mirror of
https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code-action.git
synced 2026-08-22 03:18:54 +08:00
Auto-set subprocess env scrub when allowed_non_write_users is configured (#1093)
* Auto-set CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB when allowed_non_write_users is configured Sets the env var automatically whenever allowed_non_write_users is non-empty, so downstream workflows don't need to add it manually. Updates the input description and docs/security.md to note the behavior. 🏠 Remote-Dev: homespace * Fall back to inherited env when allowed_non_write_users is unset 🏠 Remote-Dev: homespace * Let workflow/job env override the auto-set scrub flag Env var takes priority so users can opt in/out via CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB at job or workflow level independently of allowed_non_write_users. 🏠 Remote-Dev: homespace
This commit is contained in:
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
|
||||
- Accepts either a comma-separated list of specific usernames or `*` to allow all users
|
||||
- **Should be used with extreme caution** as it bypasses the primary security mechanism of this action
|
||||
- Is designed for automation workflows where user permissions are already restricted by the workflow's permission scope
|
||||
- When set, Claude does a best-effort scrub of Anthropic, cloud, and GitHub Actions secrets from subprocess environments. This reduces but does not eliminate prompt injection risk — keep workflow permissions minimal and validate all outputs. Set `CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB: 0` in your workflow or job `env:` block to opt out.
|
||||
- **Token Permissions**: The GitHub app receives only a short-lived token scoped specifically to the repository it's operating in
|
||||
- **No Cross-Repository Access**: Each action invocation is limited to the repository where it was triggered
|
||||
- **Limited Scope**: The token cannot access other repositories or perform actions beyond the configured permissions
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user