Restore .claude/ and .mcp.json from PR base branch before CLI runs (#1066)

* Restore .claude/ and .mcp.json from PR base branch before CLI runs

The CLI's non-interactive mode trusts cwd: it reads .mcp.json and
.claude/settings{,.local}.json from the working directory and acts on
them before any tool-permission gating — executing hooks, setting env
vars (NODE_OPTIONS, LD_PRELOAD), running apiKeyHelper shell commands,
and auto-approving MCP servers. When this action checks out a PR head,
these files are attacker-controlled.

Rather than enumerate dangerous keys, replace the entire .claude/ tree
and .mcp.json with the versions from the PR base branch (which a
maintainer has reviewed). Paths absent on base are deleted. Uses local
git state, so no TOCTOU against the GitHub API.

* Read PR base ref from payload for config restore in agent mode

Agent mode's branchInfo.baseBranch defaults to "main" (or env/input
override) instead of the PR's actual target branch — it doesn't query
prData.baseRefName like tag mode does. This meant a PR targeting
develop would get .claude/ restored from main.

Fix by reading pull_request.base.ref directly from the webhook payload
for pull_request, pull_request_review, and pull_request_review_comment
events. For issue_comment on a PR (no base.ref in payload), fall back
to the mode-provided value — tag mode's value is correct (from GraphQL);
agent mode on issue_comment is an edge case that at worst restores from
the wrong trusted branch, which is still secure.

The payload value passes through validateBranchName for defense-in-depth
(GitHub enforces valid branch names server-side, but we validate anyway).

* Extend restored paths to .gitmodules, .ripgreprc, .claude.json

.gitmodules defines submodule URLs and paths; path-confusion attacks
against git submodule operations can write into .git/hooks. .ripgreprc
can set --pre (arbitrary command on each file) if RIPGREP_CONFIG_PATH
points at it. .claude.json is cheap defense-in-depth.

Documented why .git/ is excluded (not trackable in commits, and
restoring it would undo the PR checkout), along with .gitconfig
(git never reads it from cwd) and shell rc files (sourced from $HOME,
not cwd — checkout cannot reach $HOME).
This commit is contained in:
kashyap murali
2026-03-18 12:00:18 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent 1b422b3517
commit 9ddce40de8
2 changed files with 112 additions and 1 deletions
+33 -1
View File
@@ -15,12 +15,20 @@ import { setupGitHubToken, WorkflowValidationSkipError } from "../github/token";
import { checkWritePermissions } from "../github/validation/permissions";
import { createOctokit } from "../github/api/client";
import type { Octokits } from "../github/api/client";
import { parseGitHubContext, isEntityContext } from "../github/context";
import {
parseGitHubContext,
isEntityContext,
isPullRequestEvent,
isPullRequestReviewEvent,
isPullRequestReviewCommentEvent,
} from "../github/context";
import type { GitHubContext } from "../github/context";
import { detectMode } from "../modes/detector";
import { prepareTagMode } from "../modes/tag";
import { prepareAgentMode } from "../modes/agent";
import { checkContainsTrigger } from "../github/validation/trigger";
import { restoreConfigFromBase } from "../github/operations/restore-config";
import { validateBranchName } from "../github/operations/branch";
import { collectActionInputsPresence } from "./collect-inputs";
import { updateCommentLink } from "./update-comment-link";
import { formatTurnsFromData } from "./format-turns";
@@ -217,6 +225,30 @@ async function run() {
validateEnvironmentVariables();
// On PRs, .claude/ and .mcp.json in the checkout are attacker-controlled.
// Restore them from the base branch before the CLI reads them.
//
// We read pull_request.base.ref from the payload directly because agent
// mode's branchInfo.baseBranch defaults to "main" rather than the PR's
// actual target (agent/index.ts). For issue_comment on a PR the payload
// lacks base.ref, so we fall back to the mode-provided value — tag mode
// fetches it from GraphQL; agent mode on issue_comment is an edge case
// that at worst restores from the wrong trusted branch (still secure).
if (isEntityContext(context) && context.isPR) {
let restoreBase = baseBranch;
if (
isPullRequestEvent(context) ||
isPullRequestReviewEvent(context) ||
isPullRequestReviewCommentEvent(context)
) {
restoreBase = context.payload.pull_request.base.ref;
validateBranchName(restoreBase);
}
if (restoreBase) {
restoreConfigFromBase(restoreBase);
}
}
await setupClaudeCodeSettings(process.env.INPUT_SETTINGS);
await installPlugins(