* Auto-set CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB when allowed_non_write_users is configured
Sets the env var automatically whenever allowed_non_write_users is
non-empty, so downstream workflows don't need to add it manually.
Updates the input description and docs/security.md to note the behavior.
🏠 Remote-Dev: homespace
* Fall back to inherited env when allowed_non_write_users is unset
🏠 Remote-Dev: homespace
* Let workflow/job env override the auto-set scrub flag
Env var takes priority so users can opt in/out via CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB
at job or workflow level independently of allowed_non_write_users.
🏠 Remote-Dev: homespace
* Restore .claude/ and .mcp.json from PR base branch before CLI runs
The CLI's non-interactive mode trusts cwd: it reads .mcp.json and
.claude/settings{,.local}.json from the working directory and acts on
them before any tool-permission gating — executing hooks, setting env
vars (NODE_OPTIONS, LD_PRELOAD), running apiKeyHelper shell commands,
and auto-approving MCP servers. When this action checks out a PR head,
these files are attacker-controlled.
Rather than enumerate dangerous keys, replace the entire .claude/ tree
and .mcp.json with the versions from the PR base branch (which a
maintainer has reviewed). Paths absent on base are deleted. Uses local
git state, so no TOCTOU against the GitHub API.
* Read PR base ref from payload for config restore in agent mode
Agent mode's branchInfo.baseBranch defaults to "main" (or env/input
override) instead of the PR's actual target branch — it doesn't query
prData.baseRefName like tag mode does. This meant a PR targeting
develop would get .claude/ restored from main.
Fix by reading pull_request.base.ref directly from the webhook payload
for pull_request, pull_request_review, and pull_request_review_comment
events. For issue_comment on a PR (no base.ref in payload), fall back
to the mode-provided value — tag mode's value is correct (from GraphQL);
agent mode on issue_comment is an edge case that at worst restores from
the wrong trusted branch, which is still secure.
The payload value passes through validateBranchName for defense-in-depth
(GitHub enforces valid branch names server-side, but we validate anyway).
* Extend restored paths to .gitmodules, .ripgreprc, .claude.json
.gitmodules defines submodule URLs and paths; path-confusion attacks
against git submodule operations can write into .git/hooks. .ripgreprc
can set --pre (arbitrary command on each file) if RIPGREP_CONFIG_PATH
points at it. .claude.json is cheap defense-in-depth.
Documented why .git/ is excluded (not trackable in commits, and
restoring it would undo the PR checkout), along with .gitconfig
(git never reads it from cwd) and shell rc files (sourced from $HOME,
not cwd — checkout cannot reach $HOME).
Two defenses for tag mode where an attacker with repo write access could
craft a prompt injection payload in an issue/PR to gain RCE on the
Actions runner:
1. git-push wrapper (H1 #3556799)
The Bash(git\ push:*) rule permitted arbitrary flags and remotes,
including combinations that execute shell commands locally. Replaced
with scripts/git-push.sh which allowlists exactly 'origin <ref>' with
no flags, validates the ref via check-ref-format. Same pattern as
scripts/gh.sh.
2. acceptEdits instead of blanket Write/Edit (Asana 1213310082312048)
Edit/MultiEdit/Write in allowedTools granted write access to the
whole runner filesystem (~/.bashrc etc). Removed from allowedTools
and set --permission-mode acceptEdits, which auto-accepts edits
inside cwd ($GITHUB_WORKSPACE) and denies outside. Headless SDK has
no prompt handler so 'ask' becomes deny.
Also:
- Noted that create-prompt/index.ts exports ALLOWED_TOOLS env var that
nothing reads. The live path is modes/tag/index.ts. Mirrored the fix
in both so the file the H1 report likely points to stays in sync.
- Updated prompt text (3 callsites) to reference the wrapper.
- Updated tests (4 prompt-content asserts, 7 tool-list asserts).
* feat(inline-comment): add confirmed param + probe-pattern safety net
Subagents that inherit this tool sometimes probe it with test comments
('Test comment to see if I can create inline comments') after hitting
unrelated errors elsewhere. Recurring issue across customer PRs.
Adds two defenses:
1. confirmed param: set true to post (final review comments should pass
this). When false, buffers to a JSONL file instead of posting.
2. Probe-pattern safety net: when confirmed is omitted (backward compat
for existing prompts), the body is checked against obvious probe
patterns ('test comment', 'can i', 'does this work', etc.). Matching
calls are buffered instead of posted.
A post-run step in action.yml reports the buffered call count and bodies
as a workflow warning for diagnostics.
Backward compatibility:
- Existing single-agent prompts (no confirmed param) post normally unless
the body happens to start with a probe phrase (unlikely for real
review comments)
- The code-review skill is being updated to pass confirmed: true in its
final posting step
- Subagent probes that would previously post now harmlessly buffer
* refactor: replace probe-regex with Haiku classification in post-step
The regex approach was narrow and could miss creative probe phrasings.
Replaced with a batch Haiku classification that runs after the session
completes.
Flow:
- MCP server: confirmed !== true -> buffer to JSONL (no classification
in-band, no latency in the tool path)
- Post-step (src/entrypoints/post-buffered-inline-comments.ts): reads
buffer, sends all bodies to a single Haiku call, posts only those
classified as real review comments
- confirmed=false entries are never posted regardless of classification
Fail-open: if ANTHROPIC_API_KEY is unavailable (Bedrock/Vertex users)
or the classification call fails, posts all unconfirmed comments. This
matches pre-PR behavior where all calls posted immediately.
The post-step emits :⚠️: for each filtered comment so users can
see what was dropped and why.
* feat: add classify_inline_comments opt-out input
New action input classify_inline_comments (default 'true'). Setting to
'false' restores pre-buffering behavior: all inline comment calls post
immediately regardless of the confirmed param.
Threads through: action input -> CLASSIFY_INLINE_COMMENTS env ->
context.inputs.classifyInlineComments -> MCP server env ->
CLASSIFY_ENABLED module const.
Post-step is also gated on the input so it skips entirely when
classification is disabled.
* docs: document classify_inline_comments input and confirmed param
- usage.md: add classify_inline_comments to inputs table
- solutions.md: mention confirmed=true in the prompt example and explain
buffering/classification in the tool permissions section
allowed_bots does not verify that a matching bot is installed on the
repository or has write access. On a public repo, external GitHub Apps
may be able to trigger workflow events (issues, comments, PR reviews).
If the workflow listens on those events and allowed_bots is '*', an
external App can invoke this action with a prompt it controls.
Default config (allowed_bots: "") is unaffected.
- docs/security.md: add warning and mitigation guidance
- docs/usage.md: add inline warning to the allowed_bots input row
- action.yml: add warning to the allowed_bots input description
🏠 Remote-Dev: homespace
- Use allowlist for issue view (numeric issue numbers only)
- Enforce zero positional args for issue list / label list
- Pin GH_HOST and GH_REPO explicitly to avoid ambient state
- Add descriptive error messages with usage examples
* Use wrapper script for label operations in issue triage
Updates /label-issue command and examples to use a dedicated
edit-issue-labels.sh script for label operations instead of raw
gh issue edit. The script validates labels against the repo's existing
labels before applying them. Also tightens gh search permission to
gh search issues.
* Show multiple --add-label flags in label-issue example
Add a `display_report` input parameter (default: "true") that controls
whether the Claude Code Report is written to the GitHub Step Summary.
Setting it to "false" allows users with custom formatting solutions to
avoid duplicate output in the step summary.
Closes#206
Co-authored-by: claude[bot] <41898282+claude[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ashwin Bhat <ashwin-ant@users.noreply.github.com>
Reverts the following commits:
- f669191 fix: use unique local branch names for PR checkout to avoid conflicts (#931)
- 21e3fe0 Fix PR checkout to support fork PRs (#851)
Simplifies PR branch checkout back to using headRefName directly instead
of the pr-{number} local branch naming scheme introduced in #931 and the
GitHub pull ref fetch approach introduced in #851.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The previous implementation used the PR's original branch name when
fetching, which could conflict with existing local or remote branches
of the same name. This caused checkout failures for PRs with common
branch names like 'main' or 'feature/xyz'.
Changes:
- Use 'pr-{number}' format for local branch names (e.g., pr-385)
- Preserve original branch name for logging purposes
- Add detailed logging showing original -> local branch mapping
This ensures uniqueness since PR numbers are unique per repository,
while maintaining support for both same-repo and fork PRs via
GitHub's pull/{number}/head refs.
Fixes the issue introduced in #851 where fork PR support was added.
Co-authored-by: Yi-Cheng Wang <yicheng.wang@heph-ai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace `Bash(git add:*)` syntax with `Bash(git add *)` in default
tool permissions for tag mode and create-prompt. The colon-prefixed
wildcard syntax is deprecated and causes SDK validation errors.
Closes#856
Co-authored-by: Dave-London <hello@os4us.org>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
