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Auto-set subprocess env scrub when allowed_non_write_users is configured (#1093)

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* Auto-set CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB when allowed_non_write_users is configured

Sets the env var automatically whenever allowed_non_write_users is
non-empty, so downstream workflows don't need to add it manually.
Updates the input description and docs/security.md to note the behavior.

🏠 Remote-Dev: homespace

* Fall back to inherited env when allowed_non_write_users is unset

🏠 Remote-Dev: homespace

* Let workflow/job env override the auto-set scrub flag

Env var takes priority so users can opt in/out via CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB
at job or workflow level independently of allowed_non_write_users.

🏠 Remote-Dev: homespace
This commit is contained in:
Octavian Guzu 2026-03-23 12:10:02 +00:00 committed by GitHub
parent 6062f37096
commit ff9acae588
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2 changed files with 12 additions and 1 deletions
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12
action.yml
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@ -32,7 +32,16 @@ inputs:
required: false required: false
default: "" default: ""
allowed_non_write_users: allowed_non_write_users:
description: "Comma-separated list of usernames to allow without write permissions, or '*' to allow all users. Only works when github_token input is provided. WARNING: Use with extreme caution - this bypasses security checks and should only be used for workflows with very limited permissions (e.g., issue labeling)." description: |
Comma-separated list of usernames to allow without write permissions, or '*' to allow all users.
Only works when github_token input is provided. WARNING: Use with extreme caution - this
bypasses security checks and should only be used for workflows with very limited permissions
(e.g., issue labeling).
SECURITY: Processing untrusted content exposes the workflow to prompt injection. When this
input is set, Claude does a best-effort scrub of Anthropic, cloud, and GitHub Actions secrets
from subprocess environments. This reduces but does not eliminate prompt injection risk -
only use for workflows with very limited permissions and validate all outputs.
required: false required: false
default: "" default: ""
include_comments_by_actor: include_comments_by_actor:
@ -204,6 +213,7 @@ runs:
OVERRIDE_GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ inputs.github_token }} OVERRIDE_GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ inputs.github_token }}
ALLOWED_BOTS: ${{ inputs.allowed_bots }} ALLOWED_BOTS: ${{ inputs.allowed_bots }}
ALLOWED_NON_WRITE_USERS: ${{ inputs.allowed_non_write_users }} ALLOWED_NON_WRITE_USERS: ${{ inputs.allowed_non_write_users }}
CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB: ${{ env.CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB || (inputs.allowed_non_write_users != '' && '1') || '' }}
INCLUDE_COMMENTS_BY_ACTOR: ${{ inputs.include_comments_by_actor }} INCLUDE_COMMENTS_BY_ACTOR: ${{ inputs.include_comments_by_actor }}
EXCLUDE_COMMENTS_BY_ACTOR: ${{ inputs.exclude_comments_by_actor }} EXCLUDE_COMMENTS_BY_ACTOR: ${{ inputs.exclude_comments_by_actor }}
GITHUB_RUN_ID: ${{ github.run_id }} GITHUB_RUN_ID: ${{ github.run_id }}

1
docs/security.md
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@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
- Accepts either a comma-separated list of specific usernames or `*` to allow all users - Accepts either a comma-separated list of specific usernames or `*` to allow all users
- **Should be used with extreme caution** as it bypasses the primary security mechanism of this action - **Should be used with extreme caution** as it bypasses the primary security mechanism of this action
- Is designed for automation workflows where user permissions are already restricted by the workflow's permission scope - Is designed for automation workflows where user permissions are already restricted by the workflow's permission scope
- When set, Claude does a best-effort scrub of Anthropic, cloud, and GitHub Actions secrets from subprocess environments. This reduces but does not eliminate prompt injection risk — keep workflow permissions minimal and validate all outputs. Set `CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB: 0` in your workflow or job `env:` block to opt out.
- **Token Permissions**: The GitHub app receives only a short-lived token scoped specifically to the repository it's operating in - **Token Permissions**: The GitHub app receives only a short-lived token scoped specifically to the repository it's operating in
- **No Cross-Repository Access**: Each action invocation is limited to the repository where it was triggered - **No Cross-Repository Access**: Each action invocation is limited to the repository where it was triggered
- **Limited Scope**: The token cannot access other repositories or perform actions beyond the configured permissions - **Limited Scope**: The token cannot access other repositories or perform actions beyond the configured permissions