 },
repository: repositoryPayload,
sender: { login: "automation-user" },
});
const context = parseGitHubContext();
expect(context.eventName).toBe("repository_dispatch");
expect(context.eventAction).toBe("trigger-analysis");
expect(isAutomationContext(context)).toBe(true);
});
test("schedule produces an automation context", () => {
setEvent("schedule", {
schedule: "0 0 * * *",
repository: repositoryPayload,
});
const context = parseGitHubContext();
expect(context.eventName).toBe("schedule");
expect(isAutomationContext(context)).toBe(true);
});
test("payload without repository keeps default_branch undefined", () => {
setEvent("schedule", { schedule: "0 0 * * *" });
const context = parseGitHubContext();
expect(context.repository.default_branch).toBeUndefined();
});
test("workflow_run produces an automation context", () => {
setEvent("workflow_run", {
action: "completed",
workflow_run: { id: 123 },
repository: repositoryPayload,
} as unknown as WorkflowRunEvent);
const context = parseGitHubContext();
expect(context.eventName).toBe("workflow_run");
expect(isAutomationContext(context)).toBe(true);
});
});
describe("invalid partition", () => {
test("unsupported event type throws", () => {
setEvent("deployment_status", { repository: repositoryPayload });
expect(() => parseGitHubContext()).toThrow(
"Unsupported event type: deployment_status",
);
});
});
describe("common fields", () => {
test("repository and runId come from the action context", () => {
setEvent("issues", {
action: "opened",
issue: { number: 1 },
repository: repositoryPayload,
} as unknown as IssuesEvent);
const context = parseGitHubContext();
expect(context.runId).toBe("9876543210");
expect(context.actor).toBe("test-actor");
expect(context.repository).toEqual({
owner: "test-owner",
repo: "test-repo",
full_name: "test-owner/test-repo",
default_branch: "main",
});
});
test("inputs fall back to documented defaults when env vars are unset", () => {
setEvent("issues", {
action: "opened",
issue: { number: 1 },
repository: repositoryPayload,
} as unknown as IssuesEvent);
const { inputs } = parseGitHubContext();
expect(inputs.prompt).toBe("");
expect(inputs.triggerPhrase).toBe("@claude");
expect(inputs.assigneeTrigger).toBe("");
expect(inputs.labelTrigger).toBe("");
expect(inputs.branchPrefix).toBe("claude/");
expect(inputs.branchNameTemplate).toBeUndefined();
expect(inputs.useStickyComment).toBe(false);
expect(inputs.classifyInlineComments).toBe(true);
expect(inputs.useCommitSigning).toBe(false);
expect(inputs.sshSigningKey).toBe("");
expect(inputs.botId).toBe(String(CLAUDE_APP_BOT_ID));
expect(inputs.botName).toBe(CLAUDE_BOT_LOGIN);
expect(inputs.allowedBots).toBe("");
expect(inputs.allowedNonWriteUsers).toBe("");
expect(inputs.trackProgress).toBe(false);
expect(inputs.includeFixLinks).toBe(false);
expect(inputs.includeCommentsByActor).toBe("");
expect(inputs.excludeCommentsByActor).toBe("");
expect(inputs.baseBranch).toBeUndefined();
});
test("inputs reflect the env vars set by action.yml", () => {
process.env.PROMPT = "do something";
process.env.TRIGGER_PHRASE = "/claude";
process.env.ASSIGNEE_TRIGGER = "@claude-bot";
process.env.LABEL_TRIGGER = "claude-task";
process.env.BASE_BRANCH = "develop";
process.env.BRANCH_PREFIX = "bot/";
process.env.BRANCH_NAME_TEMPLATE = "{{description}}";
process.env.USE_STICKY_COMMENT = "true";
process.env.CLASSIFY_INLINE_COMMENTS = "false";
process.env.USE_COMMIT_SIGNING = "true";
process.env.SSH_SIGNING_KEY = "ssh-key-material";
process.env.BOT_ID = "111";
process.env.BOT_NAME = "custom-bot";
process.env.ALLOWED_BOTS = "dependabot[bot]";
process.env.ALLOWED_NON_WRITE_USERS = "trusted-user";
process.env.TRACK_PROGRESS = "true";
process.env.INCLUDE_FIX_LINKS = "true";
process.env.INCLUDE_COMMENTS_BY_ACTOR = "alice";
process.env.EXCLUDE_COMMENTS_BY_ACTOR = "bob";
setEvent("issues", {
action: "opened",
issue: { number: 1 },
repository: repositoryPayload,
} as unknown as IssuesEvent);
const { inputs } = parseGitHubContext();
expect(inputs.prompt).toBe("do something");
expect(inputs.triggerPhrase).toBe("/claude");
expect(inputs.assigneeTrigger).toBe("@claude-bot");
expect(inputs.labelTrigger).toBe("claude-task");
expect(inputs.baseBranch).toBe("develop");
expect(inputs.branchPrefix).toBe("bot/");
expect(inputs.branchNameTemplate).toBe("{{description}}");
expect(inputs.useStickyComment).toBe(true);
expect(inputs.classifyInlineComments).toBe(false);
expect(inputs.useCommitSigning).toBe(true);
expect(inputs.sshSigningKey).toBe("ssh-key-material");
expect(inputs.botId).toBe("111");
expect(inputs.botName).toBe("custom-bot");
expect(inputs.allowedBots).toBe("dependabot[bot]");
expect(inputs.allowedNonWriteUsers).toBe("trusted-user");
expect(inputs.trackProgress).toBe(true);
expect(inputs.includeFixLinks).toBe(true);
expect(inputs.includeCommentsByActor).toBe("alice");
expect(inputs.excludeCommentsByActor).toBe("bob");
});
test("boolean inputs only accept the lowercase string true", () => {
process.env.USE_STICKY_COMMENT = "TRUE";
process.env.USE_COMMIT_SIGNING = "1";
setEvent("issues", {
action: "opened",
issue: { number: 1 },
repository: repositoryPayload,
} as unknown as IssuesEvent);
const { inputs } = parseGitHubContext();
expect(inputs.useStickyComment).toBe(false);
expect(inputs.useCommitSigning).toBe(false);
});
});
});
describe("type guards", () => {
const issuesContext = createMockContext({ eventName: "issues" });
const issueCommentContext = createMockContext({
eventName: "issue_comment",
});
const pullRequestContext = createMockContext({ eventName: "pull_request" });
const reviewContext = createMockContext({
eventName: "pull_request_review",
});
const reviewCommentContext = createMockContext({
eventName: "pull_request_review_comment",
});
const workflowDispatchContext = createMockAutomationContext({
eventName: "workflow_dispatch",
});
test("isIssuesEvent accepts only issues events", () => {
expect(isIssuesEvent(issuesContext)).toBe(true);
expect(isIssuesEvent(issueCommentContext)).toBe(false);
expect(isIssuesEvent(workflowDispatchContext)).toBe(false);
});
test("isIssueCommentEvent accepts only issue_comment events", () => {
expect(isIssueCommentEvent(issueCommentContext)).toBe(true);
expect(isIssueCommentEvent(issuesContext)).toBe(false);
});
test("isPullRequestEvent accepts only pull_request events", () => {
expect(isPullRequestEvent(pullRequestContext)).toBe(true);
expect(isPullRequestEvent(reviewContext)).toBe(false);
expect(isPullRequestEvent(issuesContext)).toBe(false);
});
test("isPullRequestReviewEvent accepts only pull_request_review events", () => {
expect(isPullRequestReviewEvent(reviewContext)).toBe(true);
expect(isPullRequestReviewEvent(reviewCommentContext)).toBe(false);
});
test("isPullRequestReviewCommentEvent accepts only review comment events", () => {
expect(isPullRequestReviewCommentEvent(reviewCommentContext)).toBe(true);
expect(isPullRequestReviewCommentEvent(reviewContext)).toBe(false);
});
test("isIssuesAssignedEvent requires issues event with assigned action", () => {
const assignedContext = createMockContext({
eventName: "issues",
eventAction: "assigned",
});
const openedContext = createMockContext({
eventName: "issues",
eventAction: "opened",
});
const assignedCommentContext = createMockContext({
eventName: "issue_comment",
eventAction: "assigned",
});
expect(isIssuesAssignedEvent(assignedContext)).toBe(true);
expect(isIssuesAssignedEvent(openedContext)).toBe(false);
expect(isIssuesAssignedEvent(assignedCommentContext)).toBe(false);
});
test("isEntityContext accepts the five entity events", () => {
expect(isEntityContext(issuesContext)).toBe(true);
expect(isEntityContext(issueCommentContext)).toBe(true);
expect(isEntityContext(pullRequestContext)).toBe(true);
expect(isEntityContext(reviewContext)).toBe(true);
expect(isEntityContext(reviewCommentContext)).toBe(true);
expect(isEntityContext(workflowDispatchContext)).toBe(false);
});
test("isAutomationContext accepts the four automation events", () => {
expect(isAutomationContext(workflowDispatchContext)).toBe(true);
expect(
isAutomationContext(
createMockAutomationContext({ eventName: "repository_dispatch" }),
),
).toBe(true);
expect(
isAutomationContext(
createMockAutomationContext({ eventName: "schedule" }),
),
).toBe(true);
expect(
isAutomationContext(
createMockAutomationContext({ eventName: "workflow_run" }),
),
).toBe(true);
expect(isAutomationContext(issuesContext)).toBe(false);
});
});
+49
View File
@@ -158,6 +158,55 @@ describe("downloadCommentImages", () => {
);
});
test("should save a JPEG from an extensionless URL with a .jpg extension", async () => {
// Regression for the case where a JPEG screenshot is pasted into an issue.
// GitHub serves it from /user-attachments/assets/<uuid> (no extension), so
// the URL-based guess used to default to ".png" while the bytes are JPEG —
// producing a mislabeled file that the Anthropic API rejected with a 400.
const mockOctokit = createMockOctokit();
const imageUrl =
"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f871c23e-a84d-4f1f-b9a0-86626c63f161";
const signedUrl =
"https://private-user-images.githubusercontent.com/screenshot?jwt=token";
// @ts-expect-error Mock implementation doesn't match full type signature
mockOctokit.rest.issues.get = jest.fn().mockResolvedValue({
data: {
body_html: `<img src="${signedUrl}">`,
},
});
// JPEG magic bytes: FF D8 FF, then arbitrary padding.
const jpegBytes = new Uint8Array([0xff, 0xd8, 0xff, 0xe0, 0x00, 0x10]);
fetchSpy = spyOn(global, "fetch").mockResolvedValue({
ok: true,
arrayBuffer: async () => jpegBytes.buffer,
} as Response);
const comments: CommentWithImages[] = [
{
type: "issue_body",
issueNumber: "143",
body: `![Screenshot_20260607_204205_Chrome.jpg](${imageUrl})`,
},
];
const result = await downloadCommentImages(
mockOctokit,
"owner",
"repo",
comments,
);
expect(fsWriteFileSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
"/tmp/github-images/image-1704067200000-0.jpg",
Buffer.from(jpegBytes.buffer),
);
expect(result.get(imageUrl)).toBe(
"/tmp/github-images/image-1704067200000-0.jpg",
);
});
test("should handle review comments", async () => {
const mockOctokit = createMockOctokit();
const imageUrl =
+37 -3
View File
@@ -37,9 +37,43 @@ describe("parseAllowedTools", () => {
test("handles --allowedTools followed by another --allowedTools flag", () => {
const args = "--allowedTools --allowedTools mcp__github__*";
// The second --allowedTools is consumed as a value of the first, then skipped.
// This is an edge case with malformed input - returns empty.
expect(parseAllowedTools(args)).toEqual([]);
// The first --allowedTools has no value (the next token is another flag);
// the second consumes mcp__github__*. This matches how the SDK option
// parser (parse-sdk-options.ts) reads the same input.
expect(parseAllowedTools(args)).toEqual(["mcp__github__*"]);
});
test("captures multiple values after a single --allowedTools flag", () => {
// Regression for #1357: the install-decision parser must capture every
// value, not just the first, so it agrees with the tools actually granted
// to Claude. Previously only "Read" was seen, so the github MCP server was
// not installed even though mcp__github__get_commit was granted.
const args = '--allowedTools "Read" "Grep" "mcp__github__get_commit"';
expect(parseAllowedTools(args)).toEqual([
"Read",
"Grep",
"mcp__github__get_commit",
]);
});
test("captures multiple values spread across lines under one flag", () => {
const args = `--allowedTools
"Read"
"Grep"
"mcp__github__get_commit"`;
expect(parseAllowedTools(args)).toEqual([
"Read",
"Grep",
"mcp__github__get_commit",
]);
});
test("ignores commented-out lines", () => {
// Regression for #1357: a commented-out flag must not be counted, matching
// the SDK parser which strips comment lines before parsing.
const args = `# --allowedTools "mcp__github__get_commit"
--allowedTools "Read"`;
expect(parseAllowedTools(args)).toEqual(["Read"]);
});
test("parses multiple separate --allowed-tools flags", () => {
+15
View File
@@ -131,6 +131,21 @@ describe("stripHiddenAttributes", () => {
),
).toBe('<img src="pic.jpg" class="image">');
});
it("should not corrupt content when an attribute value contains the other quote type", () => {
// Regression for #1366: an apostrophe inside a double-quoted attribute
// (or a double quote inside a single-quoted attribute) must not cause the
// closing quote to be mismatched, which previously mangled later text.
expect(
stripHiddenAttributes(`<Tooltip title="We'll do it" placement="top">`),
).toBe('<Tooltip placement="top">');
expect(
stripHiddenAttributes(`<img alt="Bob's avatar" src="pic.jpg">`),
).toBe('<img src="pic.jpg">');
expect(stripHiddenAttributes(`<div title='say "hi"'>Content</div>`)).toBe(
"<div>Content</div>",
);
});
});
describe("normalizeHtmlEntities", () => {
+164
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
import { describe, expect, test, beforeEach, afterEach, spyOn } from "bun:test";
import * as core from "@actions/core";
import {
setupGitHubToken,
WorkflowValidationSkipError,
} from "../src/github/token";
describe("setupGitHubToken", () => {
let originalOverrideToken: string | undefined;
let originalAdditionalPermissions: string | undefined;
let getIDTokenSpy: any;
let setSecretSpy: any;
let warningSpy: any;
let fetchSpy: any;
let setTimeoutSpy: any;
let consoleLogSpy: any;
let consoleErrorSpy: any;
beforeEach(() => {
originalOverrideToken = process.env.OVERRIDE_GITHUB_TOKEN;
originalAdditionalPermissions = process.env.ADDITIONAL_PERMISSIONS;
delete process.env.OVERRIDE_GITHUB_TOKEN;
delete process.env.ADDITIONAL_PERMISSIONS;
getIDTokenSpy = spyOn(core, "getIDToken").mockResolvedValue("oidc-token");
setSecretSpy = spyOn(core, "setSecret").mockImplementation(() => {});
warningSpy = spyOn(core, "warning").mockImplementation(() => {});
fetchSpy = spyOn(global, "fetch").mockResolvedValue(
new Response(JSON.stringify({ token: "app-token" }), {
status: 200,
statusText: "OK",
}),
);
setTimeoutSpy = spyOn(global, "setTimeout").mockImplementation(((
handler: any,
) => {
handler();
return 0 as any;
}) as any);
consoleLogSpy = spyOn(console, "log").mockImplementation(() => {});
consoleErrorSpy = spyOn(console, "error").mockImplementation(() => {});
});
afterEach(() => {
if (originalOverrideToken === undefined) {
delete process.env.OVERRIDE_GITHUB_TOKEN;
} else {
process.env.OVERRIDE_GITHUB_TOKEN = originalOverrideToken;
}
if (originalAdditionalPermissions === undefined) {
delete process.env.ADDITIONAL_PERMISSIONS;
} else {
process.env.ADDITIONAL_PERMISSIONS = originalAdditionalPermissions;
}
getIDTokenSpy.mockRestore();
setSecretSpy.mockRestore();
warningSpy.mockRestore();
fetchSpy.mockRestore();
setTimeoutSpy.mockRestore();
consoleLogSpy.mockRestore();
consoleErrorSpy.mockRestore();
});
test("returns app token from OIDC exchange", async () => {
await expect(setupGitHubToken()).resolves.toBe("app-token");
expect(getIDTokenSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith("claude-code-github-action");
expect(setSecretSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith("app-token");
});
test("skips without retrying when workflow is missing from default branch", async () => {
const message =
"Workflow validation failed. The workflow file must exist and have identical content to the version on the repository's default branch.";
fetchSpy.mockResolvedValue(
new Response(
JSON.stringify({
error: {
message,
details: {
error_code: "workflow_not_found_on_default_branch",
},
},
}),
{ status: 401, statusText: "Unauthorized" },
),
);
await expect(setupGitHubToken()).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
WorkflowValidationSkipError,
);
expect(fetchSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(warningSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
`Skipping action due to workflow validation: ${message}`,
);
});
test("skips without retrying when workflow validation message has no error code", async () => {
const message =
"Workflow validation failed. The workflow file must exist and have identical content to the version on the repository's default branch.";
fetchSpy.mockResolvedValue(
new Response(
JSON.stringify({
error: {
message,
},
}),
{ status: 401, statusText: "Unauthorized" },
),
);
await expect(setupGitHubToken()).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
WorkflowValidationSkipError,
);
expect(fetchSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(warningSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
`Skipping action due to workflow validation: ${message}`,
);
});
test("retries ordinary token exchange errors instead of skipping", async () => {
const message = "Bad credentials";
fetchSpy.mockImplementation(
async () =>
new Response(
JSON.stringify({
error: {
message,
},
}),
{ status: 401, statusText: "Unauthorized" },
),
);
await expect(setupGitHubToken()).rejects.toThrow(message);
expect(fetchSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(3);
expect(warningSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
test("does not skip message-only workflow validation errors with unexpected status", async () => {
const message =
"Workflow validation failed. The workflow file must exist and have identical content to the version on the repository's default branch.";
fetchSpy.mockImplementation(
async () =>
new Response(
JSON.stringify({
error: {
message,
},
}),
{ status: 500, statusText: "Internal Server Error" },
),
);
await expect(setupGitHubToken()).rejects.toThrow(message);
expect(fetchSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(3);
expect(warningSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});